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 The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was created in 1992 to coordinate global 
governments to protect biological resources. The CBD has three goals: protection of 
biodiversity, achievement of sustainable use of biodiversity and facilitation of equitable 
sharing of the benefits of biological resources. The goal of protecting biological resources 
has remained both controversial and difficult to implement. This study focused more on 
the goal of biodiversity protection. The research was designed to examine how globally 
constructed environmental policies get adapted by national governments and then passed 
down to local levels where actual implementation takes place. Effectiveness of such 
policies depends on the extent of actual implementation at local levels. Therefore, 
compliance was divided and examined at three levels: global, national and local. The 
study then developed various criteria to measure compliance at these levels. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods were used to analyze compliance and 
implementation. The study was guided by three questions broadly examining critical 
vi 
 
factors that most influence the implementation of biodiversity protection policies at the 
global, national and local levels. Findings show that despite an overall biodiversity deficit 
of 0.9 hectares per person, global compliance with the CBD goals is currently at 35%. 
Compliance is lowest at local levels at 14%, it is slightly better at national level at 50%, 
and much better at the international level 64%. Compliance appears higher at both 
national and international levels because compliance here is paper work based and policy 
formulation. If implementation at local levels continues to produce this low compliance, 
overall conservation outcomes can only get worse than what it is at present. There are 
numerous weaknesses and capacity challenges countries are yet to address in their plans.  
In order to increase local level compliance, the study recommends a set of robust policies 
that build local capacity, incentivize local resource owners, and implement biodiversity 
protection programs that are akin to local needs and aspirations.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.0 Introduction     
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) provides a global governance structure 
for coordination of countries to try implementing the global goals of biodiversity 
conservation. The three goals of the CBD include: Protection of biodiversity, 
achievement of sustainable use of biodiversity and facilitation of equitable sharing of the 
benefits of biological resources. The CBD only binds national governments. 
Implementation of these goals requires the binding of national and local institutions, 
individuals, and conservation organizations through legislation, negotiation, planning and 
contracting. It is through actual local level implementation of globally and nationally 
designed policies that meaningful compliance by member states can be attained.  
Although good progress in these goals has been made in a number of areas such 
as national planning structures and information sharing tools, implementation has 
continued to present very difficult challenges arising from low capacities, lack of political 
will, and less than optimal decision making (South Africa National Report, 2009). Key 
aspects of compliance should be comprised of enforcement ability, human and financial 
resources, action oriented planning, strong national policies, supportive national 
legislation and institutional capacity building (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). International 
conservation organizations also need to find better ways to improve national capacities as 
well as build structures that support local implementation using local institutions.   
The way compliance with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) is 
defined and measured determines how countries formulate their compliance policies. 
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Countries select conservation strategies and determine how compliance is defined. 
Currently, compliance requirements range from just signing and ratifying an international 
treaty, sending country representatives to conferences organized by treaty secretariats, 
and submitting reports. Compliance is not an event but a process that should generate 
new actions at different levels that continue to set standards, enable participation, and 
offer knowledge to address implementation challenges.  
Effective protection of biodiversity should require that a clear distinction be made 
between policy formulation and policy implementation. Compliance under the CBD 
needs more than the fear of reputational implications and sanctions to include financial, 
human, and institutional capacities within a country to implement the three goals of the 
CBD. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1984), policy formulation is comprised of 
actions taken by governments to secure objectives whose attainment is difficult. Policy 
implementation involves the interaction between the setting of goals and actions taken to 
achieve them, a situation where each element is dependent on the other (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984). By “other”, here, I mean all stakeholders from local to international 
levels.  
Most compliance theories make assertions that do not explain in-country 
compliance variables such as different levels of influence from state, non-state actors, and 
international treaties. Guzman (2002) argues that without a good understanding of the 
connections between international treaties and how these influence country actions, it 
would be difficult to articulate policy advice with respect to compliance with 
international systems. This is one of the reasons there is poor coordination, insufficient 
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collaboration and cooperation across levels between organizations involved in 
biodiversity protection.  
It was necessary at this stage to look to theories that explain adoption and 
implementation of international treaties to understand how both governments and 
conservation organizations deal with resource management problems. The managerial 
theory was the first to be examined. It emphasizes global coordination and the idea that 
managers should be allowed to freely manage. Consent theory makes an assumption that 
once countries consent to a treaty, they automatically comply. The other theory that was 
used in this initial analysis was the legitimacy theory. It asserts that countries comply 
simply because treaties come into being following legitimate processes. Finally, 
international relations theorists believe that international organizations through 
collaboration can bring all collaborating countries into compliance (Guzman, 2002). 
These theories are each explained in greater details under the literature section in chapter 
two. These theories however fail to explain how globally designed conservation policies 
are adapted and how they get implemented by national governments.   
The purpose of my study was to analyze the extent of influence of the Convention 
on Biodiversity (CBD) on countries and implementation of specific biodiversity 
protection initiatives. In addition, my study also identified approaches that countries use 
for local level implementation. The study took a national and local scale approach to 
compare and contrast policy development with actual national and local level 
implementation. Global, national and local implementation analysis using scientific, 
social, political and economic criterion was made to highlight gaps in policy between 
global, national, and local implementation. 
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1.1 Why the Convention on Biodiversity? 
Using the CBD as a case study was ideal because it is one of the global treaties 
with the highest number of countries that have signed membership now standing at 195 
and with public-private partnerships of more than 250 (CBD, 2010). The present research 
set out to uncover underlying capacity challenges and now presents a novel political, 
socio-economic, policy, structural, institutional, and technological perspectives that 
would improve compliance. This compliance is by individual countries and the nature of 
support provided by conservation organizations.  
Using a mixed methods approach, the current study analyzed and explained key 
theoretical and practical elements that constrain or facilitate both implementation and 
compliance with CBD goals at global, national, and local levels. There are interacting 
external and internal factors that affect the capacity of various countries during 
implementation and the level of compliance with treaties (Weiss & Jacobson, 1998). 
These capacities were identified. The theoretical meaning of compliance is explained as 
well as its practical implications on conservation outcomes. Cross sectors as well as 
vertical political, institutional and organizational relationships were analyzed. An 
analysis of the CBD’s influence and challenges faced by governments on the adoption 
and internalization of global biodiversity initiatives into national and local policies aimed 
at achieving the three goals of the CBD is here presented. 
Compliance at global level is a total of conservation activities from local to 
national levels that take into account specific policy and programmatic collaborative 
actions in areas of implementation. Some of these policy issues include: capacity 
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building, data and information sharing, participation, and development of institutions 
within countries (CBD, 2010, Weiss & Jacobson, 1998). The study of biodiversity 
protection is a broad and complex process requiring analysis from the policy perspective, 
management side, science side, social capital side, and economic side of society. Social 
capital is seen through active and effective participation of stakeholders, not only at 
different levels of government, but also from all sectors that potentially impact upon the 
existence of biological resources. Sufficiently developed conservation social capital 
augments policy, management, science, institutional and economic systems.    
From an economic perspective, there are two categories of local levels. These are 
the communities in rural settings whose livelihood directly depends on agriculture and 
land-based resources for their survival. The other category is a more privileged category 
comprised of businesses that indirectly depend on land-based resources to produce and 
look to the environment to deposit their waste. The business category has more claims 
placed on biological resources than rural communities while, rural communities are 
heavily implicated in their destruction. Looking at the management side, rural 
communities have not been involved much while the business group is not only heavily 
involved, but also wields a lot of influence on decisions that directly affect the 
management of biological resources.  
   Biodiversity protection therefore is a part of a large and more complex science 
and socio-political challenge of the whole society; At the international setting, that aspect 
of the whole society is demonstrated by the number of CBD party membership of 195 
countries, participation by so many international conservation organizations and private-
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private partnerships. Similar broad participation as seen at global settings should be 
replicated nationally and at local levels, especially in rural communities that have direct 
contacts with biological resources.  
1.1.1 The definition of biodiversity 
Biodiversity, also known simply as biological resources, is the number and 
variability of all living organisms (plants, animals, fungi and bacteria). Biodiversity 
conservation in the context of the CBD extends beyond just species extinction to include 
conservation of natural habitats, ecosystems, and genetic materials (OECD, 1994). 
Biodiversity can therefore be defined as "the variability among living organisms from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems" (CBD, 2002).  Biodiversity supports life on earth 
and is essential in the provision of environmental services like freshwater, fuel, carbon 
storage and marine life. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
When the 2010 biodiversity protection target of beginning to reduce biodiversity 
degradation at global, regional and national settings was not met by countries, the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) put out a statement. This statement said that 
current conservation efforts and system are not adequate to meet biodiversity protection 
challenges and also meet economic development needs of the society (Koetz et al. 2011). 
Key hindrances identified in the UNEP statement were lack of adequate financing, 
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incoherence amongst management institutions, weak linkages between science and 
policy, low capacity at national level to implement policies, and a significant disconnect 
between various management and consumption sectors (Koetz et al. 2011).  At local 
levels in most countries, there exists chronic shortage of trained conservation 
professionals; there is no sufficient political support to biodiversity protection policies 
and low capacity agencies and conservation institutions.  
Although the international community, global conservation organizations, and 
national governments have continued to developed programs and national laws that 
govern biodiversity protection, the diversity and quality of biological resources has been 
declining (CBD, 2010). As of 2006, global biological resources consumption was 
estimated to exceed the earth’s capacity by 40% (Global Footprint Network, 2010).  
Partly the problem is that current planning methodologies do not incorporate costs 
beyond administrative restrictions and enforcement of conservation regulations (Naidoo 
et al. 2006). All levels of biodiversity protection and planning come with different types 
of costs ranging from specific interventions to protect areas or species to foregone 
economic opportunities. These goals must be planned for and compensated, but most 
national plans do not contain this level of detailed initiatives. Some studies rightfully 
argue that the costs of biodiversity conservation are paid by local communities who in 
most cases benefit the least from biological resources (Adams et al. 2004).  
It is therefore clear that the problem is partly related to the lack of effective 
engagement of local communities and private sector institutions where actual 
implementation takes place. Inability to engage with local settings makes it difficult to 
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bring about change to local perceptions so as to create an understanding of the value of 
protecting biodiversity (Myeong & Choi, 2010).  Involvement of local institutions and 
communities in the design and program implementation is only possible if people at local 
levels know what the government and conservation experts are doing and when their 
input is sought after.  
According to the Global Outlook Biodiversity Outlook (2010), biological diversity 
in the world is being lost at an unprecedented rate. The loss is largely a result of habitat 
destruction from land use changes that include overconsumption of natural resources, 
pollution of the environment, climate change, invasive alien species and development 
(CBD, 2010). Continued degradation of biodiversity reveals non-compliance with the 
CBD goals. Various theories that explain compliance fall short of ideas how countries 
comply with international treaties (Guzman, 2002).  
Reducing consumption, changing lifestyles and the current business operate to 
bring about sustainable use and reduce overexploitation of biodiversity comes with 
opportunity costs. Communities and businesses will not undertake protection of 
biodiversity if this comes with high opportunity costs. Effects of biodiversity degradation 
are viewed as distant issues in nature whereby a local loss in forest resources due to 
agricultural expansion or overexploitation to provide timber do not manifest themselves 
to communities. The manifestations of such effects are likely to be felt and paid for by 
future generations. There are two types of opportunity costs, opportunity costs of current 
biodiversity consumption against the externality effects on future generations, and 
opportunity costs of sustainable use.  
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Table 1: The status of biological resources globally as of 2008 
 
Country/region 
Populatio
n 
(millions) 
Total 
Consumed 
(Ha/person) 
Total 
biological 
capacity 
(Ha/person) 
Biocapacity 
Deficit/Surplus 
(Ha/person) 
World 6739.61 2.70 1.78 -0.92 
     
High-income countries 1036.98 5.60 3.05 -2.54 
Middle-income 
countries 4394.09 1.92 1.72 -0.20 
Low-income countries 1297.55 1.14 1.14 0.00 
Africa 938.45 1.40 1.50 0.10 
Middle East/Central 
Asia 382.65 2.45 0.92 -1.53 
Asia-Pacific 3725.16 1.63 0.86 -0.78 
South America 390.13 2.70 7.38 4.68 
Central 
America/Caribbean 66.77 1.68 0.97 -0.71 
North America 448.94 6.17 4.08 -2.09 
EU 495.12 4.71 2.25 -2.47 
Other Europe 238.09 4.00 4.87 0.87 
Notes  
Ecological Footprint measured in hectares per person 
Biocapacity measured in hectares per person 
Total Footprint the consumption of resources from: Cropland + Grazing lands + Forest lands +Fishing + 
Built-up areas 
Biological capacity = Cropland + Grazing lands + Forest lands +Fishing + Built-up areas        
 
Source: Global Footprint Network (2008) 
 
Table 1 above shows that as of 2008, at the world level, there were about 6.7 
billion people. Total global consumption of biological resources stood at an equivalent of 
2.70 hectares per person. The total global biological capacity of the planet was 1.78 
hectares per person. This level of biological capacity meant that globally, there was an 
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over-consumption of biological resources going into a deficit by an equivalent of 0.92 
hectares per person. High income countries were home to about one billion people with 
biodiversity consumption of negative 2.54 per hectare per person. Middle income 
countries had about 4.4 billion people with a deficit in biodiversity of negative 0.20 
hectares per person. As for low income countries, total population at 2008 was 1.3 billion 
and had even levels of use and supply of biological resources at 1.14 hectares per person.. 
Continued overexploitation of biological resources beyond the level where the 
Earth is able to regenerate brings about an ecological deficit. Biodiversity deficits leads to 
higher accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, more wastes beyond the 
level the Earth can absorb and could finally lead to the collapse of the ecosystems 
(Global Footprint Network, 2013). Biological resources deficits should be part of the 
equation in measuring compliance.  
1.3 Background of the study 
First of all, there is need for greater understanding that biodiversity conservation 
by countries is not an inconvenient truth to be resisted. Biodiversity is a foundation of 
economic development, a life support resource, provides for political and social stability 
and therefore all countries must take a bold collective action to protect it (Global 
Footprint Network, 2010).  The Global Footprint Network (2009) report responding to 
the Stiglitz Commission argues that we are living in a time when the limiting factor is no 
longer our factories’ capacity to produce, but the biosphere’s capacity to provide the 
ecological services needed for economic development. Therefore, rather than get 
entangled in ideological debates and ignore the real problems that come with 
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overexploitation of biodiversity, countries need empirical facts to facilitate in building 
political consensus to support policies that guide economies to operate within the Earth’s 
ecological limits (Global Footprint Network, 2010). This study was designed to provide 
discussions to these empirical facts.   
Tracking of distinct policies implementation as well as in combination helps in 
the understanding of biodiversity degradation drivers and where these effects would most 
be felt. One example is the push toward the use of biofuels such as eternal as an 
alternative to fossil fuels for purposes of reducing carbon emissions to the atmosphere. 
The final outcome according to the Global Footprint Network calculations represents a 
shift and a net increase of environmental pressure. The reduction on carbon emissions 
comes with an increase in demand on forest or croplands that in the final analysis reduce 
the quantity and quality of biological resources.   
Founded in 1992, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has made it easy for 
countries, other partner organizations, and local institutions to learn from one another. 
There is a clear enabling environment and so many organizations are playing critical 
roles in collaboration with both government and with each other in biodiversity 
protection. One challenge currently facing most governments is that rather than having 
local institutions at local level implementing, many international organizations are doing 
virtually all conservation work at local levels. International organizations represent both 
the government and local institutions in training local people, sharing knowledge, and 
doing actual biodiversity protection programs.  
Although these organizations are making very important contributions, there are 
many local problems they cannot solve and local institutions are supposed to step in. 
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Efforts at building effective and innovative local institutions would be sustained and 
continued if local expertise, knowledge, and buy-in is secured. Efforts to strengthen local 
institutions should include initiatives to empower all citizens at local settings. One point 
of departure is the private sector businesses who wield a lot of influence on individual 
countries policy development usually, toward their profit motives (Coglianese & Nash, 
2004).  
National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) provide a roadmap for 
implementation of the CBD goals. Guided by NBSAPs, individual governments have 
over the years developed various national and local initiatives that help in the 
implementation and compliance with CBD goals. The international community in 2002 
met and encouraged all parties to the Convention on Biodiversity to start drawing 
national protection plans. It was expected that as soon as governments ratified the 
convention on biodiversity and began to draw national plans, implementation of the CBD 
goals and progress towards beginning to reverse biodiversity degradation globally will be 
realized (CBD, 2010). National governments continue to face implementation challenges 
and movement toward compliance has been a very slow process.   
1.4 Objectives of the study 
National biodiversity conservation initiatives need to secure institutional as well 
as society’s confidence in the justification of conservation efforts. Biodiversity 
conservation is undertaken to ensure continued existence and adequate flow of biological 
benefits. A framework for collaboration by parties to the CBD and various partnerships is 
needed for better outcomes; information and data sharing, and capacity building to 
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facilitate implementation of CBD goals (Stephens et al., 2002).  The broad objective of 
this study was to analyze and explain how globally designed biodiversity conservation 
policies get adapted by national governments and are finally passed to local levels for 
actual implementation.  
Specifically, the study has tried to:  
i. Uncover critical policy, administrative, economic and political factors 
affecting the implementation and compliance of international treaties 
ii. Describe how national and local environmental policies and priorities evolve 
and adapt under international environmental treaties. 
iii. Estimate opportunity costs of biodiversity protection in local rural settings as 
well as in the private sector and industry settings 
iv. Examine specific combinations of theory, policy interventions, and national-
local regulatory mechanisms that can move countries towards greater 
compliance. 
Biodiversity protection is the responsibility of governments first. It is at this level 
where programs are created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and conditions 
under which they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). But, the reality is that governments 
have not taken the leadership. Critical structures at the national level needed for 
coordination are still missing. Very few governments have built an equivalent of Clearing 
House Mechanisms (CHMs). Most governments are also not publishing their own data. It 
is from this lack of data at both national and local levels that questions for this research 
began to emerge. Therefore, there a need to examine different decision points and how 
information is shared between sectors, agencies and governments. When information and 
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data gaps persist, effective policy implementation suffers, and costs of building 
consensus goes up (Esty & Ivanova, 2004). 
This study addresses the following key questions:  
1. What are the critical policy, administrative, economic and political factors that 
influence the implementation and compliance of international treaties at both 
national and local levels? 
2. How do national and local environmental policies and priorities evolve and adapt 
under international environmental treaties?  
What are the opportunity costs of compliance with all goals of the CBD? 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study was about extending compliance requirements from the global setting 
beyond the national level to local levels where actual policy implementation is done. This 
study was not about whether countries comply or not with international treaties, but 
rather, when they comply, how they meet treaty requirements and implement specified 
goals, and the extent that compliance outcomes meet the biological thresholds of the 
resource in question. 
This present study is significant in many different ways:  
 There is no literature that has documented the adoption stages that international 
treaties go through from international conferences where agreements are made to 
villages and private enterprises that implement these global agreements. This 
research was designed to fill this gap. 
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 For effective analysis and compliance outcomes, this study divided compliance 
into three distinct stages: compliance on paper at global level, compliance as a 
policy process at the national level, and compliance as an act of actual 
implementation at local levels. The study analyzed compliance based on these 
three stages to see exactly what needs to happen and how each stage is developed 
to drive compliance to higher levels.   
 Compliance should take into account the range of capacities of national 
governments, institutions, communities and the status of biological resources 
(Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Weiss & Jacobson, 1998). I therefore  assert 
that in addition to other measures of compliance such the signing of a treaty by a 
country, submitting reports and creating institutions, the degree of understanding 
and knowing the extent to which every country is able to meet the demand for 
biological resources, without out-stripping its supply, is a tangible platform to 
measure compliance. This can about through effective mobilization of all 
stakeholders at both national and local levels.  
 At both national and local levels, there has to be an understanding of the 
compliance threshold and which components of implementation each sector at 
different levels in society should put into place so as to comply. The earth’s 
regenerative capacity provides for the ecological threshold which if exceeded, the 
quality of life on earth begins to get compromised (Borucke et al. 2013). 
Compliance with CBD goals should take into account the fact that the planet has 
ecological boundaries within which consumption of natural resources and 
development has to be secured (Borucke et al. 2013; Rockström et al. 2009). 
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Purposely, I have tried to connect compliance at different levels of policy 
environments and local implementation. I also examined institutional, political, structural 
and economic aspects of the CBD beyond national levels to include its causal effects on 
local institutions. How conservation organizations work with both government and 
communities and the challenges that come with such relationships was analyzed. 
Uncovering various national and local capacities, strengths and weaknesses that affect 
most of the compliance theories is critical for effective decision making.    
Linking local decision making and implementation challenges to global policy 
commitments requires a comprehensive examination of capacities; political, and socio-
economic priorities within countries. Although there are many studies that have examined 
global compliance challenges with international treaties (Jacobson & Weiss, 2010; 
Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Guzman, 2002; Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995; Chayes 
et al., 1998), my study examines compliance at three levels: Global compliance, national 
compliance and local compliance. Central to overall compliance is what countries are 
doing to comply with global treaties, what local communities and institutions are doing at 
local levels to facilitate compliance, and how global conservation initiatives are taken to 
local settings where actual policy implementation takes place.  My study has generated 
valuable grass-roots perspectives on compliance, implementation, institutional capacities 
and relationships at the national and local levels.   
Non-compliance with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity can best be 
explained by the level of support given and sanctions placed on individuals, communities 
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and institutions at local levels within countries. Furthermore, compliance with CBD goals 
also depends on the nature and strength of cooperation between various stakeholders.  
Theories that try to explain why countries comply with international treaties make 
mere assertions that either lack specific structures or stop short of explaining why and 
how compliance is attained (Guzman, 2002). It is not through internalization of 
international treaty norms that national institutions move toward more compliance as 
asserted by Koh (1996), but through improvement of capacities of both human and 
national bureaucracies (Guzman 2002; Wilshusen et al. 2002)). I demonstrate that low 
capacities, weak policies and institutions in society can be strengthened and improved 
through capacity building, cooperation with more established organizations, through 
information sharing and human resources training.  
Using systems theory, the present study examined the strength of working 
relations, the extent that problems are shared between government and conservation 
organizations and the nature of support that exist between governments and conservation 
organizations.   The use of Information Technology (IT) facilitates not just information 
sharing, but also experiences, and resources. The CBD is using information technology to 
share reports, data training and conservation information with parties and partner 
organizations. Countries are encouraged to develop national information sharing tools. 
Analysis of factors that facilitate governments to create better and more effective tools 
for information sharing across all institutions so that local level institutions are 
constructively involved in the implementation, data collection and sharing of biodiversity 
information nationally was done.  
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1.6 Interface between policy and implementation 
Although governments play a significant role, science has been the guiding policy 
framework for biodiversity protection and continues to play a significant role in decision 
making. With the ever rising conservation constraints, there is an increasing need to 
move toward incorporating the scientific framework with governance and political policy 
considerations. Finding ways in which various stakeholders cooperate will help to pool 
more resources to adequately address biodiversity conservation challenges that have 
persisted through the last four decades.  The present study has established institutional 
linkages based on both science and governance approaches to explain global biodiversity 
protection and national public policies.  Explaining public policies to the public is 
necessary for the awareness raising of the social and political constraints with regard to 
conservation at local levels. Public policy is based upon government action in providing 
guidelines to carry out various government functions that provide for public goods to 
society (Martin, 2003). My study has put together factors that facilitate understanding of 
how governments adopt global policies and facilitate their implementation at local levels.   
At the national level, critical decisions are made, plans are drawn and programs 
get created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and conditions under which 
they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). Notably, under agenda 21, more detailed 
guidelines and policy recommendation are established, such as development of national 
strategies, plans and process for effective implementation. The at implementation levels 
is establishing clear linkages between all sectors and institutional levels.  
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Linking local decision making and implementation challenges to global policy  
will facilitate greater understanding between government, international organizations and 
local level institutions. This understanding will help in the setting of realistic and 
achievable goals that take into account local needs and global priorities (Gordon et al. 
2005). When governments are involved, political institutions play a central role in either 
aiding or constraining implementation of any law or plan. According to Gordon et al. 
(2005), global conservation strategies concern themselves with “where” to protect rather 
than “how” to protect biodiversity. In doing so, the scientific criteria are used in decision 
making and not the broader social, economic and political considerations that are 
sensitive to local needs. The study has tried to find ways to make biodiversity protection 
more politically appealing.    
1.7 Understanding compliance as a system 
Understanding of compliance in totality requires a systems theory approach. A 
systems theory is a broad framework that allows different agencies and organizations to 
work as a collective whole for an overall mission. A system is a combination of many 
different parts that are meant to work together in order to achieve a specific goal. There 
are interacting external and internal factors that affect the capacity of various countries 
during policy formulation and implementation to determine the level of compliance with 
treaties (Jacbson & Weiss, 2010). An analysis of the CBD’s influence and challenges 
faced by governments on the adoption and internalization of global initiatives helps to see 
how the three goals of the CBD are being met.  
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Compliance at the global level is a collection of locally and nationally generated 
systems of policy. Also, compliance entails programmatic collaborative actions cutting 
across implementation, capacity building, information sharing, participation, and 
development of institutions within countries (CBD, 2010, Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). 
Compliance is a broad and complex process requiring analysis of actions from the 
various policy perspective, management, scientific understanding, social capital 
development and economic considerations of society.  
Social capital is seen through the active and effective participation of stakeholders 
not only at different levels of government, but also from all sectors that potentially 
impact upon the existence of biological resources (Pretty & Smith, 2003). Sufficiently 
developed conservation social capital augments policy, management, science, 
institutional and economic systems (Ostrom, 2010). From an economic perspective, there 
are two categories of compliance. These are the communities in rural settings whose 
livelihood directly depends on agriculture and land-based resources for their survival. 
The other category is a more privileged category comprised of businesses that indirectly 
depend on land-based resources to produce and look to the environment to deposit their 
waste. The business category has more claims placed on biological resources than rural 
communities while rural communities are heavily implicated in their destruction (Pretty 
and Smith, 2003). Looking at compliance from the management lens, rural communities 
have not been involved much while business groups are not only heavily involved but 
also wield a great deal of influence on decisions that directly affect the management of 
biological resources.  
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Globally, compliance means the extent to which states participate and sign onto 
the CBD goals (Weiss & Jaconson, 2010). Domestically, compliance depends on a wide 
range of institutional, political and socio-economic mechanisms cutting across many 
sectors and governance levels within countries (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Compliance 
means more than just signing a treaty by government if the goals of the CBD are to be 
met. Various theories used to explain compliance do not agree on what it would take for 
governments to comply (Guzman, 2002; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Most studies do not 
connect compliance with implementation. Other studies examine how reputation and use 
of various incentives facilitate compliance but these too do not analyze or take into 
consideration local levels.  
Most institutions and individuals involved with biodiversity management within 
countries seek compliance only if it aligns with their own interests (Rees, 2003). 
Moreover, they also lack technical capacities and policy conceptualization skills in 
biological resources management (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). Prior research has found 
that strong parliamentary and local legislation enables the development of sound 
organizational ethics where terms of the treaty are given priority (Oliver, 1991). Political 
stability as a sign of strength of parliamentary systems and legislative developments is 
questionable in a lot of countries.  
   Compliance therefore needs to be seen as a large and more complex system of 
science and socio-political challenges for the whole society. In the international setting, 
all governments should be willing not just to participate but also to implement the 
agreement at the national level. The global broad participation must be seen to be 
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replicated within countries by having all sectors and institutions participating in 
biodiversity protection. 
1.8 Defining compliance elements 
ON the basis of the current global status of biodiversity, investments and efforts 
all countries have put into conservation, the time to re-evaluate what to consider when 
defining compliance is now. Compliance can be viewed as performance-based 
measurement of implementation, a concept often used in areas of energy or other systems 
of engineering (Eisenhower, 2014).  Existing efforts and investment are either not taking 
all countries fast and far enough or there are important compliance elements missing 
from the equation. According to the Global Footprint Network (2010), the current rate of 
natural resources consumption have moved the world much closer to an era of peak 
energy, climate change, food shortages, biodiversity loss and freshwater stress. An 
“overshoot” situation where people are using more resources than the earth can support is 
now being experienced and getting worse. For instance, most land conversion in tropical 
regions (where most of biodiversity lives) is under pressure from consumers living 
outside the tropics. Lands allocated to forests are diminishing while the quality of soils is 
being degraded much faster to feed the ever rising global population. A biodiversity 
tragedy is not far from happening, because regardless of how successful the current 
conservation programs get, outcomes will never replicate the original land quality.  
It is, therefore, critical that more tangible measurement variables be included as 
requirements in measuring how countries comply with all the goals of the CBD. 
Countries need to be informed of their national footprint, their biological capacity and 
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level of consumption in relation to available national resources. Countries as well as 
conservation organizations need to know how much needs to do, and where to 
concentrate more conservation efforts.     
Inclusion of more measures in the definition of what is required for countries to 
comply at this time when the trend is the rising demand and dwindling supply of 
biological resources is critical. For countries that know that they are in an ecological 
deficit, one goal toward compliance is to develop tangible initiatives to get out of the 
ecological deficit. So as not to ignore overexploitation locally, countries should be 
required to compare the demand on biodiversity with supply and report the same to the 
CBD secretariat. 
1.8.1 Role of international treaties 
Environmental treaties provide structures for governments to build commitments 
and negotiate for consensus on public interest management. Treaties, however, do not go 
into specific actions that sanction what and how countries comply. When governments 
enter into a treaty, they are simply expected to comply with the commitments they have 
made to meet the terms of the treaty (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; Kline & Raustailia, 2000).  
Treaties are negotiated through diplomatic processes to build political consensus that 
often imposes no concrete obligation, participation is voluntary, and levels of 
commitments by governments are self-monitored. There is no penalty for non-
compliance. 
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Individual government compliance is supported through a variety of ways that 
include international conferences, information sharing tools using the internet and 
working in partnerships with international non-governmental conservation organizations. 
Globally, compliance means the extent to which states participate and sign onto 
the CBD (Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Domestically, compliance depends on a wide range 
of institutional, political and socio-economic mechanisms cutting across many sectors 
and governance levels within countries (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Compliance means 
more than just signing a treaty by government if the goals of the CBD are to be met. 
Various theories used to explain compliance do not agree on what it would take 
governments to comply (Guzman, 2002; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010). Most studies do not 
connect compliance with implementation. Other studies examine how reputation and use 
of various incentives facilitate states compliance but these too do not go down to local 
levels where actual implementation takes place.    
Biodiversity conservation can be very abstract in the sense that it is difficult to 
situate in real life situations and within institutional policies. The abstract characteristic 
coupled with lack of understanding and inability to conceptualize policy process requires 
creates a disconnection between policy and implementation. Effective information 
sharing, therefore, human and institutional capacity building, and development of 
governance structures across national and local settings is needed. Some studies argue 
that even when the benefits and sustainable use of biological resources may be positive, 
most sectors are reluctant to justify spending time and effort unless they are either 
sanctioned by law and or by the society to get involved (Coglianese & Nash, 2002). 
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Most institutions, for profit organizations and individuals within countries comply 
with biodiversity protection goals only when it aligns with their own interests (Rees, 
2003). Moreover, most also lack technical capacities and policy conceptualization skills 
in biological resources management (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). Although strong 
parliamentary and legislative systems may facilitate the development of sound 
organizational ethics where terms of the treaty are given priority (Oliver, 1979), weak 
local and national have remained barriers to effective implementation. In addition, 
political instability and parliamentary systems in most countries account much of the 
conservation problems.   
1.9 Implementation of CBD goals 
Science has been the guiding policy framework for biodiversity protection and 
continues to play significant role in decision making. There is an increasing tendency 
now to move toward incorporating the scientific framework with governance so as to 
adequately address the conservation challenges that have persisted throughout the last 
four decades. Governments, private institutions and international conservations 
organizations have begun to play critical roles in biodiversity conservation.  
Guided by the global strategic plan, individual governments began in 2002 to 
draw their own National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) upon which local 
initiatives and implementation of conservation policies and actions were supposed to be 
clearly outlined. However, NBSAPs in most countries remain simply a mere bundle of 
declaration of intentions rather than commitments to specific actions (Harrop & Ptichard, 
2011). All member countries to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) now have 
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NBSAPs but most do not have the capacity nor clear commitments and strategies on how 
to implement specific actions on a sufficient scale to meet all the CBD goals. 
Some of the challenges start with the global approach because the CBD urges 
countries rather than requiring parties to fulfill specific implementation obligations 
(CBD, 2010). Effective implementation of CBD goals depends on how governments 
sanction NBSAPs to lower level structures and communities. As governments try to 
confront biodiversity protection challenges, they need good analysis of both the macro 
and micro complex relevant factors that influence the choices that people make at 
different levels in society and within government. This kind of capacity is lacking within 
many government institutions.  
National plans developed by individual countries fail to match the goals outlined 
by the CBD with the interests of all groups in government and the communities (Tang et 
al., 2009). National plans are supposed to provide feasible bottom-up means to establish 
concrete strategic goals, identify biodiversity degradation drivers and establish 
mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, measuring trends, and reporting performance 
(Tang et al., 2010) but stakeholder participation remains very narrow and highly skewed 
to those with different interests (Sajor, 2009). This study tries to reconcile NBSAPs on 
paper with the on the ground realities both nationally and at the local level.  
How governments take NBSAPs to lower level structures and communities where 
implementation takes place is extremely challenging. Most people involved within 
countries and local settings not only look after their own economic interests but also lack 
technical skills, policy conceptualization, training and understanding on how to 
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implement the goals of international treaties (Kline & Raustiala, 2000). The 
mainstreaming of biodiversity protection initiatives into national and local day-to-day 
issues so that they are seen as beneficial concrete actions and not costly abstract ideas 
does not seem to be well articulated to lower level institutions and structures within 
countries. 
1.9.1 Local level implementation 
Local policy implementation is not just about biodiversity conservation in itself. 
There needs to be a clear understanding of how biodiversity conservation policies impact 
upon community needs, business interests, poverty and local economic development 
priorities. According to Pressman & Wildavsky (1984) out of one goal – to protect 
biodiversity, multiple goals start to emerge requiring multiple decision paths. This 
multiplicity of decision paths requires multiple decision makers who may have different 
priorities and may not care about outcomes from other decision paths (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984).  
1.9.2 Adaption of local and national policies to international treaties 
The challenge to biodiversity protection is the inability to find ways which 
policies can be widely adopted and effectively implemented at all levels in society. 
Habitats that host biological resources have continued to lose out to the rising human 
population and the needs of economic development (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Rands et al. 
2010). Biodiversity continues to be depleted at an increasing rate (CBD, 2006). Towards 
the end of the 1990s, habitat reserved for biodiversity stood at 5 percent and for humans 
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at 95 percent (Terborg, 1999). Terborg (1999) calls for radical changes in conservation 
governance policies in all countries to avert total destruction of biological resources. 
Consumption of biological resources has persistently superseded conservation efforts 
(Global Footprint Network, 2010). The ongoing development of biodiversity protection 
policies and efforts put into various international and national institutions will be futile if 
in the long-run these are not widely adopted, are not be effective and functioning. 
Advancement in democratic international institutional instruments and use of 
information technology (IT) has created awareness and global cooperation in biodiversity 
management. Governments that are parties have taken up the big role of implementing 
the goals of these treaties to protect biodiversity within their borders. The convention on 
biological diversity (CBD) also known as the Biodiversity Convention is an international 
legally binding treaty such that countries that join it are required to implement its 
provisions. 
1.10 Global – National – Local conservation model  
At the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying. 
Globally, many treaties are in a sense drafted to generate policy rather than as a source of 
obligations (Harrop & Pritchard, 2011). Actual implementation of treaty goals locally 
calls for governments to provide capacity, direction to all stakeholders and develop a fair 
framework for conservation and equitable distribution of benefits of biological resources 
in more practical ways. Because of perceived immediate costs of biodiversity protection 
many governments are not willing to build environmentally sound protection structures 
for distant biological resources (Harrop & Pritchard, 2011).    
29 
 
Any plan, therefore, that promotes biodiversity protection at local levels should be 
developed with the main objective of changing people’s perceptions. This includes 
improving local knowledge, developing clear sanctions and penalties, and also creating 
specific institutions to manage biological resources (Alexander, 2005). This calls for 
biodiversity protection to be pursued simultaneously at three levels; global, 
national/country and local levels. It is the local level implementation strategies that add to 
national level success/failure and finally the global status and outlook of biological 
resources. It is in the local setting that government regulations/laws that govern the 
society are most felt. Also it is in these settings where frameworks for political 
relationships are developed and where specific policies and practices are implemented.  
Effective biodiversity protection initiative and planning must be based on constant 
interplay between theory and practice and thus subject to constant modification as new 
information is acquired. Issues that arise out of putting together theory and practice 
should be solved collaborative between government institutions across all levels and 
various organizations as well as communities and private sector institutions.   
Examination and analysis of country plans, progress reports, analysis of national 
and local institutional developments, capacity building in the form of information 
technology, human resources training to build epistemic communities, and specific 
connections from the CBD to governments to local levels.  
Measurement of implementation and compliance was tried by Jacobson & Weiss 
(2010) but was not very clear. My study has taken the issue of measurement seriously and 
wants to examine the relationship between national governments and local institutions. 
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The next chapter examines theoretical constructs that speak to institutional 
collaboration and international relations. A review of various literature on compliance 
with international treaties and implementation in general was done. Some other literature 
on the goals of the CBD and implementation of various actions to protect biodiversity 
(Jacobson & Weiss, 1998), show strong indications that this is something that countries 
would want to do. There are however implementation and compliance problems of 
varying magnitudes in different countries (Wilshusen et al., 2002). Successful 
implementation of all goals of the CBD and achievement of greater compliance rests on 
collective action by all parties to the CBD, its partnerships and many other sectors.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 is a literature review on compliance and implementation of the 
Convention on Biodiversity. This review of literature was done in the context of human 
needs, the laws that govern human society and the forces inherent in human nature 
(Thompson & Morgenthau, 1948). Specifically, the chapter examined the literature on 
international and national politics, policy formulation, local leadership, institutional 
cooperation, and economics of biological resources, the scientific explanations and social 
capital. The study examined international relations literature from the perspective of 
global, national and local policy environments and institutional evolution. The literature 
reviewed thus far provided a good foundation for the methods chapter.  
2.1 Management of biological resources 
Biodiversity management falls under multiple governing authorities and 
jurisdictions, therefore, are most likely to be under-produced if mechanisms meant to 
promote and reinforce cooperation are missing (Grunberg & Stern, 1999; Esty & 
Ivanova, 2002). At regional levels, government-to-government cooperation is required 
for successful implementation of biodiversity protection policies. At national levels, 
devolved authority and decision making to local levels so as to encourage popular 
participation and capacity building for communities is required to strengthen the 
implementation of the goals, therefore, leading to higher compliance (Basurto, 2008).  
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The underlying conceptual framework of biodiversity overexploitation is their 
public good nature. Public goods are available for enjoyment for free by the society and 
are difficult to confine to a single individual or group and are non-rivalry in consumption 
(Esty & Ivanova, 2002). Management of environmental public resources requires strong 
public policy solutions that have to be tailored to meet social equity, ecological 
effectiveness, political feasibility, and economic efficiency (TEEB, 2009). Policy making 
and program implementation for public goods such as the management of biological 
resources should not be based on narrow self-interests but collective action by all 
stakeholders cooperatively (Esty & Ivanova, 2002; Ostrom, 1990). 
The influence of the Convention on Biodiversity on government policy as well as 
at local level implementation and what types of institutions get created deserves a deeper 
analysis. This because over the last two decades, the goals of biodiversity protection have 
not been met, implementation has not been sufficient and compliance levels have 
remained below expectations. Borrowing from the theory of cross-scale linkages, this 
study examined the nature of relationships that has evolved at local, national and 
international levels. Specific variables looked into in these linkages were financial 
support linkages, capacity building linkages, technological and management linkages 
(Igoe & Kelsall, 2005). These linkages take various forms such as formal or informal 
rules of interaction between international organizations and local level institutions to 
define the nature and type of support, information sharing and transfer of intellectual 
expertise (Basurto, 2008). 
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Local implementation takes two distinct approaches; there is the political process 
and the administrative process (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). The political process 
takes the form of authority and power that is given to agencies created to implement 
policies. Administrative process speaks to the capacity of these conservation agencies and 
community institutions in management, financial and human resources (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984). A key constraint to implementation is that conservation of biological 
resources continues to be seen as a cost to society. Since biodiversity protection is a 
multi-layered and multi-sector resource of interest, explaining implementation, therefore, 
requires theories that can bring order and meaning to those that are tasked with 
implementation as well as to those that would be impacted most. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
Although there are more than 50,000 international treaties globally today covering 
most issues across the society, the general lack of central enforcement ability and the 
voluntary nature of their requirements make them rather ineffective in shaping states 
behavior (Hathaway, 2005).  Hathaway (2005) places the power of international treaties 
at the crossroads of when treaties actually influence states behavior and when they do 
not. Understanding the politics that influences governments’ decision to commit and to 
comply helps to see the extent that treaties influence countries (Hathaway, 2005).   
Examining most existing theories from the lens of biodiversity protection, they do 
not sufficiently explain compliance with the convention on biodiversity (CBD) goals. At 
the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying. Locally, 
compliance has to mean much more than just ratification of a treaty and should go 
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beyond policy making. Although the Convention on Biodiversity merely urges member 
states rather than requiring them to fulfill its goals, national initiatives should commit 
countries to more stringent obligations for higher compliance if biodiversity protection 
targets have to be met in the future.  
Wilshusen et al. (2002) argues that biodiversity protection should stop being 
placed secondary to other priorities by governments and instead focus on strict 
enforcement of conservation laws. Compliance with the CBD should call for much more 
than just state reputations and sanctions. Compliance with the CBD requires much than 
political commitments. Countries must have financial capacity, human resources, strong 
institutions and willingness of the citizenry to change their lifestyles and consumption.   
Conservation of biodiversity presents a very long and broad chain of causality 
across sectors at different levels globally (Jasanoff, 1998; Guzman, 2014). Causality 
comes with numerous decision points as different levels present their aspirations and 
interests to each other (Wang, 2011). Individuals and institutions tasked with the 
responsibility of biodiversity protection find themselves having to answer to multiple 
principals such government, communities, private sector institutions and their own 
employers creating multiple decision points. Conservationists are in effect, required to be 
able to balance conflicting interests and expectations of their many principals. This 
makes coordination difficult and weakens enforcement of regulations.      
Going forward, the key questions to ask are: (1) How much compliance and what 
type of compliance is expected at every decision point? (2) To what extent are the means 
matched with the ends?  This kind of compliance is better explained using the managerial 
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theory rather than enforcement, sanctions and reputational costs. Managerial theory is 
based on a cooperative problem-solving model (Chayes & Chayes, 1993) and therefore 
can serve the CBD goals better. The managerial theory allows more freedom for 
managers to manage and has given rise to the popular saying “managing for results” 
(Boston et al. 1996). A cooperative problem-solving approach to decision making allows 
parties to identify all their strategies both strong and weak. The weak strategies get 
supported without compromising their strong strategies.  
Other leading theories that have contributed to explanations on compliance are: 
international relations theories, legitimacy theory, consent-based theory and institutional 
theory. International relations theories concern themselves more with inter-state relations 
and less on what actually takes place within states (Guzman, 2002). Protection and 
management of biodiversity takes place inside states so this does not really help much 
going forward in this research. Consent-based theories hold that states are not subject to 
any external obligations which they have not consented to (Guzman, 2014).  However, 
for conservation of biodiversity, consent to comply is not enough. Commitment to the 
goals of the CBD requires both commitment and capacity to carry through to completion 
specific implementation obligations.  
According to Guzman (2002), the legitimacy and consent-based theories make 
assertions that countries obey international treaties either because they have consented to 
those treaties or because treaties come into being through legitimate processes. Where 
there is determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence, it is assumed that 
there is a strong tendency toward high compliance. Determinacy means clarity of rules, 
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symbolic validation is the presence of procedural practices, coherence is the connection 
between rational principles and the rules, and adherence is the connection between the 
rule and those secondary rules used to interpret and apply primary rules (Guzman, 2014). 
Institutional theory views countries as primary international actors and uses cooperation 
to explain how institutions within countries can move countries toward greater 
compliance by reducing costs of verification in international treaty commitments (Koh, 
1997). Institutional theory goes deeper to explain how individuals, interest-groups and 
how private actors impact upon national decisions.   
The problem with these theories is that they cannot explain the acceptable level of 
compliance and what it would take to attain that level. According to Guzman (2014), 
consent by a country is in itself an incentive to comply. At the same time, legitimacy of a 
treaty does not give capacity to countries to comply.  The legitimacy theory fails to 
explain why nations should actually obey a legitimate treaty.      
  Conservation of biological resources cannot be left to governments alone. 
According to Koh (1997), there exist non-state actors that share this responsibility as 
explained by the transactions theory. This theory explains how public and private sector 
organizations interact to internalize international treaties, interpret rules and enforce 
them. This theory goes beyond treating governments as unitary actors to also bring in all 
other stakeholders into the decision making ring. These are classified as transactional 
actors whose role is to facilitate interactions and help to develop patterns of behavior, and 
norms that can go into supporting compliance. Actual decisions at national level to 
comply or not are heavily influenced from domestic institutions (Guzman, 2014).  
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However, compliance with environmental treaties requires more than participation of 
local institutions and stakeholders. It requires changes in perception, lifestyles, 
conservation skills, training and information sharing tools.  
Going forward, this study has used game theory and living systems theory to 
model compliance and implementation of biodiversity protection goals.  
2.2.1 Game theory 
  Conservation of biodiversity has always been implemented through negotiations 
by interested parties within the confinements of normative social goals such as access to 
use of resources to support basic needs, poverty alleviation, economic wellbeing among 
many other priorities (Frank & Sarkar, 2010). Different groups with competing interests 
such as communities, conservation agencies, governments, and private sector businesses 
get modeled as decisions of a single agent trying to maximize objectives of each interest.  
There is potential for conflicts as each party wants to strategically get maximum 
benefits out of the negotiations.  When such conflicts occur, decision support tools such 
as the use of multi-criteria analysis have often been used to settle the conflict (Frank & 
Sarkar, 2010). However, in situations where there exist multiple interested parties, game 
theory provides the best way to model strategic positions taken by all parties. Frank and 
Sarkar (2010) argue that game theory helps to identify conservation conflicts with Pareto-
inefficient Nash Equilibrium, thus, enabling actions that achieve closer to optimal 
conservation outcomes.  This is based on policy solutions that use mechanisms designed 
to provide optimal individual incentives structures.  
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Across many sectors and geographic regions, there is evidence that conservation 
negotiations lead to trade-offs between different interests (McShae et al. 2011). The full 
range of trade-offs are often under-estimated and rarely lead to win-win situations. When 
Nash equilibria are Pareto-inefficient, stakeholders should cooperate otherwise seek the 
intervention of higher authority. This works only if the higher authority is not perceived 
as a stakeholder, otherwise it gets very problematic (Colyvan et al. 2011). Game theory is 
a normative approach with a precise analytical framework that recognizes sub-optimal 
conservation outcomes while facilitating players (countries or conservation organizations 
in this case) to see possible best solutions. 
There exist two equilibriums: when conservations and owners of biodiversity 
resources fully cooperate and also when they fail to fully cooperate. A full cooperation 
leads to an efficient equilibrium outcome because conservation strategies get 
implemented. A failed cooperation results in an inefficient equilibrium outcome because 
conservation strategies do not get implemented (Hoven, 2004).       
2.2.1 Systems theory  
Borrowing from the living systems theory (Wang, 2004), the study examined 
organizational, community, society and supranational systems that have to be designed 
for purposes of information sharing and organizational learning at the international level. 
Systems theory provides answers to the question how globally designed biodiversity 
protection programs fit into the needs of local situations as well as effective relationship 
between global and local institutions (Deming, 1986). The purpose of an institution 
according to the living systems theory is to reach a desired steady state where institutions 
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are effective and their existence to continue to meet specified goals is guaranteed (Wang, 
2004). 
In the context of information management, this study asserts that the CBD can be 
viewed as a decider subsystem. Wang (2004) argues that the decider is an information 
process sub-system that receives, in this case, reports, plans and data from all other sub-
systems and transmits information outputs for guidance, coordination and management of 
the whole global structure. The relationship between the CBD, its member countries and 
local institutions can be viewed as a living system. Information Technology facilitates 
communication across these systems otherwise known as countries, and facilitates global, 
national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy and data rich 
websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better communication, 
sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). The systems concept is a presentation of how 
the different units/structures in different hierarchies within an organization interact and 
manipulate when it is convenient or adapt the organization to the external environmental 
demands (Almaney, 1974). 
Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a form of information 
network with the flow of information providing decision makers at varying management 
levels with information needed to make decisions of all types (Mockler, 1968). Decisions 
are made in a dynamic and interactive environment. Organizational control, decision 
making and planning for specified objectives is best done by combining different 
authorities with a diverse set of specializations in different organizational units using 
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systems theory. The systems approach facilitates for more comprehensive information, 
faster, at the point and in the form it is needed to make better decisions (Mockler, 1968). 
2.3 Institutional development 
Numerous international, national and local institutions working across boundaries 
at various jurisdictions to find solutions for biodiversity degradation across geographical 
and political boundaries have been created (Reischl, 2012). Reischl (2012) introduces the 
idea of “planetary boundaries” so as to show the shortcoming of international institutions 
when working at national or local levels as these are likely to affect and be affected by 
decisions taken at different levels and by different institutions. There is not enough 
understanding of various global governance systems in light of interacting planetary 
boundaries (Reisch, 2012). There is great concern that the capacity of international 
institutions alone cannot be able to project multilevel interacting earth process (Reischl, 
2012). This therefore renders support to the importance of local organizations and 
cooperation with local institutions. What then has to be done is to establish linkages 
between institutions with a clear consensus on how to manage the relationship (Devall, 
2006; Smith, et al. 2009; Resischl, 2012).   
Governments often voluntarily create institutions as they see needs. There are also 
times when institutions emerge spontaneously not because they are designed but as a 
response to human actions (Brousseau, 2011). The current structure by most governments 
gives conservation responsibility to government institutions and not the people at local 
levels to make decisions on the fate of natural habitats (Wilshusen et al. 2002). While 
some literature compellingly supports the top-down approach to biodiversity protection 
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(Rabinowitz, 1999), there is a general trend by more scholars to write in support of 
bottom-up approach. 
There is an increased tendency now to dialogue with management avenues found 
in public sector institutions, communities, private sector and other international 
organizations to find creative approaches and initiatives that go beyond the scientific 
management in conservation (Wilshusen et al., 2002). There are more other factors such 
as social, economic, political, institutional and technological that determines the success 
of biodiversity conservation policies regardless of how sound a policy could be 
scientifically (Carlson, 2013).  
The management side takes two avenues. The top-down restrictions that stop 
communities from the use of biological resources are often viewed as imposing economic 
hardships. Other scholars argue that although biological resources are local, non-local 
interests also have a stake in local resources. Wilshusen et al., (2002) argues that local 
interests should not supersede national and global interests. Conflicts then start to emerge 
and estimation of opportunity costs to determine winners and losers when conservation 
goals are implemented. 
2.4 What are scientists telling us? 
Before going deep into the literature, it is important to find out what scientists are 
saying to all other stakeholders in biodiversity management. The full story itself is very 
long with too many details, but this study has instead chosen to highlight a very long 
journey in very few words. Human beings have been causing extinctions of other species 
for over 50,000 years (Zedan, 2004; Devall, 2006). In the past 500 years alone, the rate of 
42 
 
human caused extinctions has increased exponentially (Devall, 2006). From the end of 
the 20th century to date, many more types of accelerated activities are creating huge 
cumulative effects that scientists call the “crisis of extinction” (Zedan, 2004; Devall, 
2006).  
Many scientists are now making projections that between 30 to 50 percent of the 
biodiversity could be extinct by the year 2050 (Ibid, 2004). According to the World 
Conservation Union (WCU), as of 2003, there were 12,259 plants and animals threatened 
with extinction due to human activities. The rate of species extinction is 1,000 to 10,000 
times higher than it would be under natural conditions (Devall, 2006; WCU, 2003). 
According to Kremen et al. (2000), more than 13 million hectares of forests are destroyed 
annually. Deforestation of tropical forests alone leads to loss of most species extinction.    
2.4.1 Biodiversity protection is not a quick-fix problem   
Some studies (Guzman, 2002; Esty & Ivanova, 2002) have examined the 
influence of environmental treaties in countries at a national level. At a national level, 
what really happens there is policy development, which in most cases does not reflect 
implementation at local levels. There can be a policy on paper that does not exist at 
implementation levels. At a national level, governments have been known to play what is 
known as symbolic politics (Davidson & Frickel, Edelman, 1964) where rhetorical 
policies are advanced to imply commitment and reinforce public’s convictions that real 
implementation of policy to protect biodiversity is being competently addressed, when in 
actuality this is not true.  
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At the global setting, just ratifying a treaty is seen as one aspect of complying. 
Locally, compliance must mean much more than just ratification of a treaty and should 
go beyond policy making. Although the Convention on Biodiversity merely urges 
member states rather than requiring them to fulfill its goals, national initiatives should 
commit countries to more stringent obligations for higher compliance if biodiversity 
protection targets have to be met in the future. Wilshusen et al. (2002) argues that 
biodiversity protection should stop trying to be everything to all people and focus on 
strict enforcement of conservation laws. 
One key objective of this research was to examine how national policies and 
institutions evolve and adapt under international environmental treaties. Policy and 
institutional evolution process is still under theorized and under analyzed (Brousseau, 
2011). Biodiversity protection is not a quick fix problem to be done with so that other 
forms of development can proceed (Chan et al., 2006).  The arguments made by private 
sector institutions that environmentalism hurts economies and will cost economic growth 
works against government intervention and weakens regulation meant to protect the 
environment. The sticking point between full implementation of international 
environmental treaties by all countries has been about the tradeoffs between more 
development and environmental conservation. 
2.5 Public Administration and biodiversity conservation 
Biodiversity protection is sometimes regarded as a political motive skillfully 
constructed with the aim of crystallizing problems in order to influence public policy 
(Devall, 2006). It is the conflicting interests between development and conservation that 
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infuse the scientific discourse into politics in government (Devall, 2006; Crist, 2003). 
Concerns over biodiversity protection need to go further beyond scientific boundaries, to 
include policy, sociological, economic and cultural issues in society. International treaties 
are not adequately structured to deal with national policies.  
Treaties not only lack enforcement ability, their language is mostly rhetorical in 
nature and full of discretionary statements such as “where feasible” or if the “State 
decides” (Devall, 2006). Biodiversity protection requires strong and enforceable 
regulations that can only come from a national government. Provisions of international 
treaties, therefore, have to be translated into national and local legislation for treaty 
objectives to be realized. While policy making is the responsibility of elected officials, 
policy implementation in conservation needs to go beyond public administrators and 
bureaucracies to include communities and local organizations.     
There is limited policy literature that explicitly explains the political role in 
conservation policy. This limitation arises out of the distance between natural science-
trained conservationists on one side one side and the other side, the politics-
administration dichotomy within government bureaucracies, and private sector influence 
(Adams & Hutton, 2007; Fesler & Kettl, 1996). This difference is more pronounced in 
the context of capacity for natural resources conservationists to engage with the politics 
of conservation at both government and private sector institutional levels (Adams & 
Hutton, 2007).  
The status of conservation outcomes depends more on political processes, while 
implementation of various conservation policies are inherently political (Adams & 
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Hutton, 2007). Biodiversity protection problems have continued to persist globally 
because of lack of strong public administration. By placing the political processes of 
biodiversity conservation in the context of a strong public administration arm of 
government, policy implementation and national compliance with biodiversity protection 
goals will be transformed. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 1994), government intervention failure was described as an 
underlying source depletion pressures of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its 
components. Intervention failures result from weak institutions that implement and 
enforce conservation policies. 
2.6 Compliance with international treaties 
Biodiversity protection and natural resources management in general do not have 
developed systems of measurement, monitoring and reporting (TEEB, 2009). For 
effective implementation and compliance, an understanding of quantitative measurement 
of biodiversity and ecosystem values is needed to alert policy makers to possible tipping 
points (TEEB, 2009). Countries are required to report their compliance but it is not 
possible to develop specific guidelines for every country as to the scope and methodology 
of the reports ( Esty & Ivanova, 2002). Most countries do not have the capacity in human 
resources, information technology, and institutional structures to meet their reporting 
obligations. Furthermore, the Convention on Biodiversity does not contain strong 
enforcement provisions. Therefore, the only incentive for compliance is if there is 
pressure from the public, moral requirements or local legislations. There are again 
difficulties in an environment where there is insufficient performance data such that 
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“name and shame” strategy fails when wanting to point out serious policy violators (Esty 
&Ivanova, 2002).    
  Jacobson and Weiss (1998) argue that very little is known about national 
compliance with and implementation of international treaties. Compliance means 
observance of regulations and adherence to commitments contained in the treaty. Weak 
or unenforced legislations produce weak compliance, meaning that the mere existence of 
legislation does not mean that there is compliance. At the same time, there can be 
compliance even when there is weak and ineffective implementation. At the global level, 
the mere submission of reports by governments is a measure of compliance. Slow 
movement toward meeting all the goals of the CBD provides reasons to believe that 
compliance with and implementation of international environmental treaties is both 
imperfect and inadequate.  
Studies conducted on compliance so far (Mitchell, 1994) examines factors that 
affect compliance, (Jacobson &Weiss, 1998), looks at factors that lead to improved 
implementation of and compliance with environmental treaties such as political, 
economic and cultural variables, (Rinquist & Kastodinova, 2005) have analyzed 
effectiveness of environmental treaties and outlined the challenges of measuring 
effectiveness. Biodiversity management problems have been persistent over the years, 
they span jurisdictions and generations. The inter-jurisdictional and intergenerational 
span of these problems calls for governance mechanisms that can alter incentives in favor 
of environmentally sound choices. These choices can provide for adequate information 
and establish concrete mechanisms for policy implementation (Esty & Ivanova, 2002).         
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2.7 Global policy environment 
The global policy formulation and implementation should be guided by first 
establishing the optimal level of global consumption that can be defined as contributing 
to sustainable use of biological resources. Short of this, there is no reference point. What 
is being done at the moment is the historical conservation discourse, which I believ if 
well understood is a good basis for conservation policies development.    
According to Mangel et al., (1996), the first batches of global policies for the 
protection of biodiversity were developed in 1978. These did not include explicit set of 
mechanisms for implementation and were therefore not widely adopted. In the year1994, 
reviews to examine why the 1978 policies failed were initiated and designed to 
incorporate effective guiding principles and mechanisms for implementation. Policy 
adoption and implementation still remained the key challenge. In 1992, an institution in 
the name of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was created to coordinate global 
governments to start to reverse biodiversity degradation through implementation of 
specific initiatives to meet specific global goals.  
Since then, there has been an increasing number of global, regional and national 
policy initiatives aimed at biodiversity protection and management (Rands et al. 2010). 
All parties to the CBD met in 2002 and agreed to develop a framework to facilitate 
implementation of the CBD goals, so as to start reversing biodiversity degradation by the 
year 2010. The approach agreed to was to develop national plans. About 90% of the 
countries that have signed membership with the CBD now have fully developed National 
Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs). The question to ask now is whether these 
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plans can actually propel national governments towards better implementation and higher 
compliance.    
The NBSAPs have elicited support to biodiversity protection activities from local, 
national and regional civil society organizations that add to the work of international 
organizations (Rands et al. 2010). Despite this growing support, biodiversity has 
continued to decline (CBD, 2010). This has prompted the international community to 
shift conservation approaches toward a more targeted framework of national parks and 
protected area networks (CBD 2006) and Public-Private Partnerships. Over the last 20 
years, protected area networks have grown steadily at  an average of 2.5% and was found 
to be covering 24 million Km2 with 133,000 designated sites as of 2006 (Rands et al. 
2010).  
The CBD initiatives were widely adopted by governments but were not effective 
as all countries missed the target of starting to reverse biodiversity degradation by the 
year 2010. The CBD does not have enforcement mechanisms to sanction countries and 
therefore implementation has been problematic (Adenle, 2010). The capacity of most 
countries does not come near the threshold of global implementation requirements. For 
instance, many countries lack scientific infrastructure in the form of high quality 
universities, research labs, technical institutions and network infrastructure. There exist 
weak information technology linkages between governments, international organizations 
and private partnerships. Biodiversity protection targets were re-set again in 2011 to the 
year 2020 (CBD, 2010).       
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However, the challenge to biodiversity protection is still to find ways that policies 
can be widely adopted and effectively implemented at all levels in society. Habitats that 
host biological resources have continued to lose out to the rising human population and 
the needs of economic development (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Rands et al. 2010). 
Biodiversity continues to be depleted at an increasing rate (CBD, 2006). Toward the end 
of the 1990s, habitat reserved for biodiversity stood at 5 percent and for humans at 95 
percent (Terborg, 1999). Terborg (1999) calls for radical changes in conservation 
governance policies in all countries to avert total destruction of biological resources. 
Consumption of biological resources has persistently superseded supply (Global 
Footprint Network, 2010).  
Advancement in democratic international institutional instruments and use of 
information technology (IT) has created awareness and global cooperation in biodiversity 
management. Governments that are parties to the CBD have taken up the big role of 
implementing the goals of these treaties to protect biodiversity within their borders. The 
convention on biological diversity (CBD) also known as the Biodiversity Convention is 
an international, legally binding treaty, such that countries that join it are required to 
implement its provisions. 
2.7.1 Global strategic plan for biodiversity 
According to the new Strategic Plan (SP) 2011 – 2020, the 2010 biodiversity 
targets were both a learning process as well as an inspiration at many levels, but it 
appears the resulting actions have not risen to the scale sufficient enough to reduce the 
rate of biodiversity degradation. Even with many lessons learned and more awareness 
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among all parties to the CBD, there is no adequate integration of biodiversity protection 
initiatives, policies and programs across all sectors and levels of the economy (SP, 2011). 
Key impediments to implementation at the country level include lack of financial 
resources, low human capacity, lack of technological capital, and insufficient data and 
information necessary for policy formulation and decision making (SP, 2011). To 
adequately address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss and direct pressures that 
lead to its depletion, there is need for actions across all levels from global to local levels 
and across all sectors (SP, 2011). Engagement with local level consumption and 
production sectors is critical, so as to identify trade-offs between basic societal needs and 
conservation, and build appropriate incentives and institutions (SP, 2011).   
Although the 2011-2020 strategic plan is clear on what needs to be done to avoid 
the mistakes made when trying to meet the 2010 biodiversity protection targets, countries 
would have to come up with more specific and concrete initiatives at national levels.  
There is a desire by the international community to support national governments with 
capacity building and financial resources for local policies. However, countries would 
have to build mechanisms on how to respond to lack of financial resources, how to 
enhance human capacities and how to build sufficient data and information for decision-
making that is scientifically sound, socially feasible and politically acceptable.   
2.7.2 National policy environment 
Governments play significant roles in the development of both national and local 
institutions. Institutions in this context refer to the rules or laws that govern relationships 
between individuals, groups, organizational norms and practices in society. Biodiversity 
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protection as is constructed is a political, economic, social and organizational process. 
Biodiversity protection is embedded in all these processes.  All groups, organizations and 
institutions involved in biodiversity protection engage with each process differently, thus 
making it difficult for collective action (Brechin et al., 2002). Only the government can 
sanction all these processes to produce political justification and social justification, so 
that organizational process can set in motion the collective protection efforts.  
2.7.3 Global-Local policy interface 
Although the international community has done a great deal of work identifying 
important conservation areas and fashioning the research agenda, more successful 
outcomes and larger big impact can only come from local institutions (Smith et al. 2009). 
Successful conservation strategies are those that are developed with clear relationships 
between local communities, national government, international organizations and the 
scientific community (Devall, 2006).  
The challenge is that many local institutions are greatly underfunded and 
government institutions in most biodiversity rich locations are ineffective (Smith et al. 
2009). Most international organizations answer to their members and donors and 
therefore their priorities do not usually match those of local agencies (Smith et al. 2009). 
When local institutions are weak, various problems begin to manifest: (1) projects that do 
not gain local long-term support, (2) conservation approaches that are developed do not 
match local needs and (3) research on local issues are overlooked. Local institutions, 
agencies and other local groups should set the agenda for research, data collection and 
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decide on implementation while international organizations are only left with supportive 
roles (Smith, et al. 2009). 
Conservation plans are more legitimate and politically acceptable when local 
institutions and groups participate in making them. These plans can be better coordinated 
locally with other sectors such as land-use planning, agriculture, water and climate 
change (Smith et al. 2009). In many countries, especially developing countries, national 
plans are made by international experts and national bureaucrats with very little input 
from communities.   
Local agencies in many developing countries lack the means and influence to 
implement change (Smith et al. 2009). Many conservation programs in biodiversity-rich 
developing countries are driven by international organizations, an approach that causes 
local resentment and makes conservation seem a marginal issue (Smith et al. 2009). This 
can be overcome through the development of social-learning institutions which bring 
together local and international conservationists and researchers. Government staff are 
poorly trained, funded and motivated. Working with staff from international 
organizations gives them access to new skills and contacts, enabling them to develop 
their own conservation agendas (Smith et al. 2009).   
To assist local organizations with skills and capacity to meet conservation 
challenges and make the right decisions, foreign donors have to ensure good 
collaboration directly with them especially in understanding their specific requirements. 
Donors should also fund local groups directly to enable them to finance the establishment 
of social-learning institutions and their research priorities as well as train agency staff and 
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local experts. Weak institutions will not develop because currently, donor money tends to 
flow through international NGOs, in so many countries (Smith et al. 2009).          
2.8 Policy making and policy implementation 
Just like many other public policies, biodiversity protection policies by 
governments can best be created and implemented when there are separate institutions 
that make policy while others implement the policy. National governments pass 
legislation but implementation is done at local levels and enforced by local bureaucracies 
(Vogel & Kessler, 2002; Gussman, 2004). It is movement through these different levels 
of policy making and policy implementation that gaps in standards established by the 
legislation and required implementation arise thus creating opportunities for non-
compliance (Gjertsen & Barrett, 2003). Public policies have to be designed to make 
implementation effective by facilitating adequate institutional structures, regulations and 
incentives (TEEB, 2009).  
There are several sources of mismatch between national legislation, 
implementation and compliance. The mismatch in most countries between legislation and 
implementation result from the low level of government’s administrative capacities. 
Countries join and ratify treaties before they build sufficient capacities to take on added 
responsibilities which lead to administrative overload (Vogel & Kesler, 2002; Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2007). In other cases, this comes about because those tasked with 
implementation at local levels do not contribute in any way to making legislation 
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2007). Structures enabling participation by all stakeholders is key 
to successful implementation. Although voluntary, treaties impose directives on 
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governments that call for further directives by the same governments on local level 
institutions and communities. These different levels do not share the same level of 
resource capacities, administrative capacities, institutional capacities, technical 
knowledge and values (Porter & Brown, 1990).  
Environmental institutions in most countries are relatively new at the national 
government level. In most local levels, these institutions are just being introduced and 
most countries are working at replacing traditional practices with the best management 
practices (Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). These processes take time to be understood 
(Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). Administrative capacities are critical to successful 
implementation and national compliance with environmental treaties. Although not true 
all the time, national capacities, implementation and compliance are also associated with 
the level of national income of a country (Porter & Brown, 1991; Vogel & Kesler, 2002; 
Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). High levels of compliance should be accompanied with 
advanced national environmental regulations.     
Policy making and implementation within countries is influenced by various types 
of groups. In some countries such as India and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
guerrilla insurgents keep their bases in tropical forests and wildlife parks and keep good 
relationships with poachers. Some of these countries are not able to comply because of 
unstable political environments (Vogel & Kesler, 2002; DR Congo Progress report, 
2004). In other countries, policy making is influenced by elites in government, corporate 
executives and industry leaders ( Feinerman & Fujikura, 2008). This locks out those 
tasked with implementation from participating, thus making enforcement problematic. 
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International environmental treaties do not contain criminal enforcement provisions 
(Vogel & Kesler, 2002). The only reason that implementation is done is because: (1) of 
the moral standpoint, (2) it benefits local communities or the industry being regulated and 
(3) when there exists strong legislative and enforcement authorities.  
2.8.1 National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) 
Although the goals of the CBD are very specific, different countries’ national 
strategic planned goals and objectives vary because of different circumstances in those 
countries. What should not vary are the consistence and details, timelines and funding 
sources, including the measure and how well a plan is being implemented. In addition, 
most plan preparation activities should not overly orient to the production of a plan as a 
product that becomes a formalized series of words on paper (Tang et al., 2009). 
According to Chapin and Kaiser (1979), there are three definitions of a good national 
plan.  
National plans should contain specific goals linked to local conditions rather than 
vague umbrella goals such as protection of biodiversity, economic development or 
greater governmental responsiveness that are non-substantive. These goals must represent 
the general aspirations, problem alleviations, and needs that are premised on shared 
national values of each country.  
A plan should have fact-based specifics on the existing local conditions with 
identified needs related to the community’s physical development. High quality plans are 
produced by fact finding, frequent community-wide exchanges of information and 
proposal for action. Such plans are more effective in facilitating government 
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responsiveness because guidelines are predicated on a fact basis tailored to local 
conditions and expected patterns of public behavior.  Policies or actions within a plan 
serve as a general guide to decisions about the location, density, type and timing of public 
and private development to ensure that plan goals are achieved. Good plans contain 
policies that are specific and stated in action-oriented language, using words like will or 
must, rather than might or should. Good plans contain data and analysis that is essential 
for building the foundation for meeting objectives and developing policies.  
A plan is a product from a planning process that forms a foundation for future 
actions and therefore must continuously undergo revisions and updates. This is necessary 
because plans have to be made to constantly adapt over time to needs of the society and 
the changing physical environment (Brody, 2003).   
2.8.2 Local policy environment   
Local policy environment at both community and business levels features 
significant shortcomings as a result of either the perceived costs associated biodiversity 
protection, low institutional capacities or lack of sufficient knowledge (TEEB, 2009; 
Brechin et al. 2002). Current local policy approaches to biodiversity protection 
emphasize three frameworks of protecting biological resources: sustainable use, protected 
area networks and mainstreaming (CBD, 2010). There is a shift from strict protection 
toward broader participation. This, however, cannot succeed without building structures 
that can connect people, institutions and organizations across different levels and sectors. 
Such participation is important for developing epistemic communities necessary for 
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mobilization of political constituencies from various civil and private sector organizations 
to build resilient conservation institutions (Rands et al., 2010).          
At local levels, one can experience the argument often discussed in the literature 
is that infinite growth does not exist in a finite environment. Demand for natural 
resources that far exceeds the capacity of natural environment will eventually overwhelm 
the natural resources base (Mangel at al., 1996). Compliance with all goals of the CBD 
cannot be realized unless resource use is guided by policies that would maintain levels 
that provide for future generations that policies also should minimize changes in the 
structure and dynamics of ecosystems to the extent that any damage can be reversed 
within one human generation (Mangel et al., 1996). These are very complex statements 
especially when there is a lot of literature that highlights the difficulties communities at 
local levels experience in the context of pollution, deforestation, poverty, landlessness, 
insecure land tenure and political oppression (Myer 1998; Myers et al. 2000).  
Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection at local levels have direct impacts on 
communities. The levels of opportunity costs of foregoing consumption at present for the 
sake of future generations as well as opportunity costs of sustainable use, determines how 
compliance will be attained. Policies that link biodiversity protection to economic 
benefits, such as REDD+, have great potential to provide revenue benefits to 
communities to protect forest resources (Rands et al. 2010). Biodiversity degradation is 
not the intended consequence of human actions but rather it is an unintended 
consequence of actions taken for other reasons. Biodiversity protection can therefore be 
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seen as an economic externality of outcomes of doing what is perceived as normal 
business by the society (Rands et al. 2010; Dasgupta, 1979).    
Communities and businesses have no incentives to change their consumption, 
lifestyle, and way of doing business if opportunity costs of change are too high (Atisa et 
al. 2012). This calls for biodiversity protection to be managed as a public good provided 
collectively through conscious choices (Rands et al. 2010). Valuation techniques that 
quantify economic values of biodiversity are not well developed to provide close to exact 
measures of biological resources (TEEB, 2009). Economic value of biodiversity has to be 
built into the social, economic, legal and political decision making institutions across 
sectors and at all levels in a country to facilitate acceptable policy changes (Rands et al 
2010).      
Local institutions and community based organizations at local levels provide a 
platform for building partnerships with international organizations, government 
institutions and private sector businesses to promote effective policies for biodiversity 
protection (Colyvan, 2010). Rands et al. (2010) argues that policy responses to 
biodiversity degradation fail because they do not establish appropriate institutions, 
governance and behaviors. Partnerships provide a learning environment where 
experiences and resources are shared to build a sound knowledge base where policies 
generated are more acceptable to all. The challenge to local level biodiversity protection 
is that key and the much needed institutions are either non-existent, lack sufficient 
capacity or are just being created and are at learning stages (Atisa et al. 2012).        
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2.9 Global-National-Local model 
The global-national-local model is a framework that has been developed by this 
study to examine conservation policies meant to resolve conflicting use of biodiversity at 
national and local levels. These conflicts emerge when policies created to further global 
interests are in conflict with national interests. National conflicts also emerge when 
policies created by national governments through the influence of global policies conflict 
with local interests. It is important to resolve conflicting interests that arise at different 
levels so that there is no perceived inherent policy superiority in the way resources are 
either used or conserved. There is a need for a clear separation of basic interests and non-
basic interest. The process of global policy making should be designed in ways that allow 
national and local interests the same worth for basic and non-basic interests (Sagoff & 
Taylor, 1988). The challenge is how to ensure that interests at all levels are taken into 
account as much as it is clear that not all stakeholders from local levels can participate in 
policy making at global and national levels.  
The use of biodiversity falls into either basic need or non-basic category. 
Conservation policies should not be seen as denying communities an opportunity to either 
develop or meet their basic needs. Basic human resource interests are those which are 
morally legitimate to be fulfilled, such as land to grow food (Sagoff & Taylor, 1988). 
Violating people’s moral and legitimate rights to basic needs deprives them of their 
ability to live at the best minimum living standards. When conflicts of this nature occur, 
there must be appropriate compensation mechanisms for the forgone resources. It remains 
challenging to conservationists to separate basic needs and non-basic needs so as to 
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develop appropriate compensation mechanisms. There are resources that are non-basic to 
the industry but basic to rural communities. Some are basic to plants and wildlife but 
non-basic to human beings, while their use is not based on whether they are basic to 
specific categories.        
Ability to identify and develop policies that separate basic and non-basic 
biodiversity needs by different categories of consumers and users is difficult. It is full of 
uncertainties, pervaded by information asymmetry problems, imbalance of power, and 
legitimacy conflicts among irreconcilable representations and incompatible interests 
(Boisvert & Vivien, 2005). Most studies examining conflicts in the consumption and use 
of biodiversity have unanimously advocated for compromises and sustainable use. This 
study brings into the equation two factors, appropriate compensation mechanisms and 
capacity building. It is not so much about efficiency and equity but how much 
communities can afford to forego for the sake of conservation. How much can businesses 
afford to cut and still remain profitable?      
2.10 Sustainable use and equitable sharing of biodiversity benefits 
Sustainable use and equitable sharing are the other two goals of the CBD. The 
“Sustainable development” model was born out of the Brudtland Commission created by 
the United Nations in 1983 to address concerns that the rate of resources depletion and 
environmental degradation by current generation was disabling the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs. This commission defined sustainable development as the 
use of resources now without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
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own (UN, 1987). The big challenge to global economies is how to balance economic 
development and natural resources consumption (Carlson, 2013).  
Carlson (2013) argues that sustainable development is a risk minimization and 
risk management initiative that supports economic development within environmental 
resources constraints and scientific uncertainty. As the global society has continued to 
adapt to sustainable development, progressive degeneration of biological resources and 
loss of species has continued at an accelerated rate (Wilshusen et al. 2002; Carlson, 
2013). Many of the current approaches to biodiversity protection do not provide adequate 
measures that can protect biological resources up to the rate of current consumption 
(Brechin et al. 2002). Social stability in many countries depends on high rates of 
biodiversity consumption that supports economic growth (Carlson, 2013). Policies that 
curtail the free use of biodiversity have raised concerns among businesses who argue that 
such policies hobbles economic development.   
The greatest threats to biodiversity come from the desire by humans to pursue 
economic development and to provide for basic needs. Although sustainable development 
approaches to sustainable living and natural resource use has been successful at changing 
the way various sectors use natural resources, it does not provide concrete and verifiable 
targets on many fronts. Sustainable development fails to show a concrete relationship 
between total available resources and total consumption so as to see whether the two are 
converging or diverging.  Going the sustainable development route in biodiversity 
conservation will miss big opportunities as this does not advocate for a cap on the pursuit 
of economic growth (Carlson, 2013). Sustainable use of biological resources does not 
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provide any targets that have to be attained for a specific level of biological resources in 
relation to demand or level of consumption (Carlson, 2013).   
Studies of various sustainable development literature in relation to biodiversity 
protection does not show how implementation of sustainability approaches affect national 
and local biodiversity protection policies (Rosales, 2005). The basic definition of 
sustainable use is to continue to use biological resources so that there are some left for 
future generations. This statement does not provide both the economic demand and 
biological resources threshold that can meet both today’s and future generation’s needs. 
There is tremendous literature on the adoption of various sustainable development 
mechanisms (Porter and Brown, 1991; Rosales, 2005), such as green technology in 
various sectors, but not much is known about the final outcomes on actual positive 
impacts on biodiversity.  Rosales (2005) argues that initiatives that have been developed 
to address the root cause of environmental decline cannot be successful unless there is a 
cap on economic growth based on ecological thresholds.  
The way to ensure sustainable use of biodiversity is to restrict economic activities 
at a level that is ecologically sustainable (Rosales, 2005). The problem is that there is no 
identified threshold level of economic development that provides for sustainable use. It is 
this cap that will provide guidelines to local, national and global policies (Rosales, 2005). 
The biggest challenge of capping growth at local levels is that biological resources 
consumption by some of the rural communities can be classified as basic needs. 
Opportunity costs of foregone use of biological resources might mean life or death for 
some people. This kind of situation requires a mixed bag of policies that protects 
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communities from an unfair deprivation of resource use while at the same time protection 
biodiversity from overexploitation.  
Rapidly rising population growth leading to higher per capita consumption causes 
overexploitation of biological resources. No matter how sustainably resources are used, 
depletion will continue ( Rosales, 2005; Wilshusen et al. 2002). However, successful 
conservation depends upon rewarding communities at local settings   for the opportunity 
costs of conservation (Atisa et al. 2013; Rosales, 2005), otherwise future generations will 
pay.  
2.11 Opportunity cost considerations 
Implementation and compliance with international environmental treaties 
concerns more than just global consensus building toward agreed conservation 
objectives. Opportunity costs of economic development, geopolitics of global 
consumption of biological resources and wealth distribution are central to any success 
with implementation of conservation goals and the level of compliance realized (Drumbl, 
2002). Interdependence of economic development and environmental regulations pits the 
more developed North against the less developed Southern countries that requires 
compromises to be made, both in terms sharing financial resources to go towards 
reducing opportunity costs of conservation by the South and technological transfer to 
ameliorate conservation challenges from the North (Drumbl, 2002).  
Jacobson and Weiss (1998) use costs and benefits calculation to argue that the 
smaller the costs and the greater the benefits, the greater the probability of 
implementation and compliance. The nature of these costs needs to be clearly identified; 
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they do not do that. They make another assumption that countries with large gross 
national product and higher per capita Gross National Product (GNP), have greater 
probability of implementation and compliance. In some cases, this is usually the opposite.  
Drumbl (2002) asserts that more developed nations of the North show more 
demonstration toward proposing international treaties than the developing nations. The 
reason for this observation is that developing countries priorities are more to carter for 
basic needs such as safe provision for safe drinking water, healthcare, education and food 
(Drumbl, 2002). In addition, implementation and observation of international treaties 
come with associated costs. Some of these costs go toward supporting legislation, 
institutions and enforcement of laws required to give force to an international treaty 
including investments in technology and manpower development (Strategic plan, 2011; 
Drumbl, 2002).  
The desire by both developed and developing countries to continue to grow their 
economies as a priority creates fears of economic decline if nations were to strictly 
implement the requirements of international environmental treaties. Economic 
deceleration is a big opportunity cost (Drumbl, 2002).       
2.11.1 Global opportunity costs 
Global consumption of natural resources and waste generation has reached a 
tipping-point (Drumbl. 2002). It has become abundantly clear that the planet can longer 
be able to supply resources that meet the demand placed on it as well as absorb the 
amount of waste generated (Global Footprint Work, 2006). There are conflicting global 
views on who should do more to ameliorate the impeding biodiversity crisis. Global 
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opportunity costs of biodiversity protection is what it costs the world now to reverse the 
degradation of biological resources and what it would cost the future generations to 
acquire the same resources to meet their own needs. The main point is that the future 
generations should not be made to pay for unnecessary overexploitation of natural 
resources by this generation.   
Under the North-South global relations, developing countries have entered into a 
negotiation strategy where the more developed Northern nations are to pay for 
implementation and compliance costs incurred by the developing nations (Drumbl, 2002). 
Financial commitments to developing nations have evolved into solid obligations upon 
which developing countries who are combating global environmental threads is 
predicated (Drumbl, 2002).   
2.11.2 National opportunity costs 
International treaties lack enforcement authority over nations and therefore 
nations have to design and implement conservation objectives which entail various costs 
(Adams et al. 2010). Some of these costs may come in the form of welfare loss. Nations 
need to develop mechanisms for assessing benefits and costs of biodiversity protection 
(Sinden, 2004). Treaties, therefore, have to be seen to provide more benefits to all 
participating nations for successful adoption and implementation of treaty goals. In 
addition, credible, transparent and simple punishment options need to be institutionalized 
within the treaty to ensure compliance and avoid “loophole-effects”. The costs associated 
with filling in the gaps in welfare loss or gain is the national opportunity cost.  
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National plans for biodiversity protection should adequately take into full account 
the economic costs of conservation that arise in the form of acquisition, management, 
damage, transaction and benefits (Adams et al. 2010; Naidoo et al. 2006). One example 
to show this is the establishment of a protected area networks. The government has to 
acquire land, and this land comes with long-term management costs (Adams et al. 2010). 
National opportunity costs come in two ways, organizational and social costs. National 
plans should be drawn so that they can ensure that conservation goals move to 
implementation on the ground but first they need to consider both organizational and 
social costs (Adams et al. 2010; Knight et al. 2006; Pierce at al. 2005).  
2.11.3 Local level opportunity costs 
At local levels, opportunity costs arise because sacrifices have to be made in 
terms of not using some resources. Communities may forego the use of land for farming 
and have it reserved for forestry purposes, or businesses may not use certain resources if 
these are considered threatened by overexploitation. National governments for example 
have enacted legislation to protect habitats, forests, water resources and wildlife. These 
legislations protect biodiversity by preventing communities from clearing forests on their 
land. Consequently, this reduces farm incomes.      
“The opportunity cost of protecting biodiversity on farmland   
is the income foregone in the alternative agricultural use of   
land, and is the major cost of protection”  (Sinden, 2004). 
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Biodiversity  protection  legislation  removes  the  community’s  right  to 
develop their own lands as they wish. This does impose a cost on the community. 
Opportunity costs of land use changes and natural resources conservation in many places 
has not been given attention to match their economic importance in decision making 
(Panyotou, 1994). The use of economic incentives for conservation has therefore 
continued to be compromised as opportunity costs are not fully considered in the 
valuation of biological resources (Griffiths & Southey, 1995). Opportunity costs are a 
major influence on the net benefits that local communities obtain from natural resources 
(Atisa et al. 2013). Increasing dependence on land due to limited employment 
opportunities and high rate of population growth exacerbates opportunity costs. Although 
global negotiations provide for more developed nations to finance conservation of 
biodiversity by less developed countries, there are no clear compensation mechanisms for 
local level opportunity costs.  
2.12 Information technology and information sharing tools 
Jacobson and Weiss (2010) argue that more information about conservation 
problems leads to more understanding, and more effective implementation and 
compliance. Biodiversity protection is the responsibility of governments first. It is at this 
level where programs are created by law with clearly identified purpose, means and 
conditions under which they will be implemented (Rose, 1991). The CBD encourages 
national governments to establish and strengthen National Clearing House Mechanisms 
(NCHM) websites which is hoped will contribute to cooperation and development of 
regional, sub-regional information and knowledge sharing. Very few governments have 
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built an equivalent of GBIF at national level. How governments are making effective use 
of National Biodiversity Information Facility (NBIF) or a similar agency has been 
analyzed in this study.   
Information Technology is being used as a tool for coordination of activities 
within and between organizations, governments and a host of other institutions (Dedrick 
et al., 2008). Use of IT at global level allows information and data sharing, coordination, 
discussions and transfer of ideas between regions/countries with high capacities and those 
with low capacities. The most developed and widely available information found in the 
internet is that provided by international organizations and more developed government’s 
institutions with high capacities. Most of these data is only at the country level which 
makes it less usable by resource managers and planners who require more human and 
ecological relationships at specific local regions (Guralnick et al., 2007). This study 
introduces and explores aspects of human-institutional-biological resource relationships 
in the context of information sharing. It does place local communities at the center of 
biodiversity protection and planning.   
The Internet and the World Wide Web (www) are the most significant, cheap and 
fastest communication tools so far developed and being used to share information and 
data. Within the United Nations system, the CBD has a well-developed CHMs which 
provides global information services to facilitate implementation of biodiversity 
protection plans.  The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts as the central node. The CHM is 
a place for national governments and partners to openly exchange biodiversity 
information, promote and facilitate technical scientific cooperation. Also, it is for use by 
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governments with limited IT infrastructure to find data and information needed for sound 
decision making.    
Use of IT improves communication across sectors and between countries, and 
facilitates global, national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy 
and data rich websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better 
communication, sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). Regions facing common 
conservation challenges can learn from each other how to deal with problems when 
policies and conservation programs are posted online. Effectiveness of programs 
developed for a specific region or place can be measured by comparison with others 
being implemented elsewhere (Rose, 1991) when these are easily accessible in the web. It 
is also possible to obtain and adopt information from online sources to help facilitate 
national policy development and local planning.   
The use of IT in management is viewed as one way that efficiently meets the 
demands of public institutions, lowers administrative costs and improves service delivery 
(Myeong & Choi, 2010). Public institutions use IT to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity 
about goals and cause-effect relationships during the time of implementation. Successful 
application and employment of IT in public settings requires investments in 
infrastructure, computers and relevant software which must be accompanied with training 
and capacity building.  
Management of biological resources is a complex process of balancing immediate 
benefits with long-term conservation goals and political priorities. Generating of relevant 
information and data sharing is crucial to reaching an optimal balance of various 
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stakeholder interests (Simon, 1977). Emphasis on long-term conservation goals can be 
viewed negatively when communities have no alternative to their immediate needs. IT 
facilitates in the scanning of the conservation environment for information and data 
needed to understand local and national priorities and to build a consensus on immediate 
benefits and long-term conservation goals (Esty, 2004).  
Environmental policy and decision-making critically depends on available 
information, data and analysis. Information technology tools such as wireless 
communications, remote sensing, and internet communication, have vastly increased the 
capacity to collect, share and utilize data (Esty, 2004). Information technology provides 
access to opportunities that make biodiversity protection more data driven, empirically 
verifiable and analytically rigorous.   
Biodiversity protection falls into the ranks of open projects (Witzel, 2012) that 
know no boundaries. This is the reason why it is a global effort by 195 countries and 
numerous non-governmental organizations working across borders, sharing resources, 
information and having a common purpose. A globally unified effort for biodiversity like 
this one requires systems that provide a high degree of transparence, information sharing, 
and distributed accountability among all participants at all levels (Witzel, 2012). It is for 
these reasons that Information Technology is of critical importance to the success of 
biodiversity management and protection.     
2.13 Institutional leadership 
Pallemaerts (2003) argues that social responsibility activities undertaken by 
different sectors or organizations are geared toward enabling them to choose 
71 
 
arrangements that serve their own self-interests. The same applies to communities and 
individuals. Biodiversity protection does not fall into the class of interests that private 
sector and communities would have as their priority interest. Governments, therefore, 
face problems trying to find ways to design and implement policies that will generate 
organizational leadership that is able to solve problems in different spheres of the society 
(Alkadry & Nyhan, 2005). At the same time, organizational leadership has limits in its 
discretionary space. Such requirements can only be met under a leadership that has a 
great deal of discretion and style that adopts power-with management approach that leads 
to a win-win situation by consensus and policy expansion (Graham, 1996; Golden, 1998).  
Using the structural equation model, Alkadry & Nyhan (2005) explain 
bureaucratic experience and its impact on the behavior of public organizational 
leadership. The best way to understand organizational behavior is to study it as a system 
(Scott, 1961, Kast & Rozenweig, 2001). The systems approach has great potential in 
facilitating in understanding of the complexities as open systems, closed systems, 
feedback and hierarchy (Kast & Rozenweig, 2001). Vancouver (1996) examines how 
living systems are used to model human, organization and communication to signify the 
importance of the nature of relationships in organizations.   
The international community has continued to build institutions and partnerships 
that remain central at influencing the behavior of individual governments. These 
institutions include the United Nations Agencies and the International Treaties. They 
provide structures upon which governments come together to take actions that form 
important tools for pooling resources to confront global environmental problems (Hanf, 
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2000). The difficulties that exist in the implementation of international treaties are mainly 
because there is no coercive body at the international level equivalent to law enforcement 
agents within a country (Stretton, 2010). Institutions that are necessary for the effective 
implementation of an international treaty exist at the national level where it is possible to 
coerce different actors into adopting relevant environmental policies using either 
sanctions or incentives.  
According to the new public management (NPM), agencies create expertise to 
increase effectiveness and efficiency of government intervention on issues that are 
considered most important (Stampfer et al., 2010). Looking at efficiency from the 
principle-agent model, principles and agents move through processes of policy 
formulation, institutional development, data collection, information sharing, capacity 
building and partnerships with all stakeholders.  
Domestically, national decisions on biodiversity protection are shaped by national 
politics of party states guided by domestic economic considerations, administrative 
capacities and availability of funds (Chan et al., 2006). Implementation of the CBD goals 
has continued to face great challenges because of incompatibility of basic interests, 
mandates and interest between the different agencies in government and other sectors 
(Wilshusen et, al 2002). Fragmented processes and structures of government agencies 
impede the achievement of goals, such as when there are no formal institutional 
mechanisms and institutional linkages between land and agricultural planners (Calder, 
2005).  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND DATA 
3.0 Data sources and methods 
This chapter is divided into four sections. It starts with a general introduction to 
compliance and various measures that exist in current studies, sample selection and data 
sources, and the specific hypotheses guiding the study. This is followed by an 
explanation of analytical methods, both qualitative and quantitative. The next section is 
where the conceptual model and factors that most influence compliance with CBD goals 
are explained. The study then developed an analytical approach to explain ways of 
reconciling global, national and local interest, and a shared meaning of biodiversity 
protection among stakeholders. The chapter concludes with a detailed methodology that 
examines opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation.  
Estimation of opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation is important. 
Consequently, I want to show the status of biological resources and costs of protecting 
these resources in the context of compliance. Many compliance studies simply give a 
qualitative measure of compliance with no figures attached. In addition, there are no 
agreed measures of compliance. It is for this reason that even when some countries are 
running huge deficits in the status of biological resources, they can get classified as 
compliant because there is standard criterion for measuring compliance. Estimation of 
opportunity costs helps to highlight what it would take countries to actually comply.      
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3.1 Introduction  
A number of studies have analyzed compliance with international treaties, but 
substantive implementation and compliance within countries is not known (Jacobson & 
Weiss, 2010). There are numerous measurement variables targeting different compliance 
measures with international treaties at various levels. Guzman (2014) has analyzed 
compliance with customary international law. He uses a reputational model of 
compliance to explain that countries comply with treaties simply because other countries 
have committed to honor the treaty. Hathaway (2005), along with Jacobson and Weiss 
(2010), have examined compliance from the perspective of costs and benefits that may 
arise for a country when it complies with an international treaty. Their research argues 
that transnational actors and rule of law within a country are important factors that 
reinforce implementation and compliance.  
Perkins and Neumayer (2007) have divided compliance into four models: 
domestic adjustment, reputational, constructivist, and managerial to analyze why 
countries comply but they do not really explain how and what it takes countries to 
comply with international treaties. There are no studies done so far to validate these 
compliance levels or even try to attach numbers that could give a certain threshold of 
compliance.   
Even when the rules are very clear, there are always significant gaps between the 
set of rules that are in force and actual implementation (Vogel & Kessler, 2002). There is 
clearly a research gap on compliance at the global setting, national and local levels that 
explain how countries comply and what should go into compliance at these three levels.  
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It was with these gaps in mind that I designed this research to analyze compliance 
by countries with CBD goals and implementation of specific policies, knowing that there 
are very different global requirements, different national capacities and different local 
needs. Factors that go into compliance, and how compliance can be developed, can be 
very complex. While there are clearly defined requirements at the global level, the 
requirements at both national and local levels are not defined. Countries are merely urged 
to implement global policies. How countries take these global policies to local levels and 
ensure that they get implemented is even more difficult to determine. I developed specific 
criteria in this study to try to construct what countries should do at both national and local 
levels to comply.    
Conservation responsibility starts at the signing and ratification of international 
environmental treaties, global conferences where negotiations are held, and critical 
conservation information shared. Once all negotiations are finalized and agreements 
drawn, individual governments are then encouraged to implement those agreements as 
they deem possible.  
3.2 Sample selection  
A sample of 16 countries was selected for this study. Various selection criteria 
were used, namely, geographic distribution, size of administration, biodiversity richness, 
and strong presence of conservation organizations  In order to have a broad geographic 
representation, I selected four countries from each continent (Table 3).  The sample 
included a sub-set of three countries, namely Canada, India, and Australia, because they 
were the largest and federally administered countries. The idea was to see how central 
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governments work with regional/provincial governments. Another group of three 
countries was chosen because they have been identified as the richest biodiversity 
countries in the world. These were Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo and Indonesia. 
The study made an assumption that because these are biodiversity rich countries, it might 
be easy to measure conservation efforts and compliance easily. Another criterion was 
either the presence of strong conservation organizations or countries that greatly support 
conservation programs globally. The countries chosen under these criteria were Kenya, 
Great Britain, Switzerland and the Netherlands.  
Kenya is the host country to the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP); Switzerland is host to both WWF and IUCN head offices; both the UK and the 
Netherlands are some of the largest conservation donors globally. A final group of six 
countries were chosen randomly to represent all other countries who are members of the 
CBD. These were South Africa, Ghana, Mexico, Jamaica, Jordan and Poland.  
Table 2: Sample of countries selected 
Europe Africa N & S America Asia 
Great Britain Kenya Canada Australia 
Switzerland Ghana Jamaica India 
Netherlands DR Congo Mexico Indonesia 
Poland South Africa Brazil Jordan 
 
3.2.1 Data sources 
The study used mainly secondary data obtained from a variety of sources.  
 CBD Website – Country Plans, reports and CBD documents 
 Clearing House Mechanisms of the CBD and also of individual countries 
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 National government, international and local NGO websites 
 Google.com – International and local organizations websites 
 ASAHI Glass Foundation 
 FAOSTAT 
 Global Footprint Network 
 Existing biodiversity conservation literature  
Key data obtained from NBSAPs were about the quality of the plans themselves. 
Plans must be developed in ways that are able to effectively support biodiversity 
protection. They must have a proper language, funding, timelines, specific goals and 
objectives. Data obtained from national reports included implementation challenges, 
funding status, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and building of national and 
local institutions. The CHMs provided data regarding availability of national and local 
data, local reports, and national, regional and local profiles.  
Other pieces information came from the websites of conservation organizations 
working in each country. Information on organizations working in these countries was 
obtained from the Internet using the search engine via . The following criteria were used 
in choosing the organizations during the search process. (1) There is a clearly identified 
collaboration with government and local organizations (2) They have been in the country 
for at least five years. Local organizations were selected based on the following criteria: 
(1) They have been operational for at least five years (2) They work in collaboration with 
international organizations.  
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3.2.2 Biodiversity hotspot regions 
Two to three internationally recognized biodiversity hotspot regions in each 
country were identified. Biodiversity hotspot regions are defined as bio-geographic 
regions with a significant reservoir of biodiversity that are under pressure of 
overexploitation and degradation by humans (WWF, 2006). Biodiversity hotspot regions 
are areas of great concentration of endemic species. It is around biodiversity hotspot 
regions where there is the most rapid deforestation, habitat destruction and transformation 
of landforms. In terms of management, these regions provide a more precise location 
where conservation outcomes provide the greatest payoff (Myers et al., 2000). The 
purpose for this was to help focus attention to the most important conservation areas, and 
mainly to gauge how wisely conservation resources are being invested in each country.    
Negative or degradation of the environment has greater impacts on biodiversity 
hotspots than other areas. These are areas of the greatest focus by conservation 
organizations and governments. Outcomes from conserving hotspot regions would be 
more visible than many other places. How countries and conservation organizations 
respond to conserve hotspot areas would provide a better understanding in terms of 
whether a country is ready, its capacity, and the strength of the policies developed. It is 
around biodiversity hotspot regions where it is easy to see the extent of policy 
formulation and implementation.    
There were no hotspots regions identified for the Netherlands and Jordan from 
their respective government websites, plans or by conservation organizations working in 
these countries. Poland and Switzerland each have only one biodiversity hotspot.   
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Use of biological resources beyond the levels they are able to replenish 
themselves otherwise known biodiversity degradation, can be more pronounced at 
biodiversity hotspots more than other areas. These are areas of greatest focus by 
conservation organizations and governments. Therefore, outcomes from conserving 
hotspots regions would be more visible than many other places.  
Table 3: Biodiversity hotspot regions  
 Biodiversity Hotspot regions 
Country 1 2 3 
South Africa Cape Floristic Region – 
Kogelberg Biosphere Reserve  
Maputoland –
Pondoland-Albany 
Karoo region 
Kenya Arid Horn of Africa region – 
NE Kenya 
Arabuko-Sokoke Forest 
Reserve 
Eastern 
Afromontane – Mau 
Forest 
Ghana Atewa Range Forest Reserve Coastal Guinea Forests ---- 
DR Congo Virunga National Park Kahuzi-Biega N. Park Garamba N.Park 
Switzerland Pfynwald ----- ----- 
Poland Carpathians ------ ------- 
Netherlands ------- ------- ------- 
Canada Broadback River Watershed Saskatchewan River 
Delta 
Peel River 
Watershed 
Jamaica Cockpit County-North Coast 
Forest 
Portland Bight Protected 
Area 
Surrey County 
Corridor 
Brazil Atlantic Forest region Chapada dos Veadeiros Emas N. Park 
Mexico Madrean Pine-Oak 
Woodlands (Sierra Madre 
Occidental) 
the Sierra Madre 
Oriental 
the Trans-Mexican 
Volcanic Belt 
Australia Einasleigh and Desert uplands 
– Queensland 
Mamersley-Pilbara 
(Western Australia) 
Central and Eastern 
Avon Wheatbelt 
(Western Australia) 
India Western Ghats Eastern Himalayas North Eastern India 
(Indo-Burma) 
Indonesia Sundaland Wallacea  
Jordan ------- -------- ------- 
Great Britain South Uist Lundy Menai Strait 
Source: government websites, conservation organizations websites and national plans 
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3.3 Game Theory  
Stakeholder strategies that would improve biodiversity protection are those that 
would make one stakeholder better off without making any other stakeholder worse off. 
This condition is known as Pareto improving. Compliance outcomes that satisfy this 
condition exist when each stakeholder has full information concerning all other 
stakeholder strategies. Stakeholders in biodiversity have been known to be self-interested 
more and would care about others only when they can benefit.  
A situation where all stakeholders’ benefits are improved can be achieved either 
through consensus or cooperation. Consensus often involves the use of a third party to 
force a decision that often may or may not be the maximum payoff (Colyvan et al. 2011). 
Cooperation allows stakeholders to deal with each other directly with clearly identified 
set of available strategies without relying on third parties or other authorities. Managing 
conservation conflicts without relying on consensus is an important element to attaining 
maximum outcomes and effective decision-making (Colyvan et al. 2011).   
Stakeholders/players cooperating with each other want mutually beneficial outcomes, and 
know each other’s strategies that would produce maximum payoffs.    
According to Villasant and Sumaila (2010), non-cooperative games are also 
known as competitive games. In competitive games, stakeholders are entirely motivated 
by self-interests. Also, in competitive games, there are no established lines of 
communication. This nature of games, therefore, fall into what in game theory is known 
as “prisoner’s dilemma”. This is often the case with biodiversity protection. Although 
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information regarding biodiversity conservation is freely accessible online, the self-
interest behavior has greater influence on stakeholders.     
3.3.1 Systems theory 
  The systems theory provided a basis upon which to examine individual and 
collective institutional works and relationships within and across countries. The planning 
strategies and problems identified by government documents were compared with the 
works and problems identified by conservation organizations using systems approach. It 
was possible to place specific works of individual institutions in a wider context of 
biodiversity conservation. This was necessary to be able to see both the shared 
understanding and differences in approach to biodiversity conservation at the same time. 
Analytical outcomes of the works of governments were assessed against the works of 
international organizations.      
3.4 Research questions and hypotheses 
Advancing public policies through various stages from formulation to 
implementation in society is always determined by how relevant a problem is perceived 
by stakeholders (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). While implementation is at specific 
local settings, biodiversity protection defies fragmentation and demands the collaboration 
of governments and institutions at all levels and across boundaries. Responding to 
biodiversity protection problems calls for action from the political, legal and 
administrative arms governmental, community, scientists and international efforts.  
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In trying to address the challenges facing biodiversity protection, the research 
questions were formulated to address structural, policy and multi-level and multi-sector 
conservation relationships at the international level, and national governments and local 
level implementation. These questions were intended to find answers for strategies 
needed to identify most supportive initiatives and compliance variables to be 
implemented in various countries. What happens at global and national levels is not in 
direct conflict with local level consumptive priorities but rather supports local priorities 
alongside implementation of conservation measures.  
The key questions designed to guide this study were the following: 
1. What critical factors most influence the implementation of biodiversity protection 
policies at the global, national and local levels? 
 2. How can conservation initiatives at different levels and in different countries be 
reconciled in order to support global compliance with CBD goals? 
3. How do opportunity costs of biodiversity protection affect implementation of 
CBD goals at the local levels? 
3.4.1 Factors that most influence compliance and implementation 
The level of attention and supportive efforts given to biodiversity conservation at 
the global level, national level and local levels differ in many different ways. Factors that 
most influence global, national and local level conservation efforts are also very different. 
I argue that globally designed conservation policies that are sensitive to local level needs 
have a greater chance of implementation.  
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Globally designed conservation programs must be sensitive to both national 
priorities as well as local needs such, as poverty alleviation, sustainable use of natural 
resources, and the shielding of communities from incurring higher expenses in the 
process of adopting biodiversity protection programs. The first guiding hypothesis for 
this study is:  
Hypothesis 1: International and national conservation initiatives fall short of  
conservation outcomes, and because of inadequate support to local institutions 
where actual implementation takes place, global compliance with CBD goals is 
low 
To test this hypothesis, qualitative content analysis of NBSAPs and conservation 
progress reports was done to determine what variables either constrain or aid in the 
implementation of conservation programs at international and national levels. Data 
obtained from the ASAHI Glass Foundation (AGF) was analyzed and used to test 
compliance at local levels. The critical variables that were used to test the above 
hypothesis included the 20 criteria used for evaluating compliance in table 1. The other 
variables came from the AGF data, where the survey identified global conservation 
barriers to biodiversity protection.    
3.4.2 Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to conservation 
Many methods that analyze global compliance with international treaties have 
done so in very general terms. In analyzing compliance, I argue that these treaties must 
be open to what various actors bring to the negotiation table in terms of strengths, 
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weaknesses and interests. Porter & Brown (1991) argue that countries do influence other 
countries’ actions on the global environmental arena through roles as a lead state, 
supporting state or swing state.      
Hypothesis 2: Cooperation by stakeholders in the use and management of 
biodiversity protection reconciles different self-interests better and, therefore, 
leads to higher compliance with CBD goals.  
This hypothesis was tested using game theory strategies. The central assumption 
taken in game theory was that all players/stakeholders are interested in each other and 
will play to bring out best outcomes in the game. The higher the outcomes for each player 
the more satisfied both will be.  
The advantage of game theory is that each player/stakeholder is often allowed to 
consider the interests of others. Looking to reconcile multi-stakeholder interests in 
biodiversity, surveys of several games were conducted, and their possible outcomes and 
stakeholder conflicts were explained. Under the game-theoretic approach, it is possible to 
see the different stakeholder objectives and the strategies that they will adopt when 
consensus, compromise, or cooperation are feasible as well as the best types of 
cooperation that reflect various interests and meet various objectives (Colyvan et al., 
2011). 
Stakeholders in the use and management of biodiversity take their positions on the 
negotiation or implementation table to critically examine and play using strategies they 
think gives them the highest payoff. Responses from each stakeholder are anticipated 
even before the negotiations begin, and therefore, the best counter-strategies meant to 
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generate optimal decisions can be developed. The way governments are expected to deal 
with each other is very different from the way other stakeholders such as the 
communities, businesses, industries and conservation organizations play games with each 
other. For example, in the case of two countries coming together to protect a specific 
resource, they may be motivated differently about the details of and why it is in both their 
interest to protect that specific resource. The following hypothesis was also formulated to 
test question two at local levels   
3.4.3 Reconciling global, national and local conservation interests 
The trade-offs that exist between human basic needs and biodiversity protection 
goals, and between biodiversity protection and various economic, political, and social 
considerations across sectors, are extremely difficult to reconcile (McSahene et al., 
2011).  Efforts and initiatives aimed at producing outcomes that demonstrate how 
biological resources can be managed to support the needs of local people while sustaining 
local, national and global conservation goals have not been developed in the literature. 
Therefore, the way forward would be to establish negotiations with all other salient social 
and economic interests for purposes of diffusing potential conflicts (Frank & Sarkar, 
2010). However, the sticking point surrounding over-exploitation of biodiversity is often 
the failure of the management of biological resources to ensure equitable distribution of 
the benefits of biological resources with disproportionately more benefits going to more 
powerful interests. The positions held by various interest groups in the use and 
consumption of biodiversity can therefore be classified as irresolvable (Colyvan et al., 
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2011).  In order to address the second question, the following hypothesis was formulated 
to help test how to reconcile various stakeholder interests.              
Hypothesis 3: National and local environmental policies that evolve on the basis 
of shared meaning at all levels and across sectors and institutions have a higher 
rate of acceptance, and would therefore lead to high levels of compliance with 
CBD goals.  
Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, the study analyzed how policies 
evolve and adapt to different levels and sectors by examining whether there is 
collaboration between various institutions working on biodiversity protection in each 
country.  Specifically, the study examined how different institutions at different levels of 
government render support to conservation activities, how well local offices work with 
national government offices, who reports to whom, and the nature of collaboration 
between governments and international conservation organizations. The study also 
investigated the coordination between the central government and communities in the 
implementation of national plans.  
Environmental problems have local, regional, national and global consequences 
and need to be addressed at all these levels to achieve meaningful global compliance 
(Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Vig & Axelrod, 1999). Commitment to all requirements 
and terms of international environmental treaties calls for a national governing structure 
that enables institutional capacity to be able to develop policies and to facilitate 
expression of political demands for biodiversity conservation toward local regions and 
other countries (Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005).         
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There is a tendency for most countries to rely on the experts and international 
organizations to draw plans and public policies, especially in environmental conservation. 
Borrowing from Jones (2001), there is no solid distinction between policy making and 
policy administration. Jones discusses the makers of policy who are the politicians, and 
doers/implementers who are the administrators. In the same way, as governments make 
policy, input from local level settings where implementation takes place is hypothesized 
would lead to greater compliance. The implementers at local levels are communities. 
Their input towards national conservation policies is therefore very important. Input from 
local level citizens and individuals was measured by looking at whether there are 
structures that facilitate participation, key information sharing structures, capacity 
building programs and data availability.        
3.4.4 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection  
Opportunity cost estimation is one way of accounting for the status of available 
biological resources. This way of accounting for biodiversity helps to strengthen support 
for policies developed to protect biological resources, evaluation and ensure that the 
value of biodiversity is realistically reflected alongside other national priorities within 
countries (NBSAP Australia, 2011). Using market based incentives through 
compensation for opportunity costs help to effectively engage resources managers to 
protect and conserve the resources under their management. 
The opportunity cost of biodiversity protection is a significant determinant of 
implementation decisions and compliance with the goals of the CBD. There are payoffs 
in terms of costs and benefits when people or organizations undertake conservation 
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programs. Costs act as deterrents of positive actions, while benefits act as incentives to 
adopt an action, negative or positive. Costs can come in the form of direct monetary loss, 
fines or fees imposed for failure to act. Benefits also come in the form of higher incomes, 
tax rebates or recognition. In order to address the third question, the following hypothesis 
was formulated.  
Hypothesis 4: The use of appropriate compensation mechanisms to offset 
opportunity costs that would be incurred by those that supply biodiversity services 
will increase the probability of effective implementation, and thus lead to higher 
compliance with CBD goals. 
There are various ways to measure the opportunity costs of biodiversity 
protection. The first approach to measuring opportunity costs was based upon the 
estimated costs of conservation as opposed to the available funding. When costs of 
conservation are higher than available funding, both local and external, it is assumed that 
communities or businesses will be asked to pay for the unfunded portion of conservation. 
If the costs of conservation are lower than available funding, it is assumed that 
conservation will easily be implemented. However, this is not always the case.  
 Another approach to measuring opportunity costs is by the number of taxes 
initiated, fees charged for violations, and the difference between available biological 
resources in each country as opposed to the level of use/consumption of the same 
resource. Another source is the information on the presence or the absence of economic 
incentives meant to encourage or discourage certain activities. This information may not 
be easily available in the plans and reports written by various countries.  
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3.5 Basic compliance requirements 
At the international level, the CBD has a specific set of compliance requirements. 
These requirements include submitting national plans and reports on a regular basis, and 
participation at international conferences. The monitoring to ensure that what is written in 
the plans and reported is actually implemented is the responsibility of the countries 
themselves.  
At national level, there is no country that has set any sort of compliance criteria 
for monitoring and implementing of CBD goals.  What emerged from the literature was 
that even when there are well developed environmental laws, these are not sufficiently 
implemented and enforced. Non-compliance therefore comes to light only when there are 
specific measurable violations such as industries releasing a chemical into a body of 
water or oil leaking into an open natural resource. There are so many other sectors whose 
activities are constantly degrading biological resources such the poor agricultural 
practices and deforestation, which are often not seen as violations and therefore cannot be 
penalized.   
At local levels, it is even more difficult because there is very scanty information 
to begin to tell just how much of the influence the CBD goals have reached local levels in 
various settings. These settings could be the farms in rural areas, the industries that 
depend on biological resources for their business and even urban constructions that tend 
to destroy natural areas. The extent that biodiversity considerations are given weight in 
major investment decisions is not clear.     
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3.5.1 Development of compliance criteria 
The Table 4 below shows the 20 criteria developed to determine policy 
compliance.  
Table 4: National level compliance criterion 
 Criteria for NBSAPs 
and National Reports 
Description Sources 
1 Language Specific, strong, clear, not vague Tang et al. 2010 
2 Goals Specific, covering all aspects of a specific 
resource, time-bound 
Tanget al. 2010; 
NBSAPs various 
3 Objectives Clear, covering all aspects, detailed NBSAPs various 
4 Depth & Scope Covering all aspects, detailed,  NBSAPs various 
5 National Capacity Ability of the country to implement the plan, 
human, financial and technological 
NBSAPs various 
6 Funding Amount and sources of funding,  NBSAPs various 
7 Surveys & Research Surveys, research for information and data  NBSAPs various 
8 Coordination Coordinating agencies, institutions and fining 
common goals 
NBSAPs various 
9 National Institutions The number, nature and strength of national 
institutions 
NBSAPs various 
10 Support to local 
regions 
National support in terms funding, human 
resources and technological support 
NBSAPs various 
11 Legislation/Acts The number, types and supportive  NBSAPs various 
12 Timing/Milestones Clear timelines to meet specific targets NBSAPs various; 
Tang et al. 2010 
13 Capacity Building institutional, people, technological   NBSAPs various 
14 National Network Easily identifiable relationships  between 
different sectors, institutions, organizations and 
public agencies 
NBSAPs various; 
Tang et al. 2010 
15 Key Activities Recruitment of qualified personnel, creation of 
institutions, creation of protected areas, 
negotiations with donors, communities,  
NBSAPs various 
16 Outcomes Clearly identified outcomes,  NBSAPs various 
17 Monitoring & 
Evaluation 
Taking all recommendations  taken seriously NBSAPs various 
18 Participants Less international and more local participation 
of organizations/communities 
NBSAPs various 
19 Information 
Technology 
Use of IT, information sharing tools, 
Technology transfer  
Tang et al. 2010 
20 Enforcement ability Ability to enforcement conserv. regulations NBSAPs various 
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At the international level, compliance was measured between zero and 100 
percent depending on the number of plans, reports and whether a country had a national 
clearing house mechanism (NCHM). Just submitting one plan or one report was rated 
20% complaint. If a country has a NCHM, it was allocated 100% compliant. If a country 
does not have a NCHM, it was allocated 0% compliant. 
At the national level, 20 criteria were developed from the literature, plans, and 
reports with information that spoke to effective implementation and compliance. For 
instance, plans in general should have a language that is clear, specific, strong and not 
vague. These criteria are listed in Table 4 below. Each criterion was worth 5 percentage 
points. Compliance was measured between zero and 100 percent.  
The presence of a NCHM was also evaluated against 10 criteria that were 
established from the literature, national plans and the CBD website. Each criterion was 
worth 10 percentage points.  These criteria are listed in table 5 below.  
Within countries, implementation takes place at local levels. Countries can submit 
all their plans and reports to the CBD as required, but this does not mean that they are 
implementing conservation programs as stated on paper. This called for a different 
approach to analyze compliance at local levels. The study therefore used Likert scale data 
from AGF to measure local compliance. 
As for the NCHMs, there must be working links, reports from local regions, 
participants and other resources that national stakeholders may need in conservation 
decisions. Table 5 below shows the list of 10 criteria used to rate compliance with 
NCHMs.  
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Table 5. Criterion used to define compliance of the NCHMs 
 
 Criteria for NCHMs Description 
1 Working links Links that connect and cover all aspects of 
biodiversity within a country 
2 Availability of local reports/plans Reports/plans from different conservation local 
areas within the country 
3 Participation – Individuals and 
Organizations 
Identified partnerships, epistemic groups, 
institutions, experts and local agencies 
4 National Contacts Online contacts to find all relevant information 
5 National Data Data on all aspects of biodiversity protection 
6 Biological Resources The extent to which all resources are covered 
7 Funding Funding levels, sources and  
8 Regional profiles Listing and description of local conditions 
9 List of regions and focal points List of conservation areas and focal points 
from those regions 
10 Resources for local implementation This refers to technology, trained human 
resources,  
 
Although it has been agreed that treaties do influence state behavior (Hathaway, 
2005; Ringquist & Kostadinova, 2005; Weiss & Jacobson, 2010), understanding 
biodiversity conservation in the national and local contexts so as to be able to start to 
draw plans, formulate goals, iron out conflicts and develop implementation strategies is a 
process that evolves over time (Brachthauser, 2011). This study makes the assumption 
that this is the reason why there exists a big lag between the time when the treaties are 
signed and when conservation outcomes start to be seen. In most countries, ministries of 
the environment did not exist when the Convention on Biodiversity was created. To date, 
there are not enough local institutions and trained conservation experts in most countries. 
There is not enough data on biodiversity to facilitate decision making. There is also 
insufficient information sharing structures within most countries to facilitate effective 
engagement with local levels.   
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Global biodiversity conservation efforts do not equal national policy development 
and local implementation of conservation programs. This study therefore estimated 
compliance status and has examined what countries need to do to move toward a level of 
compliance where they can start to reverse overexploitation of biodiversity.  The unit of 
analysis was the country. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were used. 
Qualitative methodology was used in the review and analysis of country biodiversity 
strategy conservation plans submitted to the CBD secretariat, country conservation 
progress reports, and websites of organizations and institutions involved in biodiversity 
conservation in each country. Quantitative methodology was also useful in trying to 
determine the significance of various compliance variables, inputs and conservation 
outcomes at various levels.  
3.6 Qualitative methods 
 The key sources of data for this research was the country plans, reports and 
information found in the websites of major conservation organizations, which was mainly 
qualitative. The data is in linguistic form. A linguistic representation of data is best 
analyzed using qualitative methodologies. Both direct and indirect methodology was 
utilized. Direct methodology is when qualitative data is used directly in qualitative 
analysis. Indirect methodology is when qualitative data is transformed into a cardinal one 
and then used for quantitative analysis. 
Content analysis of information in the plans, reports and conservation 
organization websites was done. For each country, a folder for source documents was 
created. The National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs) and the fourth 
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national biodiversity implementation progress reports were uploaded to NVivo10 and 
posted into a government folder. In addition, 15 websites of other organizations working 
in these countries obtained from the Google.com search engine were uploaded into 
NVivo10 using NCapture. A separate folder for other organizations obtained from 
Google.com was created. Coding for each country was done in separate nodes. These 
nodes were further broken down into national and international in order to code for 
information for national institutions and international organizations.  
Using InVivo coding to keep the data rooted in the original documents (Saldana, 
2013), key words that made references to the research questions in this study were 
identified using the word frequency query. These words were assigned their own nodes in 
separate folders. For each node, a descriptive message of the word obtained from their 
textual context from all documents was then coded into same nodes for each country. 
This makes it easy to see these words in a passage form, see the messages they are 
conveying, and be able to decipher how various plans, reports and information on 
websites relate to research questions.     
3.6.1 Quantitative methods 
Quantitative methodology was equally useful because it helps to explain a 
research phenomenon through analysis of numerical data using mathematical models 
(Aliaga & Gunderson, 2000). It was necessary to complement qualitative analysis with 
quantitative methodology because quantitative data is more explicit, easily generalizable, 
transferable and defensible (Hargrove, 2005). Quantitative analysis was done in three 
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stages: using qualitative data in a transformed form, using data obtained from the Global 
Footprint Network and also data from AGF.  
Using the 20 criteria identified for purposes of analyzing the quality of NBSAPs 
and national reports, each criterion was scored between 0% and 100% for each country 
on the NBSAPs and national reports. Averages were estimated to give the percentage 
level of compliance for every country. 
A second cycle of coding was done for national institutions and international 
organizations for each country. This was aimed at exploring themes most emphasized by 
biodiversity protection reports, plans and other documents. This was to find out how they 
could be used to answer research questions and test the research hypothesis. The 
emerging themes became topics for further analysis. Saldana (2013) argues that social 
life happens at given coordinates or intersections of one or more actors who are engaging 
in one or more activities. The study therefore examined how the emerging themes relate 
to those found in the NBSAPs, government reports, government websites and other 
conservation organizations. Central to understanding the critical factors that most 
influence compliance with CBD goals and implementation of biodiversity protection 
policies was the number of references or the frequency with which specific themes are 
found at each intersection.   
Themes obtained from global organizations were linked to node matrices of 
national policy themes and also to node matrices of local implementation themes. Matrix 
tables for each country were generated to show various relationships based on the 
frequency that different national policy themes shared with local program 
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implementation. The actual words used in the original documents were retained as 
themes for easier reference. The data generated through matrix coding for each country 
were then subjected to regression analysis to determine the significance of various 
relationships between policy at the national and implementation levels. 
3.7 Compliance measurement 
Borrowing from measurements of diffusion of innovation in the private sector 
(Bamberger, 1991) compliance can be conceptualized as either a process or an outcome 
at community level, institutional, organizational, or global levels. Compliance as a 
process means identifying various stages, the time taken at each stage and the key 
attributes of all the stages (Daft, 1978; Van de & Chu, 1988; Bamberger, 1991). 
Compliance as an outcome means the final tangible outcomes. These may include the 
creation of specific programs, organizations, institutions, plans and strategies that 
represent a significant departure of the state of resources from the time the problem is 
identified going forward. Measuring compliance based on time is outside the scope of 
this study. Instead, various compliance attributes, outcomes and stages have been 
analyzed.   
3.7.1 Compliance measurement as a process 
Key attributes of compliance are explained in this section. When compliance with 
the goals of the CBD is measured based on implementation and conservation outcomes, 
conflicts emerge out of the technical, social, economic, political and value judgments 
from different stakeholders (Munda et al. 1994). This means that there have to be more 
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ways to measure outcomes at different levels. These conflicts are partly the sources of 
non-compliance and they take forms of both quantitative and qualitative variables.  
The technical conflicts arise from the global and national planning strategies that 
are multi-layered across many sectors and therefore always in search for compromises in 
decision making. The social conflicts come about as a result of the losses and benefits 
accruing to the society when implementing specific goals required for compliance 
standards. Economic perspectives of conflicting values originate from allocation 
(efficiency), distribution (equity), and scale (sustainability) (Daly, 1991; Munda et al., 
1994). While it is believed that the market provides optimal allocation of resources 
(Munda et al., 1994), an optimal scale of compliance with CBD goals requires more than 
the market forces. This study has taken care of this by employing both the living systems 
theory and game theory, where stakeholders cooperate as well as negotiate towards 
arriving at a consensus through compromise. Compromised conservation strategies bring 
along with them some difficulties at the implementation stages.    
The political aspect of measuring compliance is in the formulation of policy 
instruments, where targets to be met, or statements setting minimum threshold for the 
entire community, are set. Value judgment conflicts take various forms as follows: i) 
when the compliance requires minimum exploitation of natural resources but provides 
optimum yield (Munda et al., 1994) while the society wants to overexploit and get 
maximum yields; ii) maximum production of goods and services at minimum (private 
and social) costs (Munda et al., 1994) while the society is not really worried about social 
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costs; and iii) maximum sustainable use of biological resources (Munda et al., 1994) 
while the society does not have any sustainable use ability, knowledge or capacity.   
Solutions to conflicting conservation interests require an analysis of various 
conservation alternatives from those that provide superior protection to those considered 
merely rhetoric. Compliance with CBD goals calls for a collective action by the 
community, a nation, non-governmental sector and the international community. These 
different stakeholder levels see different acceptable compliance avenues. Greater 
compliance, therefore, my study argues, can come from more cooperative strategies, 
restrictive initiatives but not compromised policies and negotiated agreements. 
Availability of various alternatives to conservation settings with a clear rank from most 
restrictive, cooperative arrangements to incentive based policies needs to be determined.  
3.7.2 Compliance measurement as an outcome 
According to Bamberger (1991), when compliance is conceptualized as an 
outcome requires a listing of criteria to facilitate the measuring of compliance. There are 
two types of conceptualizations: a “closed list” or an “open list”. A “closed list” approach 
uses a universal criterion where program reports and documents are used to generate a list 
of items selected on the basis that these are critical to aiding of obstructing compliance. 
An ordered rank is then placed on each criterion. The “open list” approach is when a 
study uses survey methodologies to ask informants to provide the criteria and information 
to help develop the rankings.  
           Measuring compliance is best done through the use objective or nonjudgmental 
ratings. Nonjudgmental ratings are ideal when research findings need to be presented 
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quantitatively (Bamberger, 1991). Under nonjudgmental ratings, a measure of 
compliance was generated by identifying specific criteria and then ranking a variety of 
items under each criterion from zero to 100%.        
3.7.3 Compliance stages  
Most literature defines compliance but does not explain in detail what actually 
goes into compliance. Based on the information gathered from the existing literature, my 
study has divided compliance with the CBD into three levels: i) paper compliance ii) 
policy compliance and iii) implementation compliance. The processes and 
implementation of programs needed to comply is not a one-time event but is an effort that 
should be carried throughout the life of the program. It is through the long-term process 
that institutions are built, knowledge is accumulated, capacities are improved, experience 
acquired, and various obstacles get eliminated. Some of the key obstacles include 
untrained staff, lack of funding opportunities, lack of communication technology, and 
lack of political support (NBSAPs South Africa, 2006; India, 2000; Canada, 1999; 
Ghana, 2002; Jamaica, 2004).        
Paper compliance is attained when countries sign and ratify a treaty, start to draw 
national policies as per the terms of the treaty and begin regular or irregular submission 
of required reports and revised plans. Under the Global-National-Local Model, this type 
of compliance fits at the global level. At the global level, the key to successful policy 
adoption by governments is first to identify biodiversity conservation needs and match 
these with government priorities. Communication should be structured so as to facilitate 
reporting and planning.      
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Policy compliance is a country effort when countries begin to create institutions 
and structures to coordinate programs, hire conservationists, share information and build 
human capacities. For most countries it is the processes and national level readiness that 
defines how local level implementation is done to halt degradation of biological 
resources. Structural support mechanisms and human resources are acquired to ready 
national institutions.  
Policies that bring about partial implementation and thus low compliance are the 
result of less than ready national government in terms of human resources, inadequate 
funding and legislation. Policy compliance helps to bring national policies and programs 
into direct contact with local level communities, institutions and staff directly involved 
with implementation. It is at this stage when local level needs have to be matched with 
national biodiversity protection policies. It is at this level where major implementation 
obstacles are eliminated.      
Implementation compliance is the product of local level efforts that lead to the 
creation of institutions, conservation structures, national governments assessment of 
community needs, capacities and strengths of specific communities or organizations. By 
community here it means people in a village who share common resources, a business 
community, a neighborhood, a city or a group of organizations. Epistemic groups start to 
emerge. However, unless communities recognize and buy into the new policies, that 
biodiversity conservation is affordable and is not in conflict with local priorities 
implementation will be resisted and undermined. Compliance that results from 
implementation at local levels brings about changes in overall institutional and 
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organizational environment that can be seen in the capacities that begin to emerge, 
cultures and new social practices.    
Figure 1. Compliance framework 
 
 
 Policy development                                                                                   Information sharing 
                                                            Signing of a treaty,                           & reporting 
                                     Paper                  International negotiations 
                               compliance                Geopolitics 
                                            
                                                                             Policy formation, Consensus 
                        Policy compliance                       Building, Legislation                                                              
 
 
                    Implementation compliance                      Capacity building, local  
                                                                                              implementation &  
                                                                                                  biodiversity protection                                                
      Leadership, Epistemic groups,                                 
    Institutions, CBOs, NGOs, Communities                Economic/Political Institutions,  
    Agencies,  Programs, Projects,                                    joint decisions/local input,                                                    
    Committees Information sharing tools                        Administrative Institutions 
 
Source: Constructed by my study using information from the literature 
Implementation in the context of compliance is defined as the number and types 
of activities designed to put into practice a program that meets specified objectives and 
goals. It is through implementation processes that programs can be seen, described, and 
felt. The following conceptual compliance model has been designed to break down these 
compliance activities.  
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3.7.4 Compliance Model 
Going by the scientific findings regarding the overexploitation and degradation of 
biodiversity, each variable in the mathematical model below is in itself a step towards 
higher compliance. My research indicates that global compliance should be the sum of all 
the variables from the local level implementation programs to global ratification of a 
treaty. The various components of compliance take both qualitative as well as 
quantitative measurements. At the global level, my study has controlled for the fact that 
countries have signed and ratified the CBD, attendance to conferences, country incomes, 
country population and size of each country. Global compliance can therefore be defined 
as in the model below. At both national and local levels, this study controlled for 
availability of data, consumption of natural resources, restoration activities and costs of 
conservation.  
Gୡ ൌ fሺPaୡ ൅ Prୡ ൅	 Iୡ ൅	Naୡ ൅ Reୡ ൅ OPେ)  ………………….. 1 
Where: 
 Glୡ =  Global compliance 
Paୡ ൌ	 Paper compliance 
Prୡ =   Policy compliance 
 Iୡ   =  Implementation compliance  
Na୰ =  Natural resources consumption level 
	ܴ݁௔ =  Restoration activities  
	OPୡ  =  Opportunity costs 
Paୡ୧ ൌ ଵଷ ሾ∑ NBSAPsହଵ ൅ ∑ NRs ൅ 	NCHMsହଵ ሿ   …………….…………… 2 
Paୡ୧ 																		ൌ Paper	compliance	by	country	i  
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NBDSAPs  = All countries expected to have submitted up to 5 NBSAPs.  
NRs   = All countries expected to have submitted up to 5 National reports.  
NCHMs  = Presence or absence of National Clearing House Mechanisms 
 Paper compliance was scored based upon countries meeting all/some of the 
specific requirements set by the CBD. These requirements were; the submission of the 
first NBSAP; submission of up to four revised NBSAPs; submission of up to five 
national reports; and establishment of national clearing house mechanisms by each 
country. The scores were allocated according to table 6 below. These scores were 
allocated simply based on the number of plans or reports submitted to the CBD. As for 
the Clearing House Mechanism, it was a question of whether a country has one or not so 
a country got 0% or 100%.   
Table 6: Paper compliance estimation scores 
Submissions NBSAPs National 
Reports 
CHMs 
1 – First plan/Report 20 20  
2 – First Revised plan/Report 20 20  
3 – 2nd Revised plan/Report 20 20  
4 – 3rd Revised plan/Report 20 20  
5 – 4th Revised plan/Report 20 20  
Total Percent 100% 100% 0% or 100% 
 
3.7.5 National compliance  
Estimation of national compliance was based on the quality of NBSAPs, 
information on the progress of national conservation from national reports and the ability 
of NCHMs to both coordinate and facilitate information sharing within a country. The 
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assumption made was that the quality of planning and how countries meet planned 
activities is a sign of compliance levels.   
National	compliance ൌ fሺQ୒୆ୗ୅୔ୱ ൅	Q୒ୖୱ ൅	Q୒େୌ୑ୱሻ   ………………… 3 
Where 
Q୒୆ୗ୅୔ୱ 									ൌ Quality	of	NBSAPs  
Q୒ୖୱ 														ൌ Quality	of	National	Reports  
Q୒େୌ୑ୱ 									ൌ Quality	of	NCHMs  
National compliance was scored based on the 20 criteria identified in table 4. 
Fulfilment of each criterion was scored up to a maximum of five percentage points for 
the NBSAPs and national reports. The score for NCHMs was based on 10 criteria and 
therefore each criterion received a maximum of 10 percentage points.   
Table 7: National compliance estimation of scores 
 NBSAPs National Reports CHMs 
Number of Criterion 
for developing scores 
were 20 
(0-5)%  X 20 
 = (0% -  100%) 
(0 – 5)%  X 20 
= (0% - 100%) 
(0 – 10)% X 10 
 = (0% - 100%)
 
3.7.6 Local compliance 
Implementation and compliance at the local level was estimated using data from 
ASAHI Glass Foundation as presented in Table 8 below. Specific data was categorized as 
measuring local implementation, local capacities and direct national and international 
support for local implementation.  
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The data was in the form of Likert scale responses to given statements with the 
following scales: 1 (strongly disagree), 2(disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree)and 5 (strongly 
agree). These statements were structured in a negative way to show that what was 
actually taking place with regard to local conservation was good enough to produce 
positive conservation outcomes.  
Table 8: Local compliance estimation 
  Local level implementation variable description                         (N = 1009) Agree Disagree 
1 Other national interests often take precedence over conservation 13 79 
2 Individuals make decisions based on immediate benefits 12 83 
3 Economic considerations given higher priority over environment 15 80 
4 Policies that optimize the whole are secondary – economics & environment 10 80 
5 Members of the public shoulder conservation costs 6 86 
6 Conservation policies face high resistance 9 78 
7 International organizations do not optimize the whole – socio-economics/enviro  7 86 
8 Unanimous consent voting by the UN is not good for biodiversity conservation 11 75 
9 Lack of enforcement by UN makes global coordination weak 12 79 
10 Systematic and organizational reforms are lacking, are much needed now  10 71 
11 There is no reference point for the natural environment and life forms 13 74 
12 Society and cultural practices that support common resources are lacking 10 81 
13 Societal practices that value the environment are few and far in between 15 65 
14 There is capacity to recognize environmental problems locally but not globally  25 61 
15 Decisions based on self-interests, not others or future generations 18 64 
16 Human nature to care for others is often overwhelmed by economic 
considerations 12 77 
17 Values that respect environment and economic activities are inconsistent  11 74 
18 Lifestyles towards high energy consumption cannot be abandoned 32 76 
19 Easily comprehensible information is not communicated to the public 12 80 
20 Conservation experts communicate more with political decision makers 26 53 
21 Political decision makers do not pass on enough information to the public 10 80 
22 Environmental information is valued only when disaster occurs 15 77 
23 NGOs communicate more to political decision makers than local citizens 17 50 
24 Certain level of environmental needed to understand environment is lacking 8 79 
25 Organizations give higher priority to economics and not environmental issues 15 80 
   344 1868 
   13.76 74.72 
Source: Asahi Glass Foundation  
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A total of 1009 people responded to these questions. The percentage of people 
that gave neutral responses was eliminated. Those that responded strongly agree and 
agree were classified as agree. In general, those that responded strongly disagree and 
disagree were classified as disagree. Table 8 above shows the percentage of those 
respondents that agreed and those that disagreed. An average percentage for each was 
estimated. The percentage of people that agreed was assumed to represent the level of 
local compliance. 
    The average numbers of people that agree to the statements reflect the view of the 
success of local level implementation and compliance. The responses of the people that 
disagreed reflect the views that conservation of natural resources face numerous 
difficulties at all levels with the greatest impacts felt at local levels. 
ܮ݊௖௜ ൌ	 ଵଶହ∑ ܣ݃ݎ݁݁ଶହଵ   …………………………………………………..…  4 
Where ௖ܰ௜ 
ܮ݊௖௜ = Local compliance of country i.  
ܮܵ = Likert scale responses from table 8 above.   
3.7.7 Estimation of overall compliance 
The final compliance was estimated by putting together the average of 
compliance level by each country as follows;   
 GLୡ୧ ൌ 	Paୡ୧ ൅	Prୡ୧ ൅	Lnୡ୧    ……………………………… 5 
Where 	Paୡ୧ ൅	Prୡ୧ ൅	Lnୡ୧ is paper compliance by country i + national compliance by 
country i  + local implementation by country i.  
Paୡ୧ ൌ 	∑ሺRଵ ൅	Rଶ ൅⋯൅	Rଶ଴ሻ ൅	Nେୌ୑  ……………………………… 6 
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Prୡ୧ ൌ 	∑ሺRଵ ൅	Rଶ ൅ ⋯൅	Rଶ଴ሻ   ……………………………… 7 
Where: Rଵିଶ଴ ൌ Various	criterias 
஼ܰுெ ൌ ܰܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܥ݈݁ܽݎ݅݊݃	ܪ݋ݑݏ݁	ܯ݄݁ܿܽ݊݅ݏ݉  
GLୡ ൌ 	 భయ ∑ሺPaୡ୧ ൅ Prୡ୧ ൅	Lnୡ୧ሻ   ……………………………… 8 
3.8 Stakeholder cooperation toward compliance 
Many biological resources such as forests and fisheries exist in common pool 
resources and are therefore easily overexploited (Basurto, 2008). Implementation of 
many conservation programs especially in developing countries is done by international 
organizations often serving in more than one country. According to Ostrom (2010), most 
effective systems of governance require small to medium sized departments to provide 
direct services such as conservation institutions at the local level such as communities. 
International as well as local organizations lack enforcement ability and thus to act as 
change agents without sufficient government support and local policy ownership does not 
always bring about the desired outcomes.  
From the perspective of the CBD, biodiversity protection is a universal 
responsibility. All countries that have joined the membership of the CBD have the 
prerogative to choose how they wish to carry out conservation. Factors that support or 
inhibit biodiversity protection are many and vary across countries and regions. Using 
game theory methodology, I have tried to examine individual country strengths and 
weaknesses. Specific country strengths can be used to support another country’s 
weakness under international relations theories. The key assumption made here is that 
when countries cooperate, the kind of support they render each other takes them to a 
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higher compliance level. This happens when the strengths and weaknesses of each 
country are known to each other. Because biodiversity protection is a collective global 
responsibility, countries with strengths in specific strategies will support weak strategies 
in other countries.  
Figure 2: Stakeholders’ cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Source: Own conceptualization of game theory 
 
Figure 2 above shows the initial theoretical approach to explain cooperation under 
both international relations and game theories. At this stage, stakeholders are involved in 
negotiations to build consensus as well cooperatively looking at the extent to which they 
can benefit from the use of biological resources. In this figure, stakeholders come to the 
negotiation table hoping to go away with 100% of their interests met. As negotiations 
progress, realization sets in that they all have to give up a portion of their interest. A 
coalition is formed which then is tasked with implementation. The same process is 
repeated in all countries. These coalitions within countries then need to cooperate and 
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support conservation based on the strengths of their capacity in specific conservation 
issues. These are referred to as a strategy in game theory.         
This study has used theoretical relationship to examine strategic relations between 
implementers or owners of biodiversity and donors or the international community. 
Various benefit and loses scenarios were developed in order to see how various 
stakeholder make conservation decisions. These decisions are both local when looked at 
from the lens of implementers (owners of biological resources) and global if we were to 
look at them from to donors perspectives. Local conservation decisions reduce the 
benefits that communities enjoy from using more biological resources. It is only logical 
that these communities be compensated for more sustainable long-term conservation 
goals. The type of compensation mechanisms developed greatly depends on the type 
governmental and organizational cooperation with local institutions.   
3.8.1 Determinants of institutional cooperation 
The challenge to determining institutional cooperation arose from insufficient 
literature that explains how institutional arrangements work in various places and how 
they are able to work with each other across multiple countries. Within a country, there 
are differences at the operational level (how resources are used), the collective choice 
level (policy making level), and the constitutional level (making of laws that govern 
institutions) (Ostrom, 2010). It is for this reason that collaboration between global 
institutions, international organizations, national and local governments is important for 
successful local conservation efforts. Borrowing from Ostrom’s identified structural 
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elements of a game used to predict outcomes (Ostrom, 2010), the table below was 
constructed to show how institutions could work with each other.  
Using the components in column one under the rules of game theory (Ostrom, 
2010), the study was able to build an institutional working model in column 2. The study 
developed an analytical framework where analysis of different actions at different levels 
in different organizations was clearly displayed, see Table 9 below. There are numerous 
structures that arise when organizations work in cooperation that warrants the analysis of 
rules and other factors which usually affect how organizations work together.  
Table 9: Determinants of institutional collaboration  
Elements of Game Theory Institutional arrangement Factors to consider 
Number of actors Number of institutions Knowledge and 
Resources available 
Positions players occupy 
(Rows or Columns) 
Origin of and 
organization/institution (local, 
national or international 
Working relationships 
Amount of information 
available to each 
stakeholder/player 
Amount of information available to 
each organization/institution 
Organizational 
capacity, Information 
sharing tools    
Set of Actions that players 
take at specific nodes in a 
decision table 
Set of actions different 
organizations take at different levels 
Legislation, policy 
making,  
Implementation 
How much to give up, how 
much to gain, joint losses or 
joint benefits 
How legislation, policy and 
implementation connect with  
intermediate or final outcomes 
What each organization 
brings in, Impact 
Outcomes that players jointly 
affect 
Outcomes that organizations jointly 
affected  
How courses of action 
are selected,  
Benefits and costs assigned to 
actions and outcomes 
Benefits and costs assigned to 
actions and outcomes at different 
levels and organizations 
 Available incentives to 
act or not to act, 
Opportunity costs 
 
Source: Ostrom, 2010 
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Cooperation is the working together of biodiversity stakeholders to accomplish 
shared goals (Smith, 1995) while collaboration is the working together to achieve 
common goals (McLnnerney & Robert, 2004). In a cooperative arrangement, each 
stakeholder is responsible for that portion of conservation work that affects them directly. 
Collaboration on the other hand comes with costs in the form of time and resources 
devoted to establishing and maintaining working relationships, the value attached to such 
relationships and the reputations for being reliable and building trust between 
organizations (Williams, 1979; Breton & Wintrobe, 1982; Ostrom, 2011). 
3.8.2 Application of game theory to biodiversity protection 
In more practical ways, several stakeholders with differing interests are involved 
in biodiversity management, policy making and implementation. Conservation efforts 
will yield higher compliance outcomes if all stakeholders cooperate. Several games from 
simple two-country and two-stakeholder scenario to multiple country cooperation and 
multiple stakeholder complex games were analyzed. 
Table 10: Game theory and conservation strategies   
 Implementer 1 implementer 2 implementer 3 Implementer 4 
Conservation Orgn 1 X1,Y1 X1,Y2 X1,Y3 X1,Y4 
Conservation Orgn 2 X2,Y1 X2,Y2 X2,Y3 X2,Y4 
Conservation Orgn 3 X3,Y1 X3,Y2 X3,Y3 X3,Y4 
Conservation Orgn 4 X4,Y1 X4,Y2 X4,Y3 X4,Y4 
Conservation Orgn 5 X5,Y1 X5,Y2 X5,Y3 X5,Y4 
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Table 10 shows various game combinations that can build both cooperative and 
non-cooperative strategies between owners of biological resources and conservationists. 
The Xs and Ys are the different strategies available to conservation organizations and 
implementer (owners of biological resources) in a game. Strategies are not the same as 
outcomes. The rows represent conservation organizations’ strategies and columns 
represent owners of biological resources and these can be countries, communities or even 
private sector institutions. Each strategy leads to a specific outcome/payoff in 
conservation. The illustration in table 10 shows just one strategy for an implementer and 
the conservation organization. It is important to point out that each of these players can 
have more than one strategy.    
3.8.3 Application of systems theory to biodiversity protection 
Protection of biodiversity ideas originate from conservation organizations. The 
avenues that these organizations take toward compliance are either direct, through 
community involvement, government involvement or private sector involvement. Within 
these avenues, there are several parties (agents) that conservation organizations will work 
with. Working with any of these agents has been referred to by this study as a strategy. 
Successful biodiversity protection can be realized when there are strong strategic actions 
from the conservation community. These actions should favor public involvement in 
public discourses through government structures in order to shape citizen’s perceptions. 
Once perceptions are changed, opposition diminishes and influence toward conservation 
starts to grow (Box, 2010).  
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Most citizens are not well informed and not so involved in public discourse 
processes such that decisions are made by self-interested people and by community 
activists pushing their particular view of the public interest (Box, 2010).  For public 
administrators to intervene in order to protect biological resources, citizens support and 
cooperation is critical. The Figure 3 below shows various avenues (strategies) available 
for conservation organizations to drive the global society toward compliance. They can 
work through governments directly, through communities, through private sector or 
through all these avenues. When they choose to cooperate with either communities or 
private sector only, the level of compliance achieved is a narrow one, therefore can be 
classified as low.  
Figure 3: Compliance network model 
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When conservation organizations drive communities, private sector organizations 
and all other stakeholders to cooperate with governments, the path towards higher 
compliance is longer but wider and therefore can be classified as higher. Compliance 
spectrum ranges between 0% and 100%. The 100% compliance is a desired state which 
can only be achieved if all stakeholders are cooperating and if the conservationists are 
advancing strong strategies that are fully supported by governments. When stakeholders 
work individually, compliance can only be narrowly defined, for example, when a 
government submits a report to the CBD it is seen as complying even though the demand 
for biological resources far exceeds national biological capacity.  
Conservation organizations have to travel the distance from 0% to 100% 
compliance. For explanation sake, working through governments is the shortest distance 
while the strategies of working through communities or the private sector will take longer 
to get to 100% compliance.      
However, it is not possible to ignore communities and private sector interests if 
meaningful compliance is to be achieved. Conservation organizations will therefore have 
to work with governments to reach community and private sector interests. The distance 
travelled from 0% compliance will go through G, to either M or P or both depending on 
the socio-economic structure of a specific country.  
Although the compliance network above shows a flow that does not seem to have 
problems that could arise as organizations or governments work together, disagreements 
on how to solve environmental problems have often played out publicly. For instance, 
environmental regulations have always led to high level conflicts between private sector 
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organizations, international NGOs and civil society institutions, such as what was 
witnessed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The demands for strict and compulsory 
implementation advanced by environmental NGOs were disregarded and a voluntary 
code of conduct developed by the Business Council for Sustainable Development that 
consisted mainly of private sector corporations adopted in what should have a democratic 
process (Hawken, 1995; Banerjee, 2008). Businesses do not want to be told what to do 
and how to do what is perceived as beneficial for the whole society. 
In figure 3 above, suppose the strategies conservation organizations employ are 
ሺܵ଴, ଵܵ, ܵଶ, ܵଷ … ܵ଺ሻ if they wish to work alone. In game theory, one player game is known 
as a decision problem (Turocy & Stengel, 2002). This, however, can be difficult in 
biodiversity protection because of many stakeholders who have to use biological 
resources. Conservation organizations have to build a working relationship with all other 
stakeholders. In games of this nature, players/stakeholders have a choice to maximize 
their payoff/benefits.   
Strategy ( ଵܵ) is when conservation organizations choose to work with the 
community (OMC), ( ܵଶ) is when they work with government (OGC), (ܵଷ) is when they 
work with private sector (OPC), (ܵସ) is if they work with government and communities 
(OGMC), (ܵହ) is if they choose to work with government and private sector (OGPC), and 
(ܵ଺) is when they work with all other stakeholders.  For any avenue that conservation 
organizations take, there is an action profile, ሺܣ଴, ܣଵ, ܣଶ, … . …ܣ଺ሻ. Expected compliance, 
therefore, is multiplied by the probability of every action. 
ܥሺܵ଴, ଵܵ, ܵଶ	, …… . . , ܵ଺ሻ ൌ 	ܵ଴ሺܣ଴ሻ ൅ ଵܵሺܣଵሻ ൅ ܵଶሺܣଶሻ……൅ ܵ଺ሺܣ଺ሻ ……… 9 
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To be able to predict various outcomes or payoffs in a conservation game, I 
introduced the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies between conservationists and 
owners of biological resources, also classified as implementers of conservation policies. 
It is theoretically expected that cooperative strategies lead to higher payoffs/benefits 
while non-cooperative strategies always bring about a lower collective payoff/benefits 
(Jackson, 2011).   
  In any cooperative game between stakeholders, various strategies ௜ܺ , ௜ܻ 	can be 
seen as either favoring conservation when they lead to better implementation or 
constraining conservation when they obstruct implementation. For a conservation 
outcome ௜ܱሺܵሻ for conservation organization ଓሶ	in a conservation profile (ܵ), ݏ௜	in a 
cooperative gave leads to better implementation than ݏ௜ᇱ in a non-cooperative game. 
Conservation organizations do better with ݏ௜ than with ݏ௜ᇱ. 
 ௜ܱሺ ௜ܺ , ௜ܻሻ ൐ ௜ܱሺ ௜ܺᇱ ௜ܻᇱሻ  …………………….……………………………. 10 
In some cases, conservationists and implementers end up with less than optimal 
outcomes. This arises when both conservationists and implementers fail to axecute their 
portion of responsibility. This leads to what is known as prisoner’s dilemma in game 
theory.  
௜ܱሺ ௜ܺ ௜ܻሻ ൏ ௜ܱሺ ௜ܺᇱ ௜ܻᇱሻ   ………………………………………………….. 11 
The government, communities and private sector organizations are expected to 
respond to conservation organizations by either embracing completely the conservation 
agenda, partly embracing or completely rejecting conservation.  Implementers of 
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conservation goals can choose to fit or corrupt the environment in which they find 
themselves. This can be observed from claims made based on the force-field concept that 
for each driving force, there is a restraining force acting to prevent the transformation 
(Rago, 1996). In this context, the following strategy profile is proposed: 
Borrowing from Turocy & Stengel (2002), ܵ ൌ ሺܵ଴, ……ܵ௡ሻ is the conservation 
organization’s strategy profile, then, ܵି௜ ൌ ሺ ௜ܵିଵ, … . . , ܵ଴, ଵܵାଵ, …… , ܵ௡ሻ. Where ܵି௜ is 
the strategy of all other stakeholders except conservation organizations. Therefore, a 
weak strategy ௜ܵᇱ is advanced by all other stakeholders, such that; 
ሺ ௜ܵᇱ, ܵି௜ሻ ൌ ሺ ଵܵ, … , ௜ܵିଵ, ௜ܵᇱ, ௜ܵାଵ, … , ܵ௡ሻ	   ………………………. 12 
such that ሺ ௜ܵ	, ܵି௜ሻ ൌ ܵ 
Conservation strategy ଵܵis meant to influence stakeholder position ܵି௜ and is supposed to 
lead to better conservation outcomes if ܥሺ ௜ܵ, ܵି௜ሻ ൒ ܥሺ ௜ܵᇱ, ܵି௜ሻ for every strategy ௜ܵᇱ 
available to all stakeholders. ௜ܵ 	will lead to more efficient outcomes if ܥሺ ௜ܵ, ܵି௜ሻ ൐
ܥሺ ௜ܵᇱ, ܵି௜ሻ for every  ௜ܵᇱ≠ ௜ܵ. Conservation will be implemented when strategies chosen do 
not reduce the benefits ሺܤሻ that communities enjoy from the consumption of more 
biodiversity. When such benefits are reduced, there must be some form of compensation.   
3.8.4 Cooperation and non‐cooperation approaches to conservation  
It is not all the time that stakeholders in biodiversity protection have one common 
agenda. Some and often very strong stakeholders from the private sector want to exploit 
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biological resources for maximum benefits without hindrance. It is important to examine 
how the non-cooperation from some stakeholders affects conservation.   
Although there are arguments to the effect that communities cannot genuinely 
participate in biodiversity protection, Future Generations (2008) asserts that it is the 
question of capacity more than anything else that prevents communities from effective 
participation. Sources of community capacity building include establishing linkages with 
outside groups and introduction of technological innovations (Future Generations, 2008). 
In many countries, national governments delegate conservation responsibility to local 
levels where capacities do not match these responsibilities. There is no adequate literature 
explaining capacities at local levels to enable facilitation, institutionalization and transfer 
of appropriate technology to community organizations (Nagedre et al. 2005; Salam et al., 
2006; Future Generations, 2008).  
Organizations are created and rely on people to guide their institutional agenda, 
control systems and formal hierarchies to meet set goals and objectives. People come into 
organizations as leaders, managers or as mere workers. How organizations structure 
themselves and empower the people at different levels in these structures greatly 
influences how successful and sustainable their programs become. Therefore, for any 
meaningful cooperation to be realized between different hierarchies and across 
institutions there is a need to build local level institutions (Bawa et al. 2007; Tucker 
2004; Future Generations, 2008). When institutions internal to communities are too weak, 
any cooperation with external institutions is most likely to fail in realizing conservation 
goals (Future Generations, 2008). Building community capacities takes time, sometimes 
as long 10 years (Baral & Gautam, 2007; Future Generations, 2008). 
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      There are specific variables that characterize action situations at these levels 
of service production (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982). Game theory is a powerful tool used by 
scholars to develop mathematical models that satisfy various situations and is used to 
predict expected behavior of rational individuals (Ostrom, 2010). The game theory parts 
of a game can be conceptualized as universal working parts of an action situation 
(Ostrom, 2010). The basic components of a game in this context provide a good 
foundation to build a common method for analyzing different action situations (Ostrom, 
2010). In addition, the flow of activities, information sharing organizations and who 
receives what benefits and who pays what costs (Ostrom, 2011).   
Conservation organizations  
(ܥ௢) = ሺܤଵ, ܤଶ, …ܤ௡ሻ, ሺܥଵ, ܥଶ …ܥ௡ሻ, … , ሺܫଵ, ܫଶ … ܫ௡ሻ   ……………… 13 
Where B, C, ….., I are conservation organizations while the 1, 2, …n are conservation 
strategies  
 (ܣ௦ሻ ൌ 	 ሺܦଵ, ܦଶ, . . ܦ௡ሻ, ሺܧଵ, ܧଶ, . . ܧ௡ሻ, . . ሺ ଵܻ, ଶܻ, …	 ௡ܻሻ ………………. 14 
All other stakeholders = D, E, …Y with their conservation strategies  
The (1…n) are different strategies employed by conservationists to convince other 
stakeholders to support conservation. Other stakeholders may have their own strategies 
Yi. 
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Figure 4: Stakeholder strategies 
 
B1,D1 B2,D2 B3,D3 B4,D4 B5,D5 B6,D6 
C1,E1 C2,E2 C3,E3 C4,E4 C5,E5 C6,E6 
  
This is a simple game theory table showing how biodiversity stakeholders play 
conservation games. For instance when conservationists come forward with strategy 
(B1), other stakeholders counter that strategy (D1); when conservationists come up with 
strategy (B2), the other player counters with (D2). The winner of the game finally is the 
player who gets highest benefits. There are situations when there can be a tie. 
3.9 Institutional relationships 
The systems theory facilitated this study in examining the extent that the use of 
the Internet by national and local institutions. I analyzed both how programs are 
connected from global settings to the local level and vice versa in terms agency and 
organizational relationships. Specifically, I tried to find out the availability of 
information- sharing structures across all levels. Also, how global program initiatives 
bring about changes at national level and finally to local levels. This was necessary to try 
and capture policy links, legislation and various initiatives that may go into a 
programmatic relationship from the global to local levels between governments and 
conservation organizations.    
Conservationists, 
donors or countries 
Communities, local organizations, stakeholders 
(implementers) 
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The degree of non-compliance at global level with the goals of the CBD cannot be 
explained if there is no proper understanding of implementation challenges at local and 
national government levels. There has to be a system of both information sharing and 
coordination. This study makes an argument that low level capacities or non-compliant 
with CBD goals is partly the lack of effective engagement of local communities where 
actual implementation takes place. Implementation of biodiversity protection programs is 
a complex process of bringing together a combination of events and institutions all the 
time. These events include the various international, regional and national conferences 
involving governments, NGOs and private sector corporations all meant to facilitate 
organizational learning through interaction and information sharing.    
The Convention created two Information Technology (IT) sharing tools, the 
Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) and the Global Biodiversity Information Facility 
(GBIF). The CHM is a place for national governments and partners to openly share 
information as well as promote and facilitate technical scientific cooperation 
(www.cbd.int).  The GBIF was created in 2001 to provide free and open access to global 
biodiversity data via the Internet to foster scientific research and development globally 
and to support public use of such data. International Conservation Non-Governmental 
Organizations also created the Biodiversity Conservation Information Systems (BCIS). 
The GBIF, CHMs and BCIS are structures that can be replicated by all members of the 
CBD.  
Countries are encouraged to develop their own information sharing tools for 
effective engagement of local institutions, supporting collaboration and coordination of 
conservation programs (CBD, 2006). The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts as the central 
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node. However, the national information systems seem to face numerous organizational 
and institutional challenges.  
3.9.1 Biodiversity protection coordination problems  
Most of the problems facing biodiversity protection originate from insufficient 
information sharing structures as well as lack of data and coordination between different 
institutions and sectors. The work done at conferences simply sets the agenda and 
countries are left on their own to implement those agendas. There have to be clear 
systems providing universally-accessible data and information that is fully integrated at 
national levels and that link local implementation to international compliance. This need 
not be just a mere linkage but also a way to influence various authorities, facilitate the 
pursuit of conservation goals, and help in the allocation of resources, and measurement of 
outcomes.  
The use of information technology has revolutionized the traditional methods of 
public involvement by leveraging the collective interests of society in order to design 
conservation solutions with communities at local levels (Lei, 2013). Various conservation 
organizations are able to establish relationships with both governments and local 
institutions, which get strengthened using the systems approach. The systems approach 
provides structures for stakeholder involvement with greater transparency, sufficient 
information and learning (Save, 2002). Table 11 below shows how the systems theory 
facilitates outcomes at local, national and international levels.        
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Table 11: Functional systems levels 
 Shared meaning Participation Outcomes 
Local Public awareness 
Public education, 
Communication, 
experimentation, 
Institutionalization, 
best practices, 
common objectives 
Economic incentives, 
regulations,  
Decision-making, 
Decision 
implementation, 
dissenting views 
incorporated, change of 
mental models 
Empowerment, 
implementation,  internal 
consistency, feedback 
mechanisms, dialogue, 
problem definition, 
consensus,  accepted 
regulations, available 
options, knowledge 
integration, community 
transformation, 
National Building public 
trust, Stakeholder 
priorities, causes of 
problems, seeing 
actions and 
systematic effects, 
Policy options and 
boundaries 
Problem identification, 
problem focus, feedback 
tools for learning, 
intervention tools, 
information sharing 
tools, 
Documentation and 
analysis, goals, plans, 
reports, data, policy 
levers, points of 
intervention, greater 
transparency, clarity of 
limitations, strong 
regulations 
International Conferences, 
planning, reporting 
Information sharing, 
CHMs, document 
depository, learning 
Improved coordination, 
improved management, 
more consensus, 
      
Table 11 above shows activities that have to be undertaken at different levels in 
society in order to develop an effective conservation system. The local, national and 
global levels require specific activities to disseminate information so as to improve the 
shared meaning in conservation and participation. It is out of the level of participation 
with clear outcomes that there can be a working system. 
ܩ௖ ൌ ܵ௠ ൅ ௡ܲ ൅ ܦ௔	  …………………………………….  15 
Where:  ܩ௖= Global compliance 
ܵ௠ ൌ		Shared meaning 
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௡ܲ ൌ	Participation  
  ܦ௔ ൌ	Data 
Stave (2002) argues that traditional methods used to involve the public in general 
such as information campaigns, facilitated discussions and public hearings frequently 
leave stakeholders dissatisfied. These traditional methods are essentially a one-way 
communication from experts to members of the public with information that is not well 
explained how it meets community interests. The key assumption made here was that the 
use of information technology (IT) will facilitate the engagement of multiple stakeholders 
to predictably reduce implementation barriers and increase outcomes. The following 
themes were identified and used to explain the extent information systems facilitate 
compliance at all levels: 1) Shared meaning 2) Participation; and 3) Data. These themes 
provided the coding references which were guided by the links to all types of information 
and data found in the CBD and national CHMs. 
Quantitative measurement for these themes were generated from the number 
coded references to each theme and were used to rank how successful systems approach 
has contributed to biodiversity protection and compliance with CBD goals.  
3.9.2 Stakeholder shared meaning in biodiversity management 
Environmental resources are public goods and therefore environmental policies 
are part of the public interest issues. Many of the problems that arise in conservation of 
biodiversity are not because there is no knowledge but rather because of lack of shared 
meaning by all stakeholders in the system (Stave, 2002). Environmental protection policy 
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decisions straddle various societal values. There are no set standards on how to assign 
value to different policy outcomes in different settings. Stakeholders in biodiversity have 
differing interests and competing goals in terms of their specific needs. Information 
technology has facilitated behavioral changes in information-enabled society and has 
infused both learning and understanding (Lei, 2013).   
Public policies continue to evolve over a long period of time after they are 
legislated. Sometimes, these policies are often in a state of self-contradiction and often 
end up sending conflicting signals to society (Friedrich & Mason, 1940). If there is no 
clear and shared meaning, implementation in this kind of relationships will be difficult if 
not impossible.  For most individuals, Organizations and Corporations, the pursuit private 
interest is the upmost priority, making biodiversity problems secondary.   
3.9.3 Stakeholder participation in biodiversity management 
Greater participation by more stakeholders improves the quality of environmental 
decision-making as a result of integration of local, administrative and scientific 
knowledge (Reed, 2008).    Participation in the execution and implementation by many 
stakeholders and administrative arm of governments renders policy a continuous process 
constantly in a state of flux making it almost impossible to state with precision what the 
policy is at a specific time in a specific policy environment (Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984). In conservation, three types of participation are identified (Reed, 2008): i) 
research driven ii) development driven iii) planner-centered and iv) people-centered. 
Planner-centered participation focuses more on outcomes while people-centered is 
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concerned with empowering stakeholders to define and meet their environmental needs 
(Reed, 2008).     
3.10 Information sharing and communication tools  
It is unclear exactly how individuals, communities and local governments are 
experiencing biodiversity protection programs at local levels. The degree of non-
compliance at the global level with the goals of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) 
can only be explained when there is a good understanding of implementation challenges 
at the local and national government levels. My argument here is that partly the problem 
is the lack of effective engagement of local communities where actual implementation 
takes place. The Convention uses two Information Technology (IT) sharing tools to 
engage governments, the Central Clearing House Mechanism and the Global Biodiversity 
Information Facility. Countries are encouraged to develop their own information sharing 
tools for effective engagement of local institutions. The CBD website (www.cbd.int) acts 
as the central node. There should be national nodes in every country that connect to local 
level implementation.   
Table 12 below shows responses regarding how countries prioritize national 
interest, how individual make decisions based on immediate benefits and the extent that 
private organizations look to profits as their priority. Most people from across the world 
agree that biodiversity conservation is not a priority across government and private sector 
institutions, there are more people that agree as can be seen across D and E in table 11 
above. This shows how biodiversity protection means different to different sectors.  
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Table 12: The extent to which biodiversity protection is given priority   
Responses Rank Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
National interests often 
take precedence. 
A 8 6 18 6 0 0 
B 2 6 35 13 8 20 
C 11 22 30 13 4 0 
D 30 22 137 23 21 40 
E 51 39 254 39 67 40 
Individuals tend to make 
decisions based on 
immediate profit or loss. 
A 3 6 30 3 0 0 
B 6 0 45 3 4 20 
C 7 0 32 3 4 0 
D 36 39 181 13 33 20 
E 48 50 199 71 58 60 
Economic profits of  
organizations or regions 
are prioritized and  
environmental 
considerations are not 
A 2 6 44 3 0 0 
B 7 0 61 0 0 20 
C 2 6 37 0 4 0 
D 31 28 147 16 17 20 
E 57 56 206 77 75 60 
 Source: Asahi Glass Foundation 
    
A: Strongly disagree B: Somewhat disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Somewhat agree E: Strongly 
   agree 
 
Table 13 below puts together data to show how national dynamics and influence 
global management of biological resources.  At national level, decisions are heavily 
influenced by political, business and organizational interests and therefore the needs of 
the whole society become secondary as At the international level, decision are made by 
consensus which often leans more to what countries want. 
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Table 13: Influence of national decisions on global conservation 
 
Responses Rank Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
National Systems        
National decision-making 
systems prioritize national 
interests; policies that 
optimize the whole are 
become secondary. 
A 4 0 16 14 0 0 
B 7 0 17 10 5 30 
C 7 13 36 5 5 30 
D 40 31 203 33 32 0 
E 42 56 212 33 58 60 
National decisions influenced 
by political, business, and 
organizational interests and do 
not reflect the will of the 
public, who shoulder the 
environment. 
A 2 0 12 10 0 0 
B 5 0 24 0 0 0 
C 11 13 40 10 11 0 
D 38 38 173 14 32 20 
E 44 50 240 62 58 80 
Changes in national policy 
face great resistance (inertia), 
and as 
such it tends to stay with 
business as usual. 
A 4 0 13 5 0 0 
B 7 6 32 14 11 0 
C 11 25 80 0 11 0 
D 24 38 220 38 32 20 
E 55 31 147 43 47 80 
International Systems        
International organizations 
like the U.N. are affected by 
the will of countries, and do 
not 
optimize the whole. 
A 2 0 11 10 5 0 
B 9 0 26 0 0 0 
C 7 19 46 10 5 0 
D 18 25 150 38 47 40 
E 84 86 210 43 42 60 
Voting system at the U.N. 
with its adherence to the 
fundamental 
principle of unanimous 
consent, makes decision- 
making difficult. 
A 2 6 21 5 0 0 
B 4 6 38 5 0 20 
C 9 13 72 14 0 20 
D 22 38 191 33 47 0 
E 84 38 107 38 53 60 
International organizations 
like the U.N. are not provided 
enforcement powers or other 
forceful methods of 
coordination. 
A 4 0 13 14 0 0 
B 2 13 45 10 5 0 
C 9 13 61 0 5 0 
D 27 25 185 24 32 40 
E 58 44 136 48 58 60 
Systemic and organizational 
reforms are needed, but have 
not been implemented. 
A 4 0 4 10 0 0 
B 5 13 46 5 5 0 
C 29 19 80 5 32 0 
D 36 38 207 57 21 60 
E 25 31 107 19 42 40 
 Source: Asahi Glass Foundation  
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3.10.1 Local and national information sharing capacity 
Using NVivo10, a content qualitative analysis of NBSAPs, national reports, 
analysis of information obtained from government, international and local organizations 
websites was done. This was mainly to see the key emerging conservation themes and the 
contexts in which various key words are used.  A word frequency was done to produce a 
tag cloud of the most commonly used words in each of the documents and compare the 
messages being conveyed. Specifically, this analysis set out to identify the input from 
local levels, cooperation between all sectors, decision making and the types of decisions 
made, information sharing and communication tools.   
Institutions put in place for purposes of biodiversity protection exist at multiple 
levels. Policies drawn at global level are meant for adoption by national governments. 
Once these policies are modified and adopted to the national level, they have to be passed 
down to local levels for implementation. There has to be a shared meaning of these 
policies at all levels and across all institutions for them to be accepted for 
implementation. A shared meaning of rules, regulations and policies help to strengthen 
national enforcement of international treaties. As long as international treaties lack 
sovereign authority to enforce laws, they have very little impact at implementation levels 
(Hathaway, 2005). Shared meaning in this hypothesis means going beyond participation 
to place externally generated goals and objectives in the context of local needs. 
This is where the role of the state apparatus becomes central, as it is the 
responsibility of the government to provide direction, legitimization and information to 
its citizens (Adams & Hutton, 2007). One of the claims made by biodiversity protection 
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experts is the contribution of biodiversity protection to poverty alleviation. How poverty 
alleviation is viewed at both national and local levels from the perspective of biological 
resources protection remains controversial. While there are many people who strongly 
believe that biodiversity protection constrains development, there are many that believe it 
is not and is therefore a good tool for poverty alleviation (Turner et al., 2012). There are 
also many people that believe in sustainable use argument in biodiversity protection 
while there are some that argue that sustainable use argument is presented to postpone the 
conservation problems (Porter & Brown, 1991).  
There is a clear lack of sufficient analysis and information to inform decision 
makers and policy on the contribution of biodiversity protection in social and economic 
development (Turner, 2012). This study therefore tried to uncover and explain the shared 
understanding using information from the existing national plans, reports and the 
literature. The CBD goals and emerging conservation policies at the local levels in the 
light of national and global conservation agendas require to be carefully bridged.  
Examining the existing literature points toward a clear lack of shared 
understanding in the language used, policy processes and sharing the benefits from 
biodiversity. The role of government is to create binding regulations that mandate all 
stakeholders to act responsibly in the course of their business towards environmental 
protection. Governments build structures and networks that recruit expertise needed for 
effective intervention on issues that are considered most important (Stampfer et al., 
2010). At the same time, governments have also been known to play what is known as 
symbolic politics (Davidson, Frickel & Edelman, 1964), where countries develop 
rhetorical strategies designed to manufacture and reinforce public’s convictions that 
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biological resources protection is being competently addressed when in fact the opposite 
is true. Developments over the last two decades of trying to implement the goals of the 
CBD reveal some major disconnection between what is said and what is actually being 
implemented at the local levels (Davidson & Frickel, 2004).  
Biodiversity protection needs to be legitimated across all sectors with relevant 
rules and laws supported by prevailing social norms, traditional, charismatic or 
bureaucratic leadership (Weber, 1968). Sound organizational ethics where biodiversity 
protection interests take center stage can only thrive where all stakeholders share the 
meaning and are guided through use strong tougher enforcement mechanisms (Oliver, 
1991). 
3.10.2 Local input to national policy development 
There is overreliance by national institutions on international experts to develop 
domestic policies and also on international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
the implementation of conservation programs worldwide (Basurto, 2008). International 
experts on policy making do not often understand local conditions. Although NGOs have 
been portrayed as providing better avenues for more participation and less bureaucratized 
approaches that allow the meeting peoples’ needs with greater efficiency and at lower 
costs, recent studies have shown that this is not always true (Chapin 2004; Igoe and 
Kelsall 2005; Basurto, 2008).  
It has also been established that international NGOs cannot be classified as part of 
the civil society as they are not membership based, governed or financed and therefore 
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cannot play a representative role (Abramson 1999; Gaventa 1999; Nelson 1995; Fowler, 
2000). This leaves governments as key players in facilitating more participation and thus 
input from local communities. Although partnerships with the international community 
are extremely important for purposes of accessing financial resources and scientific 
information (Basurto, 2008), best policies are formulated using local institutions.   
3.11 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection 
According to the global Footprint Network, wastes generated from the 
consumption of natural resources can be measured, quantified and tracked by using the 
amount of land that is required to maintain those (Borucke et al. 2012). Human demand is 
expressed in the form of an ecological footprint on global natural resources where supply 
is compared to demand based on biological hectares available to every person. When 
demand exceeds supply, biological resources start to be degraded. Compliance 
measurement should therefore include the difference between available biological 
resources and the level of consumption/use in each country. Countries that are 
consistently in a biological resources deficit should be classified least complied 
regardless of their quality of planning and reporting. Minimum level of compliance 
should be defined starting from a situation when the supply of biological resources is 
either equal or greater that consumption as expressed in the equation below. 
Opportunity costs arise from restrictions imposed on the use of land, forest and 
water resources that are set aside for conservation purposes. These restrictions may 
involve stopping communities from converting land to the use of their choice or are 
allowed limited acceptable usage. Communities therefore forfeit all future streams of 
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income from the land that is restricted (Kaphengst et al. 2011; Chomitz, 2005). 
Restrictions on land use can be measured using foregone income. However, when land is 
converted to serve industry and manufacturing facilities that pollute the environment, 
opportunity costs are on the side of the environment.  Estimating such costs is extremely 
difficult and opportunity costs in biodiversity degradation are this type of costs. Industry 
has been known to use environmental resources that come from biodiversity and dispose 
off waste to the environment at no cost.       
Opportunity costs ሺܱ݌௖ሻ of biodiversity protection ($/ha) were estimated based on 
total costs ሺ ௖ܶሻof conservation less external funding ሺܧ௙ሻ and also less national budgetary 
allocation to conservation. If the final answer is positive, owners of biological resources 
would be expected to incur that cost. If the final answer is negative, the cost of 
conservation is fully covered and communities or private sector organizations will not 
incur opportunity costs ሺܱ ௖ܲ).   
ܱ݌௖ ൌ 	 ሺ ௖ܶ െ ܧ௙ െ	ܤ௔ሻ  ……………………………….  16 
For each country, total opportunity costs (ܱܶ ௖ܲሻ	will be the number of hectares in 
biological deficit/surplus times the value of positive opportunity cost. For countries in 
biodiversity deficit, opportunity cost estimates was based on complete conservation of the 
number of hectares in deficit. In other words, an equivalent of the total number of 
hectares in deficit need to brought into outright protection in the same country, if not 
cooperate and support such conversion in another country. For all other countries, a 
partial conversion was used to estimate opportunity costs. This is because unless these 
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countries continue to pay attention to conservation, they are most likely to also end up in 
biodiversity deficit.  
ࢀࡻࡼࢉ ൌ ሺ࡮ࡾࢇ࢜ࢇ࢏࢒ࢇ࢈࢒ࢋ െ	࡮ࡾࢉ࢕࢔࢙࢛࢓ࢋࢊሻࡻࡼࢉ   ………………………
 17 
3.11.1 Opportunity cost estimation 
Estimating opportunity costs of protecting global biodiversity is necessary for 
appropriate planning, fundraising and implementation of targeted conservation strategies. 
However, there exists no sufficient biodiversity cost data on leading to conservation 
organizations promoting conservation strategies with no costs and budgets (Frazee et al., 
2003). Some of the information needed for opportunity cost estimates includes lost 
revenue arising from foregone use of natural resources, as well as costs of capacity 
building for local conservation institutions. Data on foregone opportunity costs of 
biodiversity protection does not exist.  
Based on available biological resources measured in hectares and level of use for 
each country, opportunity costs were estimated in this research. 
Opportunity =  
{Available biological Resources – Level of use of biological Resources} X Cost 
per hectare. 
ܱ݌ ൌ 	 ሺܣ௕௥ െ	ܷ௕௥ሻ	ܺ	ܥ௣௛   …………………………  18 
3.11.2 Opportunity cost compensation mechanism  
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One of the objectives of this research was not really to estimate the opportunity 
costs but rather to show that it needs to be the core component in defining compliance 
with the CBD goals. Current consumption and degradation of the quality of biodiversity 
far outstrips available quantity and quality of biological resources (Myers et al., 2000). 
The gap between funding opportunities and biodiversity conservation targets in most 
areas is rather growing wider than closing (Kaphengst et al., 2011). Increasing financial 
resources is critical to successful conservation but it will require innovative approaches 
such as the inclusion of opportunity costs in conservation efforts (Kaphengst et al., 2011). 
Accurate estimates of opportunity costs and total costs of conservation leads to a more 
focused approach to the areas of the greatest need thus enabling informed decision 
making and efficiency in the allocation of financial resources (Kaphengst et al., 2011).  
Protecting biodiversity is always in conflict with human activities and economic 
development as unless human activities are restricted, they lead to habitat loss, 
fragmentation and loss of biodiversity. Restricting human activities using only legislative, 
legal or physical restrictions leaves people worse off economically (Bull et al., 2013). 
There is therefore the need for appropriate compensation mechanisms to people for lost 
economic opportunities if they get subjected to any restriction in the way they want to use 
natural resources to meet their basic needs.     
3.11.3 Types of compensation schemes 
There are two types of compensation mechanisms (Plumb et al., 2012; Kate et al., 
2011): i) opportunity cost compensation and ii) biodiversity offset schemes. Opportunity 
cost compensation is an equity based approach that applies to people directly. It is a 
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mechanism where those who benefit from environmental services should bear the burden 
of paying those who would incur some sort of cost to provide those services (Atisa et al., 
2014). Offset schemes are slightly different from opportunity cost approach. Offset 
schemes are designed to link biodiversity conservation with development activities with 
an aim of improving ecological outcomes alongside development (Bull et al., 2013).  
According to Bull et al. (2013), compensation to offset opportunity costs as well 
as offset schemes helps to link conservation with many other sectors that negatively 
impact upon biological resources with sectors that protect these resources. There are 45 
countries globally that now have mandatory opportunity cost compensation legislation for 
biodiversity and compensation mechanism are being developed in another 27 (Bull et al. 
2013; Madsen et al. 2011). Although compensation approach has been conceptually 
attractive, it comes with numerous challenges at implementation stages (Bull et al. 2013; 
Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007; Bekessy et al., 2010). 
Once opportunity costs are determined, compensation to offset conservation costs 
otherwise known as foregone benefits of use of biodiversity can be more targeted to both 
people and specific resources. This can be seen in situations where people get paid for 
agreeing not to use a natural resource or when a piece of land is purchased for 
conservation purposes (Kaphengst et al., 2011). This is necessary if it is expected that 
such use would exceeds the ecological boundary of that specific place. 
3.11.4 Biodiversity Offset Schemes 
Biodiversity offset schemes are compensation mechanisms designed to maintain 
or improve environmental values despite the negative impact outcomes as countries 
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pursue development (Bull et al. 2013; Kiesecker et al. 2009; Lindenmayer, 2007).  This 
literature argues that biodiversity offsets address negative environmental impacts after 
efforts to minimize impacts and appropriate mitigation actions have been implemented. 
There are four steps that lead to biodiversity offsets: avoid, minimize, restore and offset 
or mitigate. These four steps help to balance negative environmental impacts of 
development with positive environmental gains to maintain or improve environmental 
outcomes (Bull et al. 2013; Kiesecker et al. 2009). 
Biodiversity offset schemes stand to benefit development industries, the 
government and conservation efforts. Industries with offset schemes are more likely to be 
granted license for new operations with little or no resistance from the public. Offsets 
provide a mechanism through which government regulators encourage industry to 
contribute to conservation thus enabling broader, deeper and large-scale conservation 
(Kiesecker et al., 2009). Despite paper and policy compliance, as long as industrial 
development continues to erode biological resources, countries need to re-examine their 
definition of compliance. It is important that environmental impacts of development are 
balanced by no net-loss of biodiversity.  
3.12 Decision making in biodiversity protection  
Decision making can make significant contribution to effective policy formation 
when a combination of expert knowledge and ordinary citizens work together. Policy 
formulation and problem-solving by public administrators draws from various criteria 
and rules as a basis for choosing from many alternatives (Lindblom, 1959). Grounds for 
decision making in public organizations are based on partisan mutual adjustments, 
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incrementalism and value clarification (Lindblom, 1959). No one organization or level 
within institutions is able to produce optimal decision making outcomes. National policy 
for biodiversity protection needs local inputs as well as international inputs for decision 
outcomes that would move a country toward higher compliance with the CBD goals.   
Decision making can be seen as a pendulum that swings across a broad range of 
interests, values and hierarchies in and outside of organizations. Best decisions are made 
after an extraordinary inquiry into relative values held by staff members and the society 
to settle at the one that offers greatest value (Lindblom, 1959). Although decision making 
is the function of the executive in an organization (Barnard, 1938), selection of available 
and best alternatives and values needed to attain a specified objective calls for allowance 
for a great deal of inquiry from lower levels and also other stakeholders (Barnard, 1938; 
Mockler, 1968).  
There are many big and influential organizations whose activities have direct 
profound negative effects on the environment but have not been engaged constructively 
in integrating environmental impacts into their business decisions (WWF, 2005).  
Organizations are guided by economic self-interest to the extent that they are not likely to 
adopt biological diversity protection initiatives if these do not meet their own profitability 
criteria (Regan, 1998). Corporations focus more on efficiencies required to maximize 
shareholder value where the key drivers of organizational behavior are competitive 
pressures, market demand, and supply issues (Banerjee, 2008). Conservation decision 
need to tap into private and other stakeholder organizations so as to make policies that 
take into account all interests.  
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Organizational control, decision making and planning for specified objectives is 
best achieved by combining a diverse set of specializations and values from within and 
outside of the organization. Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a 
form of information network with the flow of information providing decision makers at 
different management levels with information needed to make decisions of all types 
(Mockler, 1968). Decisions are made in a dynamic and interactive environment. The 
systems approach facilitates for more comprehensive information, faster, at the point and 
in the form it is needed to make better decisions (Mockler, 1968). Use of systems theory 
in processing and transmitting information makes organizations aware of their internal 
and external environment leading to consideration of political and social values in their 
decision making process (Mokler, 1968). 
Street-level bureaucrat theory argues for allowing more discretionary decision 
making to low level implementers of public policies. Public organizations should seek 
contribution from street-level bureaucrats when formulating policies. Changing 
regulations that affect the way street-level bureaucrats do their business without their 
input to satisfy a section of the policy interests can easily run into conflict with the 
intended policy objectives. Discretionary decision may look insignificant, but collectively 
they determine the texture of the relationship between the citizens and the government 
(Watson, case 2). Policies should be adopted after taking into account regard to the 
existing sum of human knowledge concerning all aspects of biodiversity conservation 
and existing preferences in the community.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.0 Data analysis and determination of compliance 
Chapter four was developed in line with the four hypothesis formulated to guide 
this study and is divided into five sections. The first section presents the qualitative 
analysis of key findings and the specific internal capacities within countries. The second 
section presents the analysis of critical factors that influence compliance and 
implementation of international environmental treaties. This is then followed by 
compliance analysis using the score card methodology on NBSAPs and national reports. 
Compliance analysis by way of cooperative games follows, and the last section examines 
opportunity costs of conservation.  
4.1 Introduction 
Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were employed to examine 
compliance. Specifically, qualitative methods were used to try and define compliance as 
is already defined but with more details in the form of numbers. The qualitative 
compliance findings were translated and scored on a scale of 0 to 100 percent against 
each criterion that was identified in chapter 3. Although it is the responsibility of each 
country to conserve biodiversity within its jurisdiction, the universal nature of 
biodiversity requires cooperation across countries. To examine such cooperation across 
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countries, game theory approach was used. In addition, effective implementation of any 
plan requires full participation of all stakeholders. Systems theory was used to analyze 
how various countries, conservation organizations and communities work together.  
When cooperation does not work, stakeholders involved resort to consensus 
building. Hove (2004) argues that participation is a continuum between consensus-
oriented and compromise-oriented negotiation processes aimed at making adjustments to 
stakeholder interests. Emphasis on consensus obscures adjustments that stakeholders 
make in conservation decisions (Colyvan et al. 2011). I argue that participation need to be 
designed so that rather than have stakeholders make adjustments to their interests, which 
eventually leads to less than optimal decisions, they need to cooperate and agree on the 
best collective outcome from a set of available strategies.   
Game theory was employed to show the differences on compliance outcomes 
between when countries cooperate and when they go through consensus to agree to use 
specific conservation strategies. Compliance levels developed based on the 20 criteria 
were regarded as strategies because the criteria used to determine compliance essentially 
show how strong a country is in implementing specific protection initiatives. Putting 
figures to compliance levels has not been tried by any study before. In this chapter, 
therefore, I have further developed methods that were proposed in the previous chapter to 
be able to see how countries comply at various levels and what should go into 
compliance.  
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4.2 Theoretical findings 
The use of game and systems theories was ideal so as to distinguish the idea of 
consensus building and cooperation. There can be major differences when decisions are 
made under a managed consensus and when stakeholders cooperate. Consensus is always 
never attained and, therefore, stakeholders have to find compromises (Hove, 2004). In the 
coordination of various biodiversity conservation activities to improve overall 
compliance, a consensus building model is not sufficient. There are possibilities that 
some stakeholders would lose out while others gain.       
The systems theory on the other hand was used in trying to elaborate how 
government and various organizations identify problems and the nature of solutions 
developed to address each specific problem. Analytical findings from both government 
and conservation organization activities were compared to determine similarities and 
differences. It was expected that the more similarities, the higher the compliance 
outcomes and vice versa.  
The aim of the CBD is to create a shared network of all countries to improve 
global compliance simultaneously without making any one country worse off. Various 
combinations of strategies that were assumed if effectively addressed in planning will 
increase compliance payoffs without reducing the payoffs of participating countries were 
identified.   
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4.3 Qualitative Analysis of NBSAPs, National Reports and NCHMs 
The use of qualitative analysis of key documents provided the best way to see 
how compliance and implementation is done by countries. Various passages from the 
plans and national reports were examined to see specific ideas that these documents were 
conveying. Passages with similar ideas, phenomenon, or activities were grouped together 
into nodes. The primary documents that were used to gather relevant implementation and 
compliance data were the National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plans (NBSAPs), the 
fourth national progress report submitted to the CBD and online information found on the 
websites of international and local organizations. The study used NVivo10 for qualitative 
document analysis to search, query and code specific texts with information referring to 
specific conservation issues. The key questions that guided coding of texts from these 
documents were: What is going on? What are countries doing? What are the documents 
telling us? (Gibbs, 2007).  
A query to identify the most commonly used words was conducted. Most of the 
conservation words found to be commonly used were searched to see the context or exact 
information they were conveying in the passages where they appeared. A coding process 
to put similar passages together into a node was done. From these nodes, various 
categories and conservation themes started to emerge. Codes are essence capturing and 
essential elements of a research story that when clustered together according to similarity 
facilitate to see connections (Saldan, 2013).        
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 For purposes of obtaining information regarding local level implementation, 
codifying and categorization was done to re-group and link specific themes to local 
implementation, national policies and global strategies. A third cycle of coding to 
generate conservation strategies, policies, collaboration, and stakeholder participation at 
various levels of conservation structures was conducted. Queries using key words to see 
emerging themes (Saldana, 2013) were run. Emerging themes and information patterns 
were tabulated for easier conceptualization. 
The key theme that kept emerging from various plans and reports that connected 
many aspects of conservation was the word “capacity”.  There is either too little capacity 
within countries to contribute towards meaningful compliance or too much capacity in a 
few countries to continue to overexploit biological resources beyond levels where they 
can replenish themselves.  
Table 14: Frequency of use of the word capacity by key documents 
 Country NBSAP 4th National Report
1 Brazil 0 71 
2 Jamaica 55 44 
3 Mexico 12 59 
4 Canada 13 49 
5 UK 26 36 
6 Netherlands 16 12 
7 Switzerland 12 19 
8 Poland 4 10 
9 Kenya 13 76 
10 South Africa 61 118 
11 D R Congo 9 22 
12 Ghana 13 49 
13 India 40 87 
14 Jordan 45 64 
15 Indonesia 55 37 
16 Australia 29 42 
 
Source: estimated using information from the Convention on Biodiversity Website  
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This section explores various contexts in which the word “capacity” is used to 
bring an understanding of exactly how various countries are prepared in both the 
formulation and implementation of biodiversity conservation programs.  
The use of the word “capacity” was examined in the context of national and local 
supportive capacities from existing plans and national reports. Context analysis of the 
word “capacity” to see how it was used and what it meant when used in various contexts. 
A country’s capacity in biodiversity conservation takes into account all instruments 
necessary to increase a country’s ability to carry out conservation work, whether 
equipment, information, knowledge or training (Kenya 4th National Report,  2006). 
The Kenya 4th National Report (2006) argues that capacity building is a central 
element in the implementation of biodiversity goals as well as in aiding in the successful 
design and implementation of conservation goals at all levels and sectors. The specific 
objectives of NBSAPs include the strengthening of national and local institutions, and 
community capacity for sustainable conservation of biodiversity, including the safe 
utilization of biotechnology (CBD, 2002). Inadequate resources and capacity constraints 
slow implementation of conservation plans. The breadth and depth of all types of 
capacities available would give an indication to how successfully the goals of 
biodiversity protection are being implemented. 
Tables 15a through 15d present summaries of the contexts in which the word 
“capacity” was used by NBSAPs and country reports.  
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4.3.1 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for North and Latin America 
Table 15a: Context in which the word capacity is used – Americas 
 
Country NBSAP 4th National Report 
Brazil 0 Capacity building – Humans, 
Institutional, Funding, Technological, 
Ecosystems, Programs, 
Communication, Conservation and 
Infrastructure  
Jamaica Local communities, Resources management, 
National institutions, Technical, Scientific, 
Regenerative, Carrying capacity, Risk 
assessment, Knowledge, Taxonomy, Alien 
Species, Human, Climate Change, Law 
enforcement, Management, Financial assistance, 
implementation, Research & Training, Capital 
resources, Planning, National, Lead agencies, 
Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), Fisheries 
Division, Monitoring, Biosafety, CHMs, 
Biological data, Protected Areas, Resource 
managers 
Capacity building – Assessments, 
carrying, Local, Ecosystems, Financial, 
Technical, Planning, Implementation, 
Scientific, Institutional, Conservation, 
Research, Coordination, Human, 
Marine and Recreational areas and 
Planning  
Mexico Increased human, Institutional and financial 
capacity, Information availability, decision 
making, control, monitor and mitigate and local 
capacities 
Human, People, Scientific, Research, 
Budgetary, Institutional, Technological, 
Monitoring, Decision making, local, 
funding, analysis,  
Canada National and international data base, Carrying 
capacity, Earth, Ever-growing demand, 
Ecological carrying capacity, Management, 
Museums, Institutions, Data & Information, 
Dissemination, Economics & Ecological 
capacity, Support to other countries, LDCS, 
Planning, Implementation, Shared responsibility   
Adaptive, Ecosystems, Agricultural 
lands, Wildlife, Assessment, Response, 
Marine life, Economic, Capacity 
building, Carrying, Development, 
Human, Reporting, Different levels of 
government, Agencies    
 
 
Table 15b below shows the contexts in which the word capacity was used by 
countries sampled from Europe.  
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4.3.2 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Europe 
Table 15b: Context in which the word capacity is used – Europe 
 
Country NBSAPs 4th National Reports 
UK Agricultural stability, Invasive Alien 
Species, Collections in Zoos, 
Environmental, Carrying capacity, 
Resources management, Exceeding limits, 
Ecosystems, Forest capacity, Over-
fishing, Targeted decommissioning 
program, Linkages, Botanic gardens, 
Productive, Support to other governments, 
NGOs, Awareness, Funding, 
Implementation 
Capacity building, Develop/Build, 
Adaptive, Climate Change, Scientific, 
Reproductive, Habitats, Ecosystems, 
People, Institutions, Financial, Technical, 
Local, Cooperation, implementation,  
Awareness 
Netherlands Knowledge sharing, Sustainable forestry, 
Good governance, Management, 
Ecosystems, Poor countries, Programs, 
Resilience, Protected Areas, Ecological 
Networks, Fishing fleets, Developing 
countries, Fish meal & Fish oil chain, 
Water management, Knowledge networks, 
Shared responsibility, managers.   
Indigenous/local communities, Parties, 
Capacity building, Financial, Human, 
Scientific, Technical, Implementation, 
Capacity as an indicator 
Switzerland Climate Change, Implementation, 
Protected Areas, Participatory planning, 
Knowledge management, Nature to renew 
itself, Performance of forests, Resilience, 
Natural regeneration, Alien Species, 
Ecosystems 
Glaziers/water holding, production, 
capacity building, indigenous/Local 
communities, Technology transfer, 
Networking, Scientific, Financial,  
Communications, Ecosystems, Technical, 
implementation, Parties, Switzerland, 
Cartagena Protocol, Technical/Scientific 
Cooperation, Knowledge, Programmes.  
Poland Level of spending, Finance, Legal, 
Resources, Research, Personal, 
Institutional, Technical, Public 
Administration 
Financial, Gene banks, collections of 
botanical/zoological gardens, Capacity 
building, Public, Fishing, Catch, 
Ecosystems, Parties, Financial, Human, 
Scientific, Technical, Planning.  
 
Source: NBSAPs and reports of these countries 
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4.3.3 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Africa 
Table 15c: Context in which the word capacity is used – Africa 
Country NBSAPs 4th National Reports 
Kenya Institutional, Linkages, Law 
enforcement agencies, Collaboration 
& Networking, Coordination, Kenya 
Wildlife Service, Programs, Training, 
Bioprospecting, National, 
Biotechnology, Community, 
Technology Transfer 
Planning, financial, human, scientific,  
Technology transfer, National, Institutional, 
Managers, Support to fisheries, wildlife and 
birds, Capacity Building, Community, 
stakeholders, local resources, Poverty, 
Coordination, Funding, Land degradation, 
Education, Research, Assessment, 
Implementation gaps, Information, storage 
and retrieval, Law enforcement agencies, 
National ICT, Taxonomic works and 
surveys, NGOs and CBOs, Gene banks, 
Ecosystems, Parties      
South 
Africa 
Institutional, Constraints, Local 
governments, Research, Universities, 
Councils, Institutions, Adaptive, 
Agencies, Community empowerment, 
Ecosystems, Management, Climate 
change, Financial, Local level, Staff 
Retention, Data, Human, Planning, 
Partnerships, Habitats, Economic, 
Environmental, NGOs, Assessment, 
Implementation, Programs, CBOs, 
HIV/AIDS, Funding, Programs, 
Trans-boundary, Carrying capacity, 
Negotiations, Biotechnology, GMOs, 
Monitoring and Risk Assessment, 
Technology, PA Networks, Biosafety  
Human, Capacity building, Lack of capacity, 
Enforcement, Research, Monitoring, 
National, Programs, Municipalities, Local, 
Planning, Protected area systems, Future 
priorities, 
Compromised ecosystems, Climate Change, 
Flooding, Water quality, Institutional, 
Legislation, Agencies, Compliance 
monitoring, Uneven capacities, Resources, 
Stakeholders, Mainstreaming, Parties, 
Cartagena Protocol, Overcoming constraints    
D R Congo Management, Protected Areas, Local 
communities, Funding, Law 
enforcement, Legal, Institutional 
Low skills, production, Financial, Technical 
support, Carrying capacity, National, 
Institutional, Capacity building, 
Management, Gaps – management structures 
and individuals, Implementation, Technical, 
Climate Change, Biosafety, Communication, 
CHMs, Poverty, Internal Revenues, 
Financial, Assessments, Internal wars and 
Cartagena Protocol.  
Ghana Community participation, 
Management, Carrying capacity, 
Akosombo dam, Scientific data, 
Information, Institutions, National & 
Local levels, Assessment, Human 
capacity, Fire prevention and control. 
Inadequate management, GIS, CERGIS, 
Building/Strengthening institutions, Capacity 
building, Financial support from DCs, 
Carrying capacity, management, Ecosystems, 
Parties, Cartagena Protocol, National-Level, 
Technical/Scientific Cooperation, Training, 
Planning, Protected areas, Knowledge & 
Skills, Participation of Local/Indigenous 
communities, Fringe communities, District 
Assemblies, Agricultural Production, Land 
Management.    
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4.3.4 NBSAPs and the 4th National Report for Asia 
Table 15d: Context in which the word capacity is used – Asia 
 
Country NBSAPs 4th National Reports 
India Institutional, National, Human, Strengthen,  
Grassroots level, On-job training, Invasive 
Alien Species, Climate Change, Financial 
Assistance, Natural regeneration of rivers, 
Monitoring, Enforcement, Taxonomy, 
Biosystems, New technologies, Local, 
Carrying capacity, New generation of 
taxonomists, Awareness, Biotechnological, 
Production, Scientific Management, 
Conservation, Risk Assessment, Genetically 
Modified Organisms, Biosafety, 
Communication, Manpower, Infrastructure, 
Implementation   
Gaps, Constraints, National, Regional, Local, 
Communities, Capacity building, Micro-
enterprise, Self-help groups, Biosafety, 
Education, Awareness, Coordination, 
Institutional, Legal Framework, Risk 
evaluation/management, Evaluations, 
Taxonomic, Ecosystems, Financial, Human, 
Scientific, Technical, Implementation, 
Planning, Management, Protected Areas, 
Regulations, Inter-Ministerial, Online data 
base, New Technologies, Genetically 
Modified Foods, Enabling policy & 
Legislation, Partnerships and Stakeholders, 
Local people, Center for excellence in 
Madras, Coastal systems, Farmers,    
Jordan Institutional, Productive, Ecological, 
Carrying capacity, Bio-transformation, 
Tolerance to environmental stress, Law 
enforcement, Cooperation, Management, 
Local ecologists, Information, Data, Wildlife 
Reserves, Local communities, Authorities, 
Coordination, Technical, Staff, Monitoring, 
Animal care, Ecosystems, Infrastructure and 
services, Development, Rangelands, 
Economic valuation, Technical training, 
Agencies, Funding, Implementation, Micro-
biology, Land-use practices, Safe & healthy 
foods, Local species, Stakeholders 
National, Communication, Administrative, 
Biological, Technical, Financial,  
Universities, Carrying capacity, Planning, 
Environmental, Institutional, Knowledge 
management, Development programs, 
Awareness, Local conditions/communities, 
Decision making, NGOs & CBOs, Capacity 
building, Taxonomic research, Production, 
Local civil society organizations, 
Networking, Climate change, 
Implementation, Education and training, 
Resource mobilization.  
Indonesia Institutional, Implementation, Management, 
Institutions, Carrying capacity, Effect of 
salinity on animals, Ground water, Pollution,  
Education, Communication, National, Local, 
Timber industry, Forest management, 
Overexploitation, Data, Technical, Natural 
resources, Economic growth, Laws & 
regulations, Negotiation, Awareness, 
Compliance, Fundraising, Partnerships  
Capacity constraints, Sectoral programs, 
Planning, Carrying capacity, exceeded 
capacities, capacity building, Institutional, 
Communication, NGOs, Local governments, 
Negotiations, Fundraising, National, 
Indigenous, Local communities, 
Management, Ecosystems, Financial, 
Human, Technical, Assessments, Valuation, 
Forest rangers, Implementation, Parties. 
Australia Food production, Ecosystem resilience, 
Finite capacity, Human activities, Individual 
& Collective, Productive, Survival, 
Underlying capacity, Earth’s capacity, 
Climate Change, National biodiversity 
accounting, Local, Territorial, Regional, 
Private sector, Indigenous engagement, 
Emissions accounting, NAILSMAN, Land 
management, Back-on-Track, Corporate 
planning, Land use planning, Community 
Gaps in policy research, Corals destruction, 
Land managers, Finite capacity, Capacity 
building, Nature vegetation cover, Loss of 
taxonomic workforce, NGOs, Asia-Pacific 
forestry funding, Workshops, Technology 
transfer, Maritime Surveillance, Protecting 
Maritime Resources, Adaptive, Ecosystems, 
Financing, Parties, Human, Scientific 
cooperation, Short of skills, Assessments, 
Implementation, Community engagement. 
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Networks, Program, Ecological knowledge, 
Resource degradation, Self-Regeneration.    
Other key emerging themes were put together and used as criteria for evaluating 
compliance and implementation at local levels. This was how the 20 criteria mentioned 
earlier were established. Because actual conservation activities are done at local levels 
and within sectors that exploit natural resources, it was possible to analyze what countries 
are doing and what these documents were saying. Key words surrounding these emerging 
themes were determined to be ideal criteria to be used to measure compliance levels at 
the global, national and local levels.   
4.4 Factors that most influence global compliance 
 
Information in Table 16 represents responses from a survey conducted in the year 
2013 by the ASAHI Glass Foundation where people were asked to indicate which factors 
they thought most influence compliance and implementation. Before zooming into 
specific factors in individual countries that are being examined in this study, a global 
analysis has been done to see where and how the sampled countries under study share an 
understanding of overall global conservation.     
Table 16: Factors that most influence compliance and implementation 
Factors Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
Problems in communicating 
Information 
19 23 107 34 36 33 
Pursuit of economic Profit 
 
74 69 409 76 73 56 
Global economic system 
 
74 69 241 63 39 44 
Problems in decision making 
Systems 
47 62 261 51 58 56 
Governance problems 
 
58 46 246 51 64 78 
Lack of technical resources 
 
5 4 124 7 18 33 
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Total  277 273 1388 282 288 300 
    Source: ASAHI Glass Foundation, 2012 
Since 1992, the AGF has been conducting global research on environmental 
conservation. In 2013, the AGF sent out questionnaires to key conservation 
organizations, research universities and governments, and asked staff to rank issues that 
they thought were key impediments to environmental conservation in general. The way 
the language in the research was framed fits very well with the questions that are guiding 
this study. As can be seen from table 16, in Western Europe, 19 people said 
communication was a critical factor. There were 74 people that said it was the pursuit of 
economic profit by private and public sector institutions. Also 74 people said it was the 
global economic systems, such as the measure of development using GDP, which tend to 
exclude many other aspects of development, such as the quality of our environment. 
There were 47 people that said it was decision making systems that were key 
impediments to compliance and implementation of conservation goals. What the decision 
making systems here means is who actually has the most power to influence what 
governments do. At the moment, powerful political, businesses and other private 
organizational interests wield more power and tend to influence decisions away from 
favoring environmental concerns.  
Governance problems were also highlighted as critical factors by 58 people. 
Governance here covered many factors, such as the slow response by countries in 
fulfilling their commitments to conservation, political priorities and transparency in 
decision making by various organs of government, and the public and private sectors. 
Only five people cited lack of technical resources as a critical factor impeding 
implementation. Issues highlighted in this question were technologies that would help to 
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reduce overconsumption of resources including energy. Western Europe is comprised of 
the world’s most developed nations that are well endowed technologically and therefore 
this view cannot apply to most of the countries.  
The same explanations apply to Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
the Middle East. 
4.4.1 Factors that most influence local level implementation 
Table 17 below shows the relationship between compliance and various primary 
variables. Using data from the Global Footprint Network, the following linear regression 
were obtained for sixteen countries. The dependent variable was the average biological 
capacity of all the sixteen countries. It was assumed that there is a direct relationship 
between biological capacity and these specific independent variables.   
Except for forest resources at 5% level, all other variables have significant impact 
on the biological capacity.  The population, networking (meaning coordination of various 
agencies), community institutions and the international community, croplands, grazing, 
and levels of carbon in the atmosphere have significant effects on biological capacity. 
Built-up areas, which are comprised of urbanization, constructions and road networks, 
were also found highly significant.  
However, biodiversity conservation cannot be classified as a linear, cause-and- 
effect relationship. Total activities that affect biodiversity and the total conservation 
efforts interact in ways that cannot possibly be classified as linear. Conservation activities 
and institutional relationships, therefore, need to be examined from the lens of a whole 
system. 
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Table 17: Significance of primary factors that most influence implementation 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.978 
R Square 0.957 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.907 
Standard Error 1.507 
Observations 16.000 
ANOVA 
  Df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 8 351.615 43.95 19.34 0.00 
Residual 7 15.91 2.27 
Total 15 367.52       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept 5.726 1.829 3.131 0.017 1.402 
Population (Ms) -0.004 0.002 -1.900 0.099 -0.008 
Network 10.630 1.924 5.524 0.001 6.080 
Cropland  15.820 3.265 4.846 0.002 8.100 
Grazing  -6.770 2.326 -2.911 0.023 -12.269 
Forest  -3.643 3.099 -1.176 0.278 -10.971 
Fish  -20.251 10.020 -2.021 0.083 -43.945 
Carbon  -3.830 0.819 -4.674 0.002 -5.767 
Built-up -83.377 13.083 -6.373 0.000 -114.312 
    Adjusted R squared is 91% meaning that the model is well explained by the independent variables.   
 
Biological capacity was measured in hectares per person. Population was given in 
millions; network was measured in the number of institutions and organizations that work 
together. Although not so significant, a unit rise in population leads to a reduction in 
biological capacity by an equivalent of 0.004 hectares per person. A unit rise of the 
number of conservation networks improves biological capacity by 10.63 hectares per 
person. A rise in one hectare of cropland according to this analysis improves biological 
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capacity by 15.8 hectares. This was not the expected outcome. A rise by one hectare of 
grazing land reduces biological capacity by 6.8 hectares per person. An equivalent of one 
hectare increase in fishing grounds leads to reduced biological capacity by an equivalent 
of 20 hectares of fish resources. One unit rise of carbon in the atmosphere reduces 
biological capacity by about four hectares per person. One hectare increase in the land 
taken up by buildings and other constructions reduces biological capacity by an 
equivalent of 83 hectares per person.  
4.4.2 Analysis of compliance levels  
It is important to note that national compliance is not only a reflection of the 
strength of conservation policies and quality of conservation programs but also the 
readiness of local institutions.  How ready and able local institutions are, depends on 
information dissemination, enforcement of conservation policies, training, incentives and 
perceived costs associated with such programs. It requires guidelines, education and long 
term multilevel strategies to build local capacities. Finally, program developers should 
get involved on a continuing basis to identify key attributes of a conservation program 
that gives best outcomes at minimum costs.  
There are two national approaches to compliance: (i) countries comply because it 
is appropriate to do so and (ii) countries comply just to be seen doing good without 
actually fulfilling the requirements of a treaty (Hathaway, 2005).  National compliance 
outcomes include creation of national and local institutions, changes in community’s way 
of viewing biological resources, improved communication and collaboration, and 
emergence of epistemic communities. Adoption of a treaty without fulfilling its 
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requirements may come about from lack of capacity, lack of political willingness, or 
because other issues are given higher priorities. 
4.4.3 Compliance outcomes 
The estimates of compliance were analyzed from the data obtained from the 
NBSAPS and National Reports. Data on local level compliance and implementation was 
expected to be obtained from National Clearing House Mechanisms (NCHMs) in each 
country. Countries have not developed NCHMs to serve the coordination and information 
sharing with all sectors and different stakeholders. There was, therefore, no data in the 
NCHMs to serve this need. Consequently, data from the AGF was used to estimate local 
level compliance and implementation.  
Data obtained from AGF was constructed from the Likert scale statements that 
covered all aspects of local level implementation. These aspects of local implementation 
included communication, decision making, societal values, traditions, economic vs 
environmental considerations and   priorities of biological resources. The percentage 
number of respondents, who held the view that implementation at local levels was going 
on well and that it was above a certain threshold level, was used as a measure of local 
compliance.   
Table 18 below shows average compliance across specific compliance criteria as 
well as local level compliance. National compliance based 15 of the 20 criteria 
established from data obtained from the NBSAPs and national reports were 56%. These 
15 criteria were selected as they were very similar to the AGF responses used in 
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estimating local compliance. This was done for comparison purposes to see the difference 
between national and local compliance.  
These were statements that disagreed that there were problems with local 
implementation and have been re-stated in table 18 to fit the exact views of respondents. 
Table 18: National and local compliance  
CBD – Information from 
documents  
Compliance 
level 
AGF Data – Information from  
survey data 
Compliance 
Level 
National Biodiversity 
Strategy Action Plans 31 
Ability to comprehend 
information 12 
 National Reports 79 Adequate Information  18 
Clearing House Mechanisms 81 Education and training 8 
The nature and type of 
language used by plans  51 
Consideration of future 
generations 18 
National Capacity 53 Balanced economics and Environmental Decision 10 
Local capacity 53 National Decisions reflecting local conditions 6 
Surveys, data and local 
studies 40 Societal and Cultural practices 10 
Depth & Scope of plans and 
reports 61 
Organizational and institutional 
reforms 10 
Goals set by countries in their 
plans 62 
Acceptance in changes to 
national policies 9 
Objectives – How realistic are 
the objectives 66 Coordination  12 
Institutions created to protect  
biodiversity protection 61 Sustainable lifestyles 32 
Funding allocations  46 Ability to recognize environmental conditions 25 
Legislation that biodiversity 
protection  51 
Making decisions that equally 
support conservation 12 
Clear timelines in the plans 49 Willingness to conserve biodiversity freely 17 
 Total 784  Total 199 
 Average 56%  Average 14% 
Overall global compliance = the average of 56% + 14% = 35% 
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The criteria that reflect local level implementation were selected from both the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) data as well as data from the AGF. As can be seen 
from table 17 above, overall national compliance is at 35%. This confirms most of the 
fears expressed in the literature that biodiversity degradation has continued to accelerate 
over time. At 35% compliance means that only 35% of all activities that people do go 
towards improving biodiversity protection. It also means that about 65% of all human 
activities at the national level go towards both over-exploitation and degradation of 
biological resources.   
The next step in the analysis was to test hypothesis one by examining the level of 
support and types of support indicators. Some of these indicators include decision support 
mechanisms to local levels and societal priorities that either support more or less of 
conservation, communication, local practices and cultural influences. Table 18 below 
presents the percentages on how different respondents agreed to or disagreed to the given 
statements.   
It is clear from table 18 above that 79% of the respondents feel that other national 
interests take precedence over conservation. About 83% felt that individuals make 
decisions based on immediate benefits that are often not about the protection of 
biological resources. It was also found from the respondents that there is more priority 
given to other societal needs, communication is not well targeted and that decisions are 
made to satisfy immediate needs and not long-term conservation objectives.  
On average, about 73% of these respondents in table 18 were of the opinion that 
all the 17 statements on the table support less conservation but support other activities 
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more. Compliance has been estimated to be at 35% in table 18. This confirms the first 
hypothesis that International and national conservation initiatives fall short of 
conservation outcomes, and because of inadequate support to local institutions where 
actual implementation takes place, global compliance with CBD goals is low.  
Table 19: Confirmation of hypothesis one  
 Statements Disagree Agree 
1 Other National interests often take precedence over 
environmental conservation 
13 79 
2 Individual make decisions based on immediate benefits 12 83 
3 Easily comprehensible information is not communicated from 
conservation experts to the public 
12 80 
4 Environmental experts focus communication of information too 
heavily upon political decision makers, failing to reach the public 
26 53 
5 Political decision makers do not communicate information from 
environmental experts to the public 
9 80 
6 Public does not value the information provided by environmental 
experts unless disaster occurs in their vicinity 
15 77 
7 Non-profit organizations overemphasize Communications efforts 
on political decision makers 
17 50 
8 Minimum  environmental education level is necessary for 
understanding of environmental information but is lacking  
8 79 
9 The economic profits of a corporation/organization/regions are 
prioritized so much that environmental considerations are not 
taken into account 
15 80 
10 Absence of reference towards natural and different life forms 13 74 
11 Societal and cultural practices and bases that place importance on 
“common good,” like environment, are lacking or fragile. 
10 81 
12 Societal practices and traditions that value the weak, including 
environment, are few and far between. 
15 65 
13 At most, people have capacity to recognize environmental 
conditions and effects on local level, but are incapable of 
recognizing problems globally 
25 61 
14 Human decision-making process is based on self-preservation; it 
does not consider happiness of others or of future generations 
18 64 
15 Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed by behavioral 
principles based on economic considerations 
12 77 
16 The value systems that respect one’s own environment and daily 
economic activities are inconsistent with each other 
11 74 
17 Current lifestyles based on large consumption of energy cannot 
be abandoned 
32 76 
 Average 16% 73% 
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Table 19 above shows the percentage of people that disagreed and that agreed that 
existing local conservation efforts cannot drive compliance to higher levels. The 
percentage of people that think local initiatives are good were only 16%. A total of 1009 
people responded to these statements. The 16% level does really drive down compliance 
level when an average is estimated with the national and CBD levels.     
Table 20: Overall global compliance by all countries 
Countries 
Paper 
Compliance 
% 
Policy 
Compliance 
% 
AGF Data Local 
compliance 
% 
Canada 67 86 Ability to comprehend information 12 
Mexico 67 46 Adequate information 18 
Jamaica 67 48 Education and training 8 
Brazil 73 49 Consider future generations 18 
UK 80 77 
Balanced economics and 
environment 
10 
Switzerland 67 75 
Decisions reflecting local 
conditions 6 
Netherland 67 72 Societal and cultural practices 10 
Poland 80 34 
Organizational and institutional 
reforms 10 
Ghana 60 30 
Acceptance to changes brought by 
national policies 9 
DR Congo 73 24 Coordination 12 
Kenya 33 23 Sustainable lifestyles 32 
S. Africa 40 36 
Ability to recognize environmental 
conditions 25 
India 73 54 
Making decisions that support 
conservation 12 
Indonesia 73 40 
Willingness to conserve 
biodiversity freely 17 
Jordan 27 29 Total 199 
Australia 73 75  
Total %  
Global 
Compliance 
Average - 
63.75 
Average - 
49.88 
Average 
14% 
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The Table 20 above shows compliance levels for each country at paper, policy 
and local levels. The average paper compliance is 63.75%, policy compliance is 49.88% 
and local implementation is compliant at a mere 14%.    
The paper compliance column represents the percentage level that each country 
has met with the CBD requirements. The UK and Poland had the highest compliance at 
80%. What this means is that they have submitted more reports and revised their 
NBSAPs more than other countries.   Jordan had the lowest compliance at 27%, followed 
by Kenya at 33% and South Africa at 40%. These countries have made minimum 
revisions to their NBSAPs and submitted the least number of reports. On average, 
international compliance is about 64%.  
The Policy compliance column was estimated using the 20 criteria that were 
established from the literature, plans and national reports.  Canada had the highest 
compliance at 86% and Kenya was lowest at 23%. Nationally, the average compliance 
was about 50% when looking at policy alone.  
Country compliance column is the average of paper and policy compliance. The 
global compliance without local level implementation was 57%. Compliance data on 
local level implementation is missing from Table 20 above Local level compliance was 
estimated separately using data from AGF. This data contained responses to a 5-point 
Likert scale questionnaire. where people were to either a Local level compliance has been 
analyzed using organizational and stakeholder cooperation and implementation strategies 
using game theory. 
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Table 21 below presents some of the critical factors that influence the 
management and implementation of biodiversity goals. These factors were scored 
between zero and 100%. Columns one, two and three show the percentage performance 
of each country based on the number of NBSAPs and National Reports submitted to the 
CBD and the creation of National Clearing House Mechanisms. Columns four through 15 
are part of the 20 criteria used to evaluate compliance by countries. Only 11 out of the 20 
criteria have been used here, first because of space and secondly, these 11 are the core 
variables that influence compliance and guide implementation.  
The columns show the average compliance level by each factor for all countries. 
The bottom row presents average compliance by each factor. The rows show the average 
compliance for each country across various factors. The last right column presents the 
average compliance by each country. Overall compliance by these countries measures up 
to only 49%. Based on these factors, Canada had the highest compliance at 70%. United 
Kingdom and Australia had compliance with CBD goals at 67%. Kenya, Jordan and 
Democratic Republic of Congo had the least compliance at 31%, 33% and 33% 
respectively. With respect to individual factors, the NBSAPs that are supposed to be the 
roadmap for compliance and implementation comply only up to 31%. Surveys and data 
collection activities comply at only 40%, funding at 46% and setting timelines at 49%. 
Compliance based on paper and policy levels does not really tell the whole story. 
It is therefore necessary to find ways of analyzing local level implementation to be able 
to present a true reflection of actual compliance level.        
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Table 21: Compliance level by 15 out of the 20 criteria   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Countries NBSAP 
 
Reports CHM Lang 
Nationl 
Capac 
Local 
capac Surve 
Depth 
Scope Goal Objectiv Institutn Fund Legisla Timing 
Comp 
level  
Canada 20 80 100 80 75 80 80 100 100 100 90 70 80 60 70 
Mexico 20 80 100 30 40 40 60 60 40 60 60 40 40 30 44 
Jamaicaa 20 80 100 40 40 50 60 80 70 75 50 40 50 70 52 
Brazil 40 80 100 40 50 60 40 50 60 40 60 40 70 30 48 
UK 60 80 100 80 80 80 70 70 75 80 90 80 70 60 67 
Switzerland 40 60 100 80 80 80 20 80 80 75 70 60 80 90 62 
Netherlands 20 80 100 80 70 80 0 60 80 80 80 80 30 80 58 
Poland 40 100 100 30 30 30 0 30 60 80 30 40 40 30 40 
Ghana 20 60 100 20 40 40 40 20 50 30 40 40 20 40 35 
DR Congo 40 80 100 20 20 20 20 30 40 40 50 20 20 20 33 
Kenya 20 80 0 30 50 30 40 40 50 60 40 20 20 20 31 
S. Africa 20 100 0 40 40 50 30 60 60 80 60 50 60 40 43 
India 40 80 100 70 70 60 80 80 70 60 80 20 80 80 61 
Indonesia 40 80 100 60 40 30 30 60 40 60 50 30 30 30 43 
Jordan 20 60 0 40 40 40 30 70 40 60 40 20 40 20 33 
Australia 40 80 100 80 80 80 40 80 75 80 80 90 90 80 67 
Compl 
level 31 79 81 51 53 53 40 61 62 66 61 46 51 49 49 
Source: Calculations estimated using information from NBSAPs, National Country Reports, and Clearing House Mechanisms 
The criteria where a country has highest compliance was assumed also to be an area of the highest strength and therefore its best 
strategy in a cooperative game. 
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4.5 International relations theory analysis   
Goldsmith and Posner (2005) argue that international theory is designed to 
support states in pursing their own interests on the international stage. Many international 
treaties also treat all countries as equals when in reality they are not. This is clearly 
demonstrated in Table 21 above where compliance levels by each country across various 
criteria are so different. Governments are unwilling to commit to international treaties 
when doing so does not serve national interests.   
National implementation and compliance is a total whole of conservation 
activities taking place at local levels within a country. This also includes how well 
countries are performing at a continuum from planning through capacity building to 
monitoring and evaluation at national levels. In this continuum is the rest of all other 
criterion used to measure compliance in my study. For international relations theories to 
effectively be seen to coordinate governments, they must be able to internally coordinate 
national activities to satisfy global interest. This is not practically and politically feasible. 
My study examined the effectiveness of the international relations theory by using 
compliance levels in Table 21 above. These compliance levels can be viewed as issues of 
global concern and therefore provide excellent case studies on how countries make 
decisions on what qualifies for support from outside of the country. The following 
assumptions were made in order to establish international working relationships between 
countries 
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1. Compliance levels established through scores given to each criterion shows the 
level of conservations support needs for each criteria.   
2. When governments cooperate, they should support each other in areas where they 
both have highest compliance so that the overall average compliance remains 
high.   
For explanation purposes, compliance levels on national capacities (NC), local 
capacities (LC), funding levels within each country (FG), and the strength of 
environmental legislation (LN) were selected to compare the UK and Brazil. The same 
explanations can apply to the rest of the sample of countries.   
Figure 5. United Kingdom and Brazil cooperative relationship 
  Brazil 
  NC LC FG LN 
UK NC 80, 50  80, 60 80, 40 80, 70 
LC 80, 50 80, 60 80, 40 80, 70 
FG 80, 50 80, 60 80, 40 80, 70 
LN 70, 50 70, 60 70, 40 70, 70 
 
  Suppose the UK and Brazil decide to cooperate in the management and 
implementation of key initiatives to help the two countries move to higher compliance. 
Except legislation (LN), the UK has higher compliance in national capacities (NC), local 
capacities (LC) and funding capacities (FG) than Brazil. If Brazil, therefore, were to 
approach the UK and ask for support, it will most likely ask to be supported financially 
(FG). This is the strategy where it has the lowest compliance at 40% and therefore stands 
to gain the most. On the other hand, if the UK were to approach Brazil and ask to support 
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Brazil’s conservation efforts, it will most likely want to support local capacity, which is 
at 60%, because this is where the UK will incur the least cost/effort. If the two countries 
were to be brought together by a third party and asked to cooperate, they may want to 
negotiate and settle at a strategy where the UK does not spend too much, and where 
Brazil does not benefit too little. They may go through a negotiation process and arrive at 
a consensus where the UK most likely agrees to support Brazil’s national capacity, which 
is at 50%.   This shows how each country’s national interests influence international 
relations.  
The expected outcomes from these relationships were as follows: (1) If the UK is 
to agree to support Brazil by funding its conservation activities, average compliance 
between the two countries will be 60% (average of 80% + 40%).  (2) If the UK agrees to 
support Brazil’s local capacity building efforts, average compliance will be 70% (average 
of 80% + 60%). (3) If the UK agrees to support national capacity building efforts through 
negotiation, average compliance will be 65% (average of 80% + 50%).  
In biodiversity conservation, the aim is basically to try to minimize relationships 
that lead to the lowest compliance.  The strategy that would lead to a higher compliance 
is if the UK supported local capacity building efforts. As currently structured, 
international relations theories have no way of guiding countries to settle for best 
outcomes from a relationship. In addition, governments never go through what I call self-
evaluation to establish and rank national needs so that a targeted support is possible.  
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4.5.1 Game theory analysis  
Game theory helps to explain the conflicting interests in biodiversity protection 
from an organization’s perspective in more practical ways. In any type of work, there are 
the two expected outcomes: successful implementation of programs or failed program 
implementation. Success or failure is a relative measure of an outcome which, in the 
context of biodiversity protection, is heavily influenced by stakeholder interests. Both 
success and failure help to identify strategies with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium, 
meaning a situation where conservation is less than optimal. A Pareto-optimal situation is 
one where it is not possible to improve the condition of one player without making 
another player worse-off (Villasante & Sumaila, 2010).    
For biodiversity protection, all countries should, therefore, develop policy 
mechanisms and strategies to move compliance towards closer to optimal levels, 
otherwise known as Pareto-efficient outcomes. Nash equilibrium is the optimal outcome, 
such that no player can do better by unilaterally deviating from the current course of 
action or strategy (Frank & Sarkar, 2010). To be able to put implementers and donors of 
biodiversity protection in the context of a game, they are also referred to here as players.  
4.5.2 Analysis of conservation in game theory    
My study presents a simple two-agent type of relationship between an 
implementer (country, agency, organization or local institution) of CBD goals and a 
donor (another country, national government supporting local levels, or an international 
organization). Under game theory, implementation of biodiversity protection strategies 
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can take the form of either cooperative or non-cooperative strategies. Cooperative games 
exist when players have a collective common interest on the outcomes of a game. With 
proper negotiations and consensus building, cooperative strategies bring about more 
efficient outcomes. Non-cooperative games, also known as competitive games, exist 
where players are entirely motivated by self-interest gains (Villasanet & Sumaila, 2010). 
Non-cooperative game strategies lead to inefficient outcomes.   
A modified two-agent, game-theoretic analysis approach used by Frank and 
Sarkar (2010) was used to construct conservation strategies in Figure 6 below. Figure 6 
also includes the structure of prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. “I” represents strategies 
of implementers on the rows, while “F” represents strategies of donors on the columns. 
“I” stands for implement (cooperate), while “–I” stands for does not implement (defect). 
As for the columns, “F” stands for fund (cooperate), and “–F” stands for does not fund 
(defect). The letter “B” stand for the benefits gained from using biodiversity, “S” stands 
for the subsidies (funds) given to support biodiversity protection and “α” represents the 
fraction of benefits to the society after implementing a conservation program. The first 
entry in Figure 6 is for donors (F), and the second entry is for implementers (I).           
Figure 6: Two conservation players with prisoner’s dilemma  
CBD Implementers 
Implement (I) Does not Implement ( – I) 
Fund (F) 
 
(i) (B – S), (αB + S) 
 
(ii) (–B – S), (B + S) 
 
Does not Fund (n – F) 
 
(iii) B, αB  
 
(iv) –B, B 
 
I , –I = implement, not implement, F, –F = Fund or not fund  
 D
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or
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r  
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0 ≤  α  ≤. Where α = fraction of benefits remaining after implementation.   
Expected outcomes: 
i. The Fund and Implement (F, I) strategy leads to an outcome where donors 
benefit because their funding is used in conservation, but their financial 
resources are reduced by (–S). The amount that donors use in this case is 
equivalent to foregone benefits by the community who implement 
conservation activities. This can be classified as compensation to local levels.   
Implementers overall benefits are equal to the total of the fraction of benefits 
received from biodiversity after implementation (αB) and the compensation 
received from donors (+S). This shows a cooperative situation where both 
stakeholders benefit. 
ii. The Fund and does not implement (F, –I) strategy is a situation where donors 
give funding but implementation is not done. Donors, therefore, lose 
financially (–B) by compensating (–S) to implementers for a service not 
delivered. Implementers benefit from full use on biodiversity (B) as well as 
compensation (+S) from donors. This is the worst outcome for donors but 
very good for implementers, especially if they do not care about conservation.   
iii. The does not Fund and Implement (–F, I) strategy arises when donors fail to 
provide funding, but implementation is still done. Donors benefit by B, as 
implementation is effected without funding. Implementers lose out on the 
benefits from biodiversity as they have access to only a fraction (αB) after 
implementation. This is the best outcome for donors, but it is bad for 
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implementers because their benefits of biodiversity are reduced with no 
compensation.   
iv. Does not fund and does not implement (–F, –I) is a strategic combination 
when donors give no funding and implementers do not implement 
conservation policies. From the eyes of the CBD, biodiversity continues to be 
depleted (–B) while implementers enjoy the full benefits of biodiversity (B).  
This is the situation Frank and Sarkar (2010) describe as the prisoner’s 
dilemma. Most biodiversity conservation activities can be classified under 
prisoner’s dilemma.  
4.5.3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma in conservation  
Prisoner’s dilemma arises when both implementers and donors decide that their 
individual interests are more important than the collective responsibility of protecting 
biodiversity. Donors are better off not spending their money to reduce overconsumption, 
while implementers are also better of using more of biodiversity. The benefits of 
biodiversity to the whole society are well understood, but often times donors find it either 
expensive or not in their immediate interest to support other countries or regions that are 
rich in these resources. On the other hand, when local regions find that the costs of 
conservation are higher than the immediate benefits, they will not implement 
conservation activities. Both donors and implementers, therefore, have an incentive to 
free-ride.    
From Figure 6 above, the most favorable outcomes for implementers is not 
implement (– I) while donors go ahead and fund (F). As for donors, their most favorable 
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outcome is implementers implement (I) and they (donors) withhold their funding (–F). 
When, B ˃ S, there are more biodiversity benefits to the society than the cost of 
implementation. At the same time, when the society feels they are better off to not 
implement conservation programs, –I strategy is better than I strategy; donors need to 
cooperate with implementers. Also, if (B + S) ˃ (αB + S), benefits after implementation 
are lower and, therefore, donors and implementers need to cooperate. However, when B 
˃ αB, implementers will defect. For the donor country, –F is superior or individually 
rational whether the implementing country implements CBD [B ˃ –B – S] or not [–B ˃ (–
B – S)]. 
Assumptions 
1. αB + S ˃ B 
2. S ˃ (1 – α)B  
The key question is: why do countries end up with low compliance due to non-
implementation of CBD goals even in the presence of donor support?  The answer 
depends on the type of cooperation between countries and the payoff structure. 
Application of  game theory helps to navigate through both the thinking and the nature of 
self-interest that countries have on the use of biodiversity. Implementing countries find 
non-compliance more rational in their self-interest irrespective of what donor countries 
can do, leading to low compliance. However, if the two countries collectively strive for 
cooperation through negotiation and compensation, the outcome will be Pareto-efficient. 
This need to be supported with a situation where donor funds are greater than the 
opportunity costs of conservation, such as when S ˃ (1 – α)B. reword 
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Finally, support to conservation activities globally falls far below conservation 
needs. At the same time, local communities and institutions have none or limited 
alternatives to their basic needs. Systems theory was therefore deigned going forward to 
try and analyze specific country and organizational capacities to provide solutions to the 
prisoner’s dilemma.    
4.6 Systems theory  
Although the United Nations (UN) has delegated policy-making and 
implementation of biodiversity goals to governments, international conservation 
organizations are leading governments in conservation programs internally. Borrowing 
from the “representative bureaucracy” theory, international organization’s power to mold 
national governments to be more responsive to implementation of biodiversity protection 
programs is an important consideration. The need to understand government capacities in 
all aspects of biodiversity protection in order to address the weaknesses specifically, and 
strengthen the high capacity areas, is likely to improve implementation and lead to higher 
overall compliance. On the other hand, governments also should have access to the 
decision making processes of conservation organizations, as this is likely to lead to some 
forms of trust, socialization experiences that easily shape others’ values, and would 
facilitate collective decision making.      
In order to define the most efficient form of collaboration between governments 
and conservation institutions, it is necessary to know the least complied parts of 
conservation as this is where more effort is needed. Capacities can only be seen from the 
level of success or failure in performing specific tasks. By focusing on capacities that 
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governments have on one hand and how conservation organizations can improve them 
produces more efficient outcomes.    
4.6.1 Governments and NGOs collaboration outcomes 
The next major question examined is the extent that nonprofits and international 
organizations work with governments in the implementation of biodiversity protection 
policies. To explain collaboration outcomes based on compliance levels, international 
organizations’ conservation strategies in the most biodiversity rich countries were 
examined to find their main focus and priorities in these countries. This was done to 
establish how international organizations’ missions, values and goals are both aligned to 
improve the weakest policies of countries as well as provide a roadmap for countries to 
inform conservation initiatives in individual countries.       
There are three approaches to implementation here: (i) international organizations 
draw agreements with governments that allow them to implement conservation programs 
on their own; (ii) international organizations identify the problem and ask governments to 
find ways of implementing policies that would remove the problem; (iii) organizations 
create a partnership with governments and implement conservation programs jointly. The 
first two approaches are the most popular, and this is where the problem lies. Without 
direct partnerships and collaboration with governments, it is extremely difficult to see 
weaknesses in governments and therefore be able to give support to address those 
specific weaknesses. The organizations that were found to have the greatest capacities 
and currently working in most of the sampled countries were: World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Conservation 
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International (CI), and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Activities 
of these organizations were therefore evaluated against the weaknesses identified in 
governments with highest biodiversity hotspot regions.        
Many organizations often come together, discuss, and go away hoping that what 
has been agreed upon will be implemented without discussing the process. In this 
process, the key to successful implementation is the nature of the contract that establishes 
relationships between various organizations. Contracts between conservation institutions 
should have both short and long-tern solutions because that is how conservation problems 
arise.      
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Table 22a: Government and NGOs collaboration in the DRC  
Areas of lowest conservation 
compliance 
Key focus areas by Conservation Organization 
World Wildlife Fund International Union for 
Conservation of Nature 
Conservation International 
Problems: Low quality of the NBSAPs 
given the vague and non-committal 
language. The timelines for all the goals 
and objectives is not specified. In 
addition the goals and objectives as 
stated do not adequately address the 
conservation challenges. The depth of 
NBSAPs is rather shallow and their 
scope fails to cover all critical and 
underlying conservation barriers. The 
desired conservation outcomes have not 
been clearly established.  
The National capacities – institutional, 
scientific and social are low. There are 
no adequately trained local 
conservationist personnel. Coordination 
of conservation activities across sectors 
and jurisdictions is weak and national 
support to local level institutions of 
does not exist. Local reports do not 
exist in the NCHM.  Public-private 
partnerships are very weak.        
Problems identified include: 
Poaching, very little research 
in this region, logging 
concessions, hunting, river 
pollution and sedimentation, 
land degradation, erosion and 
desertification.  
WWF has focused on: 
reducing illegal offtake of 
wildlife, partnering for new, 
effective and sustainable 
protected areas, 
Advancement of green 
economy and building 
durable mechanisms to 
conserve biodiversity, and 
that forests and carbon.   
Problems: Illegal bushmeat trade 
and habitat degradation, political 
instability, widespread poverty, 
wildlife poaching, deforestation, 
mining, poor water quality, 
agriculture and logging. There are 
no adequate environmental 
institutions, no adequate funding 
for conservation, government is 
not able to enforce environmental 
laws, big gap between legislation 
and practice. Missing 
mechanisms to coordinate 
cooperation between various 
sectors,  
Assessment of at risk species of 
both plants and animals, assisting 
with the development of Ape 
conservation plans, and works in 
close collaboration with ministry 
of environment, nature 
conservation & tourism. 
Conducting studies to identify 
critical threats to gorillas, 
chimpanzees and their habitats.  
Problems: Habitat destruction, 
conversion of forest lands to 
agriculture, and pastures, fuel-
wood, unsustainable logging, 
great dependence on natural 
resources by communities,  
Conservation International has 
developed partnerships with 
local communities to improve 
human well-being while 
conserving natural resources, 
design strategies to mitigate 
causes of forest loss, identify 
main agents and drivers of 
deforestation. Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD), 
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Table 22b: Government and NGOs collaboration in Indonesia   
Areas of lowest conservation 
compliance 
Key focus areas by Conservation Organization 
World Wildlife Fund International Union for 
Conservation of Nature 
Conservation International 
Both national and local institutions 
are weak. Capacity building activities 
are not well targeted and are not 
adequate. The country does not 
conduct   enough surveys, research 
and data collection activities. The 
goals and objectives developed in the 
plan documents are not deep enough 
to tackle the underlying conservation 
barriers and are also not broad 
enough to address all biodiversity 
resources. Funding opportunities are 
limited and funds allocated to 
conservation are extremely low.  
Institutional capacity building at both 
national and local levels is very low. 
Coordination between local and 
national institutions is poor. 
Legislation is weak, support to local 
level institutions is weak, monitoring 
and evaluation of implementation 
almost non-existent. National 
conservation institutions are not fully 
developed. Local reports do not exist 
at national level CHMs.  
Public-Private Partnerships are not 
strong.    
WWF's mission is to stop the degradation 
of the planet's natural environment and to 
build a future in which humans live in 
harmony with nature. Pulp and paper 
Industries and oil palm plantations are the 
leading causes of rapid rates of 
deforestation.  
WWF therefore supports sustainable 
management of ecosystems and promotes 
community welfare management efforts. 
It has called upon the pulp and oil palm 
industries to work with the government to 
conserve elephant habitats.   
WWF has conducted studies on Palm Oil 
management, Elephants protection in 
collaboration with local institutions.  
Has facilitated the creation of smallholder 
palm oil production certification program 
that is geared towards the sustainable 
management palm oil plantations.    
Forests protection through pushing the 
Asia paper & Pulp company to stop 
clearing forests and peatlands to allow an 
assessment of their conservation and 
carbon values.      
Problems identified: 
Loss of habitats 
through deforestation, 
shifting agriculture, 
livestock grazing, 
urban development, 
commercial logging 
and industrialization 
leading to reduced 
forest cover, pollution 
from wastes, industries, 
military and 
agricultural effluents.  
Conservation measures 
taken include: land and 
water management 
techniques, restoration 
of habitats and natural 
processes, 
implementation of 
species recovery 
programs and ex-situ 
conservation.    
Problems: Over-exploitation of 
marine resources, poor coastal 
development, poor planning, 
water pollution, air pollution, un-
processed waste from factories, 
over-fishing, global ocean 
acidification. Other problems 
relate to deforestation, 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
CI has been helping local 
governments to develop 
environmental assessments, 
spatial planning, works with 
public and private sectors to train 
farmers to improve the quality 
and quantity of agricultural 
products. Assisitng farmers with 
sustainable farming techniques, 
educating local people to 
improve participation in 
conservation, natural resources 
management, conducts public 
awareness campaigns. Currently 
working with public and private 
sectors to implement integrated 
watershed management to 
protect forests and water supply.   
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Table 22c: Government NGOs collaboration in Brazil 
Areas of lowest conservation 
compliance 
Key focus areas by Conservation Organization 
World Wildlife Fund International Union 
for Conservation of 
Nature 
Conservation International 
The quality of NBSAPs is low 
due to non-committal language 
used and lack of realistic 
timelines for stated 
conservation activities. 
Funding opportunities are both 
limited and extremely low. 
The National and local 
institutional capacities are 
weak, their coordination is 
poor and national support to 
local level institutions is not 
good enough. There are no 
strong legislations. The 
country lacks the capacity to 
carry out monitoring and 
evaluation. Both reports and 
national plans have no 
information regarding surveys, 
research and data collection. 
There are no local reports and 
data.   
Problems identified as barriers to conservation are: 
the lack of allied planning, weak governance 
systems, and failure to comply with environmental 
legislation. Others include high demand for natural 
resources as a result of population growth, 
alarming rate of deforestation, water pollution, 
logging, mining and agricultural expansion.   
WWF supports the government to establish 
conservation budgets of 0.5% of GDP per year, 
guide private companies to follow environmental 
laws and seeks innovations to help reduce use of 
natural resources especially water. Expansion 
investment in human resources to expand 
knowledge, It conducts studies, fosters public 
policies, monitoring of wild species, establishment 
of ecological corridors and improvement of the 
management of protected areas.   
Encourages the creation and expansion of 
protected areas, responsible use and sustainable 
management of natural resources, promotion of 
environmental and social standards, technical and 
community capacities.  
IUCN is doing 
ecological restoration 
in Brazil. Helping the 
government with 
establishment of 
protected areas. 
IUCN is also 
facilitating better 
coordination between 
institutions.  
 
Problems: Expanding road 
networks, building of dams, 
deforestation, climate change, 
development, and violent land 
conflicts. 
CI works to protect land and 
cultural traditions, strengthens 
surveillance and institutional 
capacities to indigenous 
associations, provides economic 
alternatives to logging, supports 
logistical needs for both 
surveillance and data collection. 
Has created a fund to support 
long-term conservation, this 
fund facilitates monitoring and 
land protection, development of 
sustainable economic activities, 
and capacity building to local 
organizations.    
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4.6.2 Application of systems theory 
Tables 22a to 22c can be better explained using the systems theory. Biodiversity 
protection weaknesses that exist in governments, those identified by conservation 
organizations, and how these problems are collectively or singularly addressed is a 
systems driven approach. It is clear that there is no uniformity between the real 
challenges found in governments and what conservation organizations want to do. For 
successful implementation and improved compliance, international conservation 
organizations should first try to understand government systems in the context capacities, 
governance challenges, and then try to develop their programs from the positions of 
governments.    
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, some of the key national biodiversity 
protection challenges are the low quality of NBSAPs, low national capacities, few and 
weak national agencies, weak legislation, and poor coordination between various sectors. 
The country lacks data on biological resources, and little or no studies/surveys are being 
conducted. Conservation organizations are not addressing challenges that this 
government seems to face, but rather, have chosen to address direct causes of biodiversity 
degradation.   
Indonesia is also having problems with low national and local capacities, poor 
national coordination, low quality NBSAPs, weak legislation, and not fully developed 
national institutions. On the other hand, conservation organizations have focused on 
conservation through emphasis on sustainable management, land and water management 
techniques, restoration of habitats, environmental assessments, and integrated watersheds 
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management. There is no clear systems linking conservation organizations to government 
initiated programs. 
Brazil is facing a systems breakdown between biodiversity protection challenges 
identified at the government level and what conservation organizations are doing. The 
quality of NBSAPs is low, there is limited and insufficient funding to support 
biodiversity protection, there is poor inter-agency coordination, there is no data, and very 
little support to local level institutions. Conservation organizations are trying to institute 
allied planning, asking the government to allocate funding to natural resources protection, 
investing in human resources to educate and raise awareness, and asking private 
companies to follow environmental laws. These organizations are also conducting 
ecological restoration activities, helping establish more protected areas, and protecting 
land and cultural traditions.       
 It was clear from this analysis that the exact nature of conservation problems that 
arise within governments, communities and conservation organizations can be viewed as 
autonomous independent systems. For better management of conservation problems, a 
concerted action that brings all these efforts together to develop a whole system, rather 
than separate systems, would lead to better implementation and higher compliance. As 
can be seen from these tables, conservation problems identified within government are 
different from what conservation organizations want to address. Protecting biological 
resources requires a multi-dimensional relationship on the basis of a shared 
understanding of the nature of specific problems and the meaning of policies designed to 
address such problems. This confirms the third hypothesis because the approaches taken 
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by various stakeholders toward conservation are different, and interpretation is different, 
thus leading to low compliance with CBD goals.  
Organizations are best managed when they are viewed as a form of information 
network – with the flow of information providing decision makers at varying 
management levels with information needed to make decisions of all types (Mockler, 
1968). Development of systems in management is viewed as one way that efficiently 
meets the demands on public institutions, lowers administrative costs and improves 
service delivery (Myeong & Choi, 2010). Public institutions use systems approach to 
reduce uncertainty and ambiguity about goals and cause-effect relationships during the 
time of implementation. The CBD needs to find ways that link conservation efforts by all 
stakeholders in biodiversity protection to improve efficiency and avoid duplication.   
Management of biological resources is a complex process of balancing immediate 
benefits with long-term conservation goals and political priorities (Wang, 2004). 
Generation of relevant information and data sharing is crucial to reaching an optimal 
balance of various stakeholder interests (Simon, 1977). Systems theory helps to find 
answers to questions on how globally designed biodiversity protection programs fit into 
the needs of local situations, as well as effective relationships between global and local 
institutions (Deming, 1986). The purpose of an institution according to the living systems 
theory is to reach a desired steady state where institutions are effective and their existence 
to continue to meet specified goals is guaranteed (Wang, 2004).   
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4.7 Local level implementation  
My study relied on secondary global data gathered by AGF to help examine local 
compliance and implementation. The data was constructed on a 5-point Likert scale 
starting with “A” strongly disagree, “C” I do not know, and “E” strongly agree with 
various statements relating to local level compliance. The AGF (2012) notes that there 
are communication problems, and therefore, conditions of the global environment are 
poorly understood at local levels. Additional data generated from qualitative analysis and 
supplemented with numerical data from Global Footprint Network was used.  
Quantitative analysis is more about numbers. It is a way of trying to explore what the 
numbers representing specific data are saying, and what can be concluded about such 
numbers.  
4.7.1 Local level compliance  
In addition to the communication problems, the public needs to be educated, their 
conservation capacity needs to be developed, and they need funding for local 
conservation activities. This is so they can understand and be able to implement 
conservation programs that either stop or begin to reverse biodiversity degradation. 
Education, funding and capacity building come in the context of national government 
support to local governments and institutions (Lo & Fryxel, 2005; Van Rooij & Lo, 
2010). In the study conducted in Guangzhu, China, Lo et al. (2012) found out that a lack 
of adequate political and administrative support by the national government at all levels 
seriously undermines regulatory effectiveness and implementation at local levels.  
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Table 23: Analysis of local level implementation 
 
Responses Rank Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
Easy to comprehend info info 
is not communicated from 
conservation experts to the 
public 
A 9 0 7 0 8 6 
B 13 0 24 7 8 9 
C 4 17 31 0 0 6 
D 39 17 132 43 17 41 
E 35 50 100 43 58 36 
Conservationists focus 
communication too heavily 
upon political decision 
makers, failing to reach the 
public 
A 4 0 15 0 8 0 
B 17 17 68 14 17 33 
C 22 0 77 14 8 33 
D 39 50 76 29 33 33 
E 17 17 36 36 25 0 
Political decision makers do 
not communicate information 
from environmental experts to 
the public 
A 4 17 3 0 0 0 
B 9 17 10 14 0 0 
C 17 0 63 0 0 0 
D 35 17 137 21 58 67 
E 35 50 77 64 33 33 
Public does not value the 
information provided by 
environmental experts unless 
disaster occurs in their 
vicinity. 
A 0 33 10 0 0 0 
B 26 17 22 7 0 0 
C 9 0 31 14 8 0 
D 35 50 138 29 25 67 
E 30 0 88 50 58 33 
Non-profit organizations 
overemphasize 
Communications efforts on 
political decision makers. 
A 9 0 5 0 0 0 
B 22 17 59 14 8 0 
C 35 33 107 14 33 33 
D 22 33 90 50 33 67 
E 13 17 27 14 17 0 
Certain education level is 
necessary for understanding 
of environmental information, 
and environmental education 
is lacking. 
A 4 0 3 0 0 0 
B 13 0 34 7 0 0 
C 13 17 39 21 8 0 
D 48 33 111 14 25 33 
E 22 50 105 57 58 67 
The economic profits of a 
corporation, organization, 
or a region are prioritized so 
much that environmental 
considerations are not taken 
into account. 
A 2 0 6 44 3 0 
B 7 0 0 61 0 20 
C 2 4 6 37 0 0 
D 31 17 28 147 16 20 
E 57 75 56 206 77 60 
A: Strongly disagree B: Somewhat disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Somewhat agree E: Strongly 
agree  
 
Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012 
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Local government agencies and other local institutions may be lacking in 
sufficient capacities in the form of trained manpower and financial resources, thus 
making them inadequately prepared to enforce and implement desired conservation 
policies. Other internal obstacles include poor coordination with other stakeholders, poor 
communication, poor management practices, and conflicting objectives (Lo et al., 2012).   
Table 23 above highlights problems that exist when the public does not sufficiently 
understand what needs to be done, and the different levels of understanding between 
politicians, policy makers and conservation organizations.  
Analysis of this kind of data helps to put into perspective the relationships 
between different stakeholders in conservation. This helps to strengthen areas that need 
attention and identify obstacles that hinder implementation.  This table also presents 
specific elements of local compliance on a 5-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” 
to “Strongly Agree.” 
4.7.2 Reconciling conservational initiatives from local to global levels 
One of the key challenges facing the international community is the ability to tell 
how individuals, communities and local governments are experiencing biodiversity 
protection programs at local levels. The degree of non-compliance with the CBD goals 
can therefore best be explained by an understanding of actual implementation efforts at 
local and national government levels. It is at local settings that government 
regulations/laws that govern the society are most felt, frameworks for political 
relationships are developed and where specific policies and practices are implemented. 
Priorities at these levels need to be synchronized towards satisfying “common goods” 
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Any plan that promotes biodiversity protection at local levels should be developed 
with the main objective of changing people’s perceptions, improving local knowledge, 
and creating specific institutions to manage biological resources (Alexander, 2005). This 
calls for biodiversity protection to be pursued simultaneously at three levels, global, 
national/country and local levels. Involvement of local institutions and communities in 
the design and program implementation is only possible if people at local levels know 
what the government and conservation experts are doing.      
Table 24: Perceptions on compliance and implementation at local levels 
 
Factors/Statements Rank Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
Societal and cultural 
practices that place 
importance on “common 
good,” like environment, 
are lacking or fragile. 
A 2 0 4 5 5 0 
B 9 0 44 0 18 0 
C 9 6 59 14 0 0 
D 47 69 209 52 47 40 
E 31 25 119 24 32 60 
Societal practices and 
traditions that value the 
weak, including 
environment, are few and 
far between. 
A 0 6 6 5 0 0 
B 11 0 67 10 32 0 
C 20 31 70 24 16 20 
D 47 31 190 48 16 80 
E 18 25 78 10 37 0 
At most, people have 
capacity to recognize 
environmental conditions 
and effects on local level 
but not globally. 
A 7 6 19 0 0 0 
B 15 38 99 10 16 20 
C 13 0 72 19 11 20 
D 38 38 151 38 42 20 
E 25 13 96 29 32 40 
Human decision-making 
process is based on self-
preservation and not 
consider happiness of others 
or of future generations. 
A 5 0 21 5 5 0 
B 13 6 79 19 16 0 
C 13 19 90 14 11 20 
D 45 44 187 33 26 60 
E 22 31 59 24 42 20 
Human nature to care for 
others is overwhelmed by 
behavioral principles based 
on economic 
considerations. 
A 0 0 12 10 0 0 
B 7 6 54 10 5 0 
C 11 19 62 5 11 0 
D 47 38 196 29 42 60 
E 33 38 98 43 42 40 
Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012 
 
A: Strongly disagree B:  Disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Agree E: Strongly agree 
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Inability to engage local communities makes it difficult to bring about change to 
local perceptions needed in order to understand the value of protecting biodiversity 
(Myeong & Choi, 2010). 
Table 25: Perceptions on compliance and implementation at national and international  
levels 
 
Factors/Statements Rank Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Asia Latin 
America 
Africa Middle 
East 
National Systems        
National decisions 
influenced by political, 
business, and organizational 
interests and do not reflect 
the will of the public, who 
shoulder the environment. 
A 2 0 12 10 0 0 
B 5 0 24 0 0 0 
C 11 13 40 10 11 0 
D 38 38 173 14 32 20 
E 44 50 240 62 58 80 
Changes in national policy 
face great resistance 
(inertia), and as such it 
tends to stay with business 
as usual. 
A 4 0 13 5 0 0 
B 7 6 32 14 11 0 
C 11 25 80 0 11 0 
D 24 38 220 38 32 20 
E 55 31 147 43 47 80 
International Systems        
International organizations 
like the U.N. are affected by 
the will of countries, and do 
not optimize the whole. 
A 2 0 11 10 5 0 
B 9 0 26 0 0 0 
C 7 19 46 10 5 0 
D 18 25 150 38 47 40 
E 84 86 210 43 42 60 
Voting system at the U.N. 
with its adherence to the  
principle of unanimous 
consent, makes decision- 
making difficult. 
A 2 6 21 5 0 0 
B 4 6 38 5 0 20 
C 9 13 72 14 0 20 
D 22 38 191 33 47 0 
E 84 38 107 38 53 60 
International organizations 
like the U.N. are not 
provided enforcement 
powers or use of forceful 
methods of coordination. 
A 4 0 13 14 0 0 
B 2 13 45 10 5 0 
C 9 13 61 0 5 0 
D 27 25 185 24 32 40 
E 58 44 136 48 58 60 
Systemic and organizational 
reforms are needed, but 
have not 
been implemented. 
A 4 0 4 10 0 0 
B 5 13 46 5 5 0 
C 29 19 80 5 32 0 
D 36 38 207 57 21 60 
E 25 31 107 19 42 40 
A: Strongly disagree B:  Disagree C: Neither (I don’t know) D: Agree E: Strongly agree 
 
Source: ASAHI Global Foundation, 2012 
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Table 25 above presents statements that contain data on local level compliance 
and implementation. It is the number of people and what they think about these 
statements that generated numbers for quantitative analysis of local level compliance. It 
is possible to relate societal practices, decision-making and capacities to national policies 
and international organizations. 
4.8 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection 
Table 26 contains data from the Global Footprint Network showing the available 
biological resources and the level of use by each of the countries that were analyzed.  
This data provided information that was used to run regression analysis to determine the 
significance of various factors that most influence compliance and implementation.    
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Table 26: Status on biological resources as of 2008 
 
Used  
 
Country 
 
Populat 
Millions Crop Grazg Forest Fish Carbo 
Buil-
up Total Crop Graz Forest Fish 
Built-
Up Total 
Defi 
/Surp 
Africa 
D R Congo 62.48 0.15 0.02 0.50 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.76 0.13 0.28 2.60 0.05 0.05 3.10 2.35 
Ghana 23.26 0.58 0.10 0.61 0.17 0.21 0.07 1.74 0.70 0.28 0.17 0.06 0.07 1.28 -0.46 
Kenya 38.46 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.95 0.19 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.53 -0.42 
South Africa 49.32 0.42 0.19 0.31 0.08 1.57 0.03 2.59 0.32 0.62 0.02 0.22 0.03 1.21 -1.38 
Asia  
Jordan 5.85 0.66 0.41 0.18 0.05 0.74 0.09 2.13 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.24 -1.89 
Australia 21.51 1.61 1.11 1.16 0.10 2.68 0.03 6.68 2.14 6.16 2.55 3.69 0.03 14.57 7.89 
India 1190.86 0.37 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.31 0.05 0.87 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.48 -0.39 
Indonesia 234.95 0.44 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.07 1.13 0.47 0.06 0.32 0.41 0.07 1.32 0.19 
Americas  
Brazil 191.54 0.80 0.95 0.55 0.05 0.48 0.10 2.93 1.09 1.03 7.25 0.16 0.10 9.63 6.69 
Jamaica 2.72 0.41 0.30 0.22 0.12 0.63 0.04 1.72 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.33 -1.40 
Canada 33.33 1.49 0.42 0.74 0.10 3.63 0.05 6.43 2.81 0.23 8.27 3.55 0.05 14.92 8.49 
Mexico 110.63 0.74 0.40 0.32 0.09 1.69 0.06 3.30 0.49 0.25 0.49 0.14 0.06 1.42 -1.87 
Europe  
Netherlands 16.50 1.30 1.09 0.54 0.10 3.14 0.16 6.34 0.30 0.06 0.08 0.44 0.16 1.03 -5.30 
Poland 38.22 0.98 0.04 0.75 0.07 2.01 0.08 3.94 0.99 0.12 0.71 0.10 0.08 2.00 -1.93 
UK 61.50 0.88 0.45 0.53 0.06 2.65 0.15 4.71 0.49 0.10 0.11 0.50 0.15 1.34 -3.37 
Switzerland 7.57 0.76 0.28 0.55 0.06 3.26 0.10 5.01 0.21 0.15 0.73 0.01 0.10 1.20 -3.82 
Source: Global Footprint Network 
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4.8.1 Estimation of opportunity cost compensation 
Table 27 below shows the different levels of biological capacity each country. 
Information on the level of biological resources in each country though true in many 
respects still requires a deeper interpretation on the deficit and surplus levels. This is 
necessary so that the real biological capacity picture is clear for each country. From the 
literal observation, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Australia, Canada and 
Brazil are the only countries with a surplus of biological capacity. The rest of the other 
countries are in biological resources deficit. Using size of land may not be the most 
efficient indicator of biological capacity because of different population densities.   
Table 27: Opportunity cost and compensation estimates 
Country Deficit/Surplus 
in Hectares 
1 
Cost of land 
per Hectare 
2 (US$) 
Total Deficit or 
surplus in US$ 
3   = (1X2) 
Total 
Population in 
Millions 
4   = (2X3) 
Biological 
capacities 
5   = (3X4) 
(US$) 
D R Congo 2.35 5000 11750 62.48 734140 
Ghana -0.46 6500 -2990 23.26 -69547.4 
Kenya -0.42 6500 -2730 38.46 -104995.8 
S. Africa -1.38 7000 -9660 49.32 -476431.2 
Jordan -1.89 11000 -20790 5.85 -121621.5 
Australia 7.89 5000 39450 21.51 848569.5 
India -0.39 3500 -1365 1190.86 -1625523.9 
Indonesia 0.19 3000 570 234.95 133921.5 
Brazil 6.69 1500 10035 191.54 1922103.9 
Jamaica -1.4 4500 -6300 2.72 -17136 
Canada 8.49 7000 59430 33.33 1980801.9 
Mexico -1.87 7000 -13090 110.63 -1448146.7 
Netherlands -5.3 10000 -53000 16.5 -874500 
Poland -1.93 8000 -15440 38.22 -590116.8 
UK -3.37 8000 -26960 61.5 -1658040 
Switzerland -3.82 8000 -30560 7.57 -231339.2 
 Source: data from GFN and Real Estate companies in these countries 
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The deficit/surplus data in hectares was obtained from table 26. The cost of land 
data in table 27 was obtained from real estate companies’ websites via Google.com. 
These land costs are average costs of agricultural lands (both crops and grazing).  The 
total deficit/surplus column was obtained by multiplying columns one and two 
(deficit/surplus X cost of land). Since biological capacity was measured in hectares per 
person, to obtain total opportunity costs therefore, I multiplied the total cost with the total 
population of each country as at 2008 to obtain figures in column five.  
Estimation of compensation across countries was assumed should be based on the 
level of biological deficit a country has. All biodiversity deficit countries should support 
biodiversity protection activities in biodiversity surplus countries. The difficult with this 
scenario is that there are a lot of poor countries that have no capacity to support other 
countries but are in biodiversity deficit. Compensation for biodiversity protection may be 
a very difficult undertaking.  
The DRC has a surplus equivalent to 2.35 hectares per person, Australia has 7.89 
hectares per person, Brazil has 6.69 hectares per person and Canada has 8.49 hectares per 
person. Canada and Australia are extremely large countries with very small human 
populations. Since the units used to measure biological capacity is hectares per person, 
these countries are showing a surplus not because their biological resources protection 
programs are very superior but simply because of their size relative to human population.  
As at 2008, Canada had a human population of 33.33 million people and is 1.17 
bigger than Brazil which had a population of 191.54 million people. Canada is also 4.26 
times bigger than DRC which had a population 62.48 million people, twice the 
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population of Canada. Brazil is 1.11 bigger than Australia which had a population of 
21.51 million people. Australia is bigger than DRC by 3.28 times. The status of 
biological capacity as presently measured cannot therefore be taken figuratively at face 
value.    
The samples of countries selected from Europe all have a deficit in biological 
capacity. This does not mean that their biodiversity protection programs are in total 
disarray. It is merely a question of both lifestyle and levels of development. It is clear that 
the level of development of a country cannot be stopped and it cannot be reduced.     
It is for this reason why it is important to estimate opportunity costs of 
conservation so as to determine the most appropriate compensation mechanisms. Some of 
the existing compensation schemes so far include off-set schemes, direct payments to 
those that have a surplus of biological resources to stop them from both over-exploitation, 
and facilitate sustainable use so that these are available to other people. These 
compensation mechanisms apply to both citizens within a country and also payment to 
countries that have a surplus.        
The findings from table 27 can best be represented graphically as in figure 5 
below. This figure shows all the countries that are in deficit (negative) and those that 
have a surplus (positive) supply of biological resources. Five out of the sixteen countries 
are in biological surplus section of the graph. The deficits are much more than surpluses.  
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Figure 7: The status of each country’s biological capacity 
 
 
4.8.2 Most appropriate compensation mechanisms 
The most appropriate compensation mechanisms should be programs that would 
compensate biodiversity rich countries the equivalent of the total of biological deficit in 
deficit countries. An underside to this approach is that biodiversity deficit countries might 
have their conservation capacities reduced further. This will be a bad outcome as it may 
lead to lower average global compliance. These findings do not provide a clear path to 
either rejecting or supporting the 4th and final hypothesis which was stated as follows;  
The use of appropriate compensation mechanisms to offset opportunity costs that 
would be incurred by those that supply biodiversity services will increase the 
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probability of effective implementation and thus lead to higher compliance with 
CBD goals. 
Compensation mechanisms can vary a lot both the country depending on the 
nature of the resource and cooperation between countries. Most compensation 
mechanisms take the form of financial resources. It is important to point out that 
compensation need not be purely in financial terms. There currently exists mechanisms 
that involve technological support, but a deeper analysis of the 20 criteria used to 
evaluate compliance reveals that compensation can take so many forms. Conservation 
needs cannot be restricted to financial terms alone.    
4.9 Implementation of the goals of the CBD 
The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (NBSAPs) prepared by 
countries are the primary biodiversity protection and policy documents guiding 
implementation. These are supposed to comprehensively cover all aspects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity thus should facilitate better 
implementation and guide countries towards higher compliance. However, most of these 
NBSAPs fall short of a clear integration of many of the critical factors that most 
influence implementation and thus lead to low compliance.  
The NBSAPs should include mechanisms to ensure that the capacity exists to 
implement projects, manage activities and monitor progress, including technology 
transfer. The plans should include regular monitoring and review, and follow adaptive 
management principles.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.0 Discussion of results    
Chapter five puts together the outcomes of this research to show both compliance 
and implementation challenges in the management of biological resources worldwide. 
The first section gives a summary of national capacity challenges of all countries that 
were examined. This is followed by a discussion on what is going on within and across 
countries. Explanations that try to reconcile the meaning of biodiversity protection across 
sectors are developed.  Outcomes from game theory conservation strategies are discussed 
next.  The chapter comes to a conclusion with findings from opportunity costs of 
biodiversity conservation.       
5.1 Introduction 
Conservation efforts aimed at enhancing biological resource protection within 
countries need to go beyond policy development at government level to include specific 
local level implementation programs. My study findings place local level implementation 
compliance level at a mere 14% and national policy level compliance at a modest 
49.88%. This is a big gap and is a clear demonstration that policies being developed at 
national level are not adequately supporting local level implementation. Development of 
national policies and plans are seen as first steps towards biodiversity protection, but 
these will remain just steps and mean very little if they do not get implemented.   
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The target set by the CBD in 2002 to reverse biodiversity degradation by the year 
2010 was not met by all countries (Barbault, 2010).  Analysis of individual country plans 
and 4th national reports also demonstrate a shortage of means, capacities and mechanisms 
to take national conservation policies to local levels for implementation. As long as there 
is no strong and active linkage between national policies and local implementation, 
biodiversity degradation will not be halted.     
Research findings from ASAHI Glass Foundation (2012) found that 
communication from scientists and researchers to politicians, strategists and decision 
makers was not sufficient to promote changes in society for environmental protection. 
Most of the information is focused more on policy makers and less on implementers. 
Moreover, this information is not presented in a comprehensible format to the general 
public, hence it is not very appealing (ASAHI Glass Foundation, 2012). Further, research 
finds that once policy makers receive specific information, this information is not often 
communicated to the public or implementers and when, if it is at all communicated, the 
people at local levels do not have the capacity and training to comprehend it well. A 
certain minimum level of education is necessary for farmers and other stakeholders, at 
local levels, to fully understand conservation policies crafted at the global and national 
levels.  
5.2 Compliance and implementation capacity challenges 
There are several compliance and implementation challenges that emerged from 
analysis of data used in this study. First there are no clearly established cooperative 
strategies that can be categorized as either favorable or unfavorable across national 
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boundaries or sectors. Within countries, it is clear how globally designed conservation 
policies get adapted to national priorities. What is not clear is how countries take these 
policies to local levels where actual implementation is done.  
Virtually all NBSAPs demonstrate lack of adequate funding from both national 
governments and international donors for conservation programs. This leaves 
international organizations that come with their own funding to take the lead mostly at 
local levels. How these international organizations cooperate and work with local 
organizations is also not clear. Some national reports have shown that it is not 
everywhere that local institutions trust international organizations. The scale of the 
impact of international organizations on local implementation is difficult to measure.     
5.2.1 North and South America 
The Brazilian NBSAP in the CBD website does not use the word capacity. It is 
therefore difficult to tell exactly how Brazil has been planning for biodiversity protection 
capacities.  
Jamaica NBSAP explains that most local communities lack capacities to carry out 
various types of integrated planning and management of biological resources. There are 
gaps in understanding conservation in general; thus a need for improved awareness 
raising, education and information sharing. There are ongoing risk assessments to 
determine carrying capacity for protected areas and sustainable use of wild Flora and 
Fauna. There are also capacity challenges at national policy level to reduce vulnerability 
of resources, conduct adaptive planning and institutional strengthening. The country is 
working at improving enforcement capacity, participating in global initiatives and is 
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seeking financial and technical assistance to increase capacity to manage biological 
resources. The plan puts emphasis on the development of a specified strategic direction 
aimed at increasing capacity of human capital to be able to prepare, evaluate and 
implement environmental impact and risk assessment.   
Mexico is still working on increasing human, institutional and financial capacity 
to meet biodiversity protection goals and needs, related to overall management. The 
country is also developing structures that provide information to people in decision 
making responsibility, for monitoring, control and mitigation of negative impacts.  
Canada has an ongoing database capacities development that enables it to manage 
harmful Living Modified Organisms (LMO). Canada has put great emphasis on 
development of policies that reflect societal objectives and ecological carrying capacity 
of the planet. Canada supports research on ecological carrying capacity, works with 
national and international organizations to improve dialogue and communication, 
management and planning. The international community would need to assist some 
countries in their management capacities so that they can pursue economic activities in 
harmony with the Earth’s biological capacity. Canada is cooperating with developing 
countries in capacity development toward biodiversity protection. The degree to which 
plans are able to enhance national capacities to conserve biological resources is seen as a 
measure of success. 
5.2.2 Europe 
United Kingdom and the Republic of Northern Ireland 
The UK and the Republic of Northern Ireland draws lessons from historical 
agricultural development to place its NBSAP in context of current developments. The 
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NBSAP argues that keeping of genetic variability is an extremely important social and 
economic resource as this is what enabled early man to develop crops and livestock 
which were a pre-requisite for settled agriculture. Continued development and global 
stability depends on the capacity to continue to maintain genetic variability. The plan 
explains that it is not desirable for invasive species to have the capacity to oust native 
species. Other aspects of capacities in the UK plan include the low financial capacity of 
zoos to maintain diverse collections and the land carrying capacity. Car travel in Great 
Britain for example has increased dramatically in the past 40 years and is projected to 
grow by a further 84% to 142% by 2025. Accommodating such rate of growth through 
new capacity is likely to have a damaging impact on biodiversity, unless it is very 
carefully managed. 
The government is working to ensure that forests are harvested in a way that 
allows capacity for renewal and is also trying to reduce over-capacity in fishing. The 
government is developing new capacity building courses such as those aimed at 
managing botanic gardens within the UK as well as providing support for capacity 
building and policy development in other countries. This is done through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) whom the plan argues that in some countries 
provide the only national capacity to address environmental issues.  
Netherlands 
The Netherland’s NBSAP puts more emphasis on sharing knowledge and capacity 
building for purposes of developing sustainable forestry, sustainable wood production 
and strengthening of governance and management. There is also emphasis to invest in 
sustaining the capacity of ecosystems to continue to provide goods and services 
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especially in developing countries where most people are dependent on natural resources 
but lack the capacity to invest in sustainable management. Ecosystems have a certain 
level of resilience but persistent damage can lead to a dramatic decline in their capacity to 
continue providing environmental services. The Netherlands plan pays great attention to 
future conservation outcomes through supporting biodiversity protection by creating a 
strong capacity of ecological networks that can adapt to possible climate changes. Some 
of the key objectives include the promotion of sustainable fishing through innovations 
meant to reduce the fleet capacity under the European Fisheries Fund. The Netherlands 
government is also assisting developing countries to develop sustainable fisheries and 
capacity building in relation to biodiversity and water management, and support to 
international knowledge networks.       
Poland 
The Polish plan explains that the greatest conservation challenge in Poland is the 
country’s low financial capacity. Poland does not have a good financial capacity to 
enable it to spend resources at a level corresponding to the needs of the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. A strong financial capacity is a pre-requisite for effective 
implementation of the CBD goals. In addition, Poland as a country clearly lacks the 
capacity to extend conservation to most needed areas such the marine environment. The 
country also does not have sufficient resources for improving research capacity.  
Switzerland 
The Swiss NBSAP has a well balanced approach to supporting national 
biodiversity conservation policies as well as to those of other countries. It is a 
government decision in line with Federal Council decision of 1 July 2008, to ensure the 
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long-term conservation and promotion of biodiversity both in Switzerland and at global 
levels. The plan explains that connected habitats are a basic pre-requisite for ensuring that 
biodiversity is rich and has the capacity to remain resilient to climate change. There is a 
shared responsibility between the central government and its regions, and implementation 
is done in a participatory manner. Sustainable use of forest resources, the plan argues, 
contributes to the productive and performance capacity of the forest. Moreover, the 
resilience of forest ecosystem and sufficient habitat offers tranquility for wild animals. 
The word “capacity” is also used to describe the spreading capacity of invasive alien 
species, and their very high adaptability as well as competitive superiority.  
5.2.3 Africa 
Kenya 
The Kenya NBSAP addresses concerns such as institutional capacities alongside 
biodiversity management incentives, research and training as well as impact assessments. 
The plan presents a clear proposal that capacity building should target law enforcement 
and regulatory agencies for the purposes of enhancing and streamlining implementation 
of environmental policies. The plan highlights the need to strengthen institutional systems 
for collaboration and establish linkages and networks to improve coordination. The plan 
also talks of capacity building in environmental economics, resource accounting, audit 
and valuation of biodiversity at tertiary levels. There is a need to strengthen bio-
prospecting capacity by equipping the national institutions to carry out research relevant 
to biotechnology, technology transfer, communication and linkages. The weaknesses 
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identified in the Kenyan NBSAP include the low capacity for monitoring and evaluation, 
research and training, technical and scientific cooperation.  
Ghana 
The Ghanaian NBSAP is constructed as though biodiversity protection is for the 
international community’s sake rather than as a national tool to protect national 
resources. The plan explains that capacity building is essential to ensuring an in-depth 
assessment of biological resources, promotion of community participation, strengthening 
the management of forests and protected areas. For instance, soil erosion has reduced the 
land carrying capacity, ground water re-charge and regeneration of vegetation in heavily 
settled areas. Further, the Akosombo dam’s generation capacity is hindered by siltation.  
There are initiatives to strengthen institutional capacities to gather and manage 
biodiversity scientific data and information. The plan talks of building human capacities 
at both local and national levels for assessment, conducting studies, ecosystems 
management through long and short-term training courses. There is a proposal to 
strengthen data and information management capacities to control and prevent fires for 
tourist areas and to stay within the resource carrying capacity.  
South Africa 
The word “capacity” was heavily used around institutional capacity building to 
conserve and prevent threats to biodiversity including capacity for sustainable use, access 
to benefit sharing, economic integration and poverty alleviation. However, there exists a 
financial and human resource capacity constraint at the government level. Specifically, 
the government lacks the ability to make negotiations, implement projects, monitor the 
implementation, offer effective participation and conduct risk assessments on Genetically 
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Modified Organisms (GMOs), as well as manage protected areas. On the other hand, 
South Africa is home to well-established research capacity with a number of world 
renowned universities and scientific institutions that present good opportunities for 
biodiversity conservation research, development planning and community empowerment, 
as well as favorable environment for bio-prospecting.  
Land degradation reduces the capacity for resources to regenerate. Across Africa, 
climate change is likely to accentuate social and ecological vulnerability and limit 
resources capacity to adapt to changes in ecosystem functioning. In order to implement 
policy and legislation effectively at local level, institutional and capacities need to be 
addressed. In addition, staff and expertise retention as well as awareness raising programs 
need to be developed. National and provincial agencies should develop common 
objectives, capacity sharing and joint accountability mechanisms for the management of 
habitats, and species across administrative boundaries. So many institutions play a role in 
biodiversity management thus a need for necessary capacity to collate data at genetic, 
species and ecosystem levels, planning and decision making. Various local levels should 
have the capacity to integrate biodiversity considerations into their spatial and economic 
planning. Moreover, they need to review environmental management programs and 
perform self-assessment to implement National Biodiversity Framework in relation to 
geographic and thematic priorities.  
Non-Governmental and Community-Based Organizations are important partners 
in conservation and their capacity building is important. There is also mention of how 
HIV/AIDS impacts upon institutional capacities. The plan talks of strengthening capacity 
for international negotiation by developing common positions with other countries from 
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the region. There is need for improved coordination of programs to build capacity across 
all relevant departments within the government.     
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
The analysis of the DRC NBSAP brings to light the key challenges of biodiversity 
protection that range from the feeling of isolation by national conservationists and trust 
on international organizations, in representing the views of local people to how political 
instability has dealt a big blow to conservation efforts. A lot of conservation challenges 
are due to the civil wars that have plagued the country for close to five decades. The 
feeling of isolation comes from the fact that most conservation programs have not 
involved local experts and citizens. For instance, some of the key protected areas in the 
country were set up without consultation with local people which resulted in the eviction 
of local people without any form of compensation.  
There are indications in the plan of strengthening the management capacity of 
existing protected areas and policy on national parks while taking into account concerns 
of local communities. The plan explains the need for institutional capacity building to 
manage funds as well as enforce legal provisions. The capacity to manage environmental 
conservation requires an effective legal and institutional framework, political will and 
local participation, awareness raising and private sector participation. The DRC is not 
well equipped in all these capacities and lacks structures to bring various sectors together.     
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5.2.4 Asia  
India 
The Indian NBSAP highlights the need for appropriate institutionalization and 
human resource capacity building for all conservation ranging from capacities to 
implement measures for captive breeding to reducing constraints faced by various 
sectors. Sectors as forest sector manpower, management of river basins, grassroots levels 
to enable participatory decision-making and managing invasive alien species at different 
levels need to be strengthened financially, with communications and funding.  
There are plans to help enhance the capacity of climate modeling in the country so 
people can understand the impacts of climate change on biodiversity at national and local 
levels. The country is also seeking technical and financial assistance from multilateral 
agencies for implementing the recommendations pertaining to mapping of ecologically 
sensitive areas along the coastline, control of pollution in the coastal waters from land 
based activities and capacity building and institutional development. Although the 
country has over a period of time developed a stable institutional structure for 
environmental management, there is still need to improve national capacities for 
biodiversity conservation and appropriate use of new technologies  
Jordan 
Jordan is currently building institutional capacities to implement the NBSAP. The 
Jordan NBSAP calls for respect of the environment’s productive capacity. The plan 
begins with highlights of historical land uses saying that land resources have been 
exploited without regard to carrying capacity. The plan argues that there is now improved 
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capacity building in areas of law enforcement and general environmental protection. 
Efforts aimed at building capacities of local ecologists and national capacity in 
conservation and management of biodiversity need to be stepped up. So far, inadequate 
technical and managerial capacity has been a hindrance to the development and 
implementation of protected area laws, policies and planning strategies. There is still 
need for local capacity building in the management of marine resources. The carrying 
capacity of many of the vegetated areas is way below current use for grazing animals as 
well as production capacities of many lands.  Capacity to monitor alien species need 
improvement.  
Although the carrying capacity of many areas has been exceeded, establishing 
limits is fraught with difficulties. Some areas such the embryonic eco-tourism market in 
Jordan could be developed and promoted to support biodiversity protection, there is no 
clear vision or the capacity to ensure that it is developed correctly. Rangelands are 
experiencing management difficulties and there is now a plan to build capacities of range 
managers. There is also a plan for building capacities for economic valuation of 
biodiversity. The country is putting in place a national and human capacity building 
structure to ensure a safe and healthy food and pharmaceutical products, and prevent 
transmission of diseases. Capacity building for the staff and stakeholders of the National 
Cleaner Production Center and Biotechnology is also being developed. 
5.3 Compliance within federally administered countries 
Large countries as well as small ones all seem to fit into one description – local 
and national institutional working relationships are weak and sometimes non-existent. 
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National government agencies are weak and also in some countries too few to mount the 
level of effort that would implement strong conservation initiatives to drive the whole 
world towards higher compliance with CBD goals. Reports from local jurisdictions as 
well as key biodiversity hotspots are missing at national level. Support to local levels is 
weak both in funding as well as capacity building. Investment in human resources, 
appropriate technologies and institutional development is limited. Although Canada, 
India and Australia all have NCHMs, these have not been developed to effectively serve 
these countries.      
5.3.1 Countries with strong presence of conservation organizations  
The presence of international conservation organizations’ headquarters in a 
country does not seem to have significant difference in compliance from other countries. 
One good example is Kenya that is home to the global UNEP headquarters and major 
regional headquarters of both WWF and IUCN. Kenya is one of the least compliant 
countries of the 16 countries analyzed. The Kenya NBSAP was not launched. It is not 
clear who drew the plan. The same plan has not been revised as required by the CBD. 
Other examples are Switzerland, Netherlands and the UK that have continued to over-
exploit their marine resources beyond levels that these can regenerate themselves. One 
interesting observation was that rather than these countries look to investing in 
conservation of national and local resources, they are supporting other countries to 
protect their resources.        
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5.3.2 High capacity countries and compliance levels 
High capacity countries are those that were seen as donors thus providing funding 
for other countries to do conservation. Compliance within these countries was therefore 
expected to be better than most countries. However, the findings from this study were 
disappointingly the opposite. High capacity countries face the same conservation 
challenges as low capacity countries of over-exploitation of biological resources. These 
countries not only over-exploit resources within their jurisdictions but also aid in the 
over-exploitation in other countries through international trade.      
5.3.3 Systems theory and information technology in conservation 
Very few governments have built an equivalent of GBIF at the national level. 
Some governments are not participating in the CHMs. Most are also not publishing their 
own data. Use of IT helps to relay information between different decision points to create 
an interactive environment between sectors, agencies and governments (Myeong & Choi, 
2010). An inclusive strategy encompassing implementation of IT interventions for 
communication, data gathering, sharing and policy evaluation provides a feasible and 
reliable way forward in attaining better results in biodiversity conservation. When 
information and data gaps persist, effective policy implementation suffers, and costs of 
building consensus go up (Esty & Ivanova, 2004).  
The use of information technology across all levels is not developed in most 
countries. Even in countries that have the CHMs, these are merely documentation 
depository warehouses. They are static in the sense that the links do not have updated 
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data, no local reports except a few that have been submitted to the CBD. There is not 
sufficient information to facilitate learning, and are not designed to engage all 
stakeholders effectively.   
5.4 Reconciling conservation initiatives for higher global compliance 
Compliance needs to be seen as a multi-level undertaking ranging from global, 
national to local level implementation. Conservation exists at three levels: global, 
national and local levels. Conservation issues are so different between these levels yet it 
is their sum that can either lead to better protection or continued biodiversity degradation. 
Furthermore, at these different levels, there are numerous sectors, all with very different 
interests. Against the perception that conservation programs are in conflict with both 
development and community needs, conservation initiatives need to be reconciled 
vertically across these levels and horizontally across all interests. Different stakeholders 
across sectors need to be made to feel that biodiversity conservation serves their needs as 
much it serves conservation interests. Only broad policies that address both conservation 
and stakeholder needs can achieve such a goal.       
According to Wilshusen et al. (2002), the moral conservation argument supports 
the idea that the international community should act on behalf of nature in all countries. 
However, there is tension all the time between local and non-local interests. Findings 
from the analysis of NBSAPs, national reports and works of conservation organizations 
demonstrate how the same biodiversity problems are seen differently and how different 
solutions are offered to same problems by different stakeholders. There is a clear 
disconnect in the way conservationists work with governments as well as communities. 
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There is need for an expanded dialogue between all stakeholders to help rank priorities, 
determine the level of commitment required across sectors and how to measure such 
commitments.       
 For many individuals, organizations, private sector institutions and governments, 
the pursuit of profits and economic development are of upmost priority and biodiversity 
conservation needs are secondary (AGF, 2012). The figure 8 below present findings from 
data of people interviewed globally on information how individuals, organizations and 
governments prioritize their interests. These findings do support the analytical findings 
from NBSAPs and various government national reports.    
On average, about 80% of the respondents agree that other national interests take 
precedence over biodiversity protection. At the individual level, decisions are made based 
immediate benefits and economic considerations are given a higher priority over the 
needs of the environment. Respondents that felt that environmental considerations were 
given adequate attention across all sectors averaged about a mere 10%.  
Figure 8: Priorities of most sectors in society 
 
Source: Own Estimates using data from AGF 
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Figure 9 below present findings from a Likert scale data about how countries 
make decisions and the limitations that they are likely to experience when making 
conservation decisions. This analysis also includes findings how international 
organizations facilitate the management of shared interests across countries and various 
sectors. Statements that generated these responses are found in table 28 below and were 
assigned numbers corresponding to the columns in figure 9.    
About 80% of the respondents agreed that national decisions are based on partial 
priorities that often relegate policies that optimize the whole to secondary considerations. 
More than 85% of respondents agreed that national decisions are heavily influenced by 
political, business and organizational interests which in most cases leave out the will of 
the public, who end up shouldering the costs of biodiversity degradation. About 78% of 
the respondents agreed that changes to environmental policies are often met with great 
resistance and as such, there is more support to the business as usual. More than 86% of 
interviewees agreed that International organizations are affected more by the will of 
countries thus fail to optimize their biodiversity protection goals alongside other national 
priorities. About 75% of the respondents also see a problem with the unanimous 
consensus principle especially with the United Nations system and agree that this leads to 
less than optimal decisions. There were more than 79% of the respondents that see the 
lack of international enforcement powers in the hands of international organizations as a 
source of weakness to global coordination. Finally, about 72% of the respondents felt that 
there is need for reforms in both systems and organizational structures so that new 
challenges as a result of environmental degradation can be taken into account.               
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Figure 9:  National decision making does not prioritize biodiversity protection 
 
Sources: Own estimates using data from AGF 
 
Table 28: National decisions give low priority to biodiversity protection 
Numbers Description 
1 National decision-making systems are based on partial optimization 
prioritizing national interests; policies that optimize the whole become 
secondary.
2 National decisions influenced by political, business, and organizational 
interests and do not reflect the will of the public, who shoulder the 
environment.
3 Changes in national policy face great resistance (inertia), and as such it 
tends to stay with business as usual.
4 International organizations like the U.N. are affected by the will of 
countries, and do not optimize the whole.
5 Voting system at the U.N. with its adherence to the fundamental principle 
of unanimous consent, makes decision- making difficult. 
6 International organizations like the U.N. are not provided enforcement 
powers or other forceful methods of coordination. 
7 Systemic and organizational reforms are needed, but have not been 
implemented.
Source: Asahi Glass Foundation  
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Figure 10 below was constructed using data that examined limitations to 
individual decision making at local levels. Information in the figure 10 takes into account 
the societal, cultural and behavioral scientific problems. The responses to the statements 
in table 29 below were used to generate figure four. 
Up to 74% of the respondents to these statements agreed that there is no reference 
point for the natural environment as well as for the different life forms to aid in decision 
making at local/individual levels. About 81% agreed that local and cultural practices that 
give importance to “common resources” are lacking or weak. About 65% of the 
respondents agreed that local practices and traditions that value biological resources 
conservation are few and far in between. There were 61% respondents that said that most 
people have the capacity to recognize environmental conditions and effects on local 
levels but are not able to recognize the same problems globally. About 64% of the 
interviewees agreed that human decision making process is based on the “now” self-
preservation and does not consider that of future generations.  
There was a statement that read “Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed 
by behavioral principles based largely on economic considerations”. To this statement, 
77% of respondents agreed. There were 74% respondents that agreed to the statement that 
value systems that respect one’s own environment as well as daily economic activities are 
not consistent with each other. About 76% of the respondents agreed that current 
lifestyles based on large consumption of resources and energy cannot be abandoned.  
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Figure 10: Support given to biodiversity protection is low  
 
 
Columns one through to eight corresponds to the numbers assigned to the 
statements in table 29 below.  
Table 29: Limitations to individual decision making at local levels 
Columns Corresponding statements  
1 Absence of reverence towards the natural environment and life forms. 
2 Societal and cultural practices and bases that place importance on “common 
good,” like environment, are lacking or fragile. 
3 Societal practices and traditions that value the weak, including environment, 
are few and far between. 
4 At most, people have capacity to recognize environmental conditions and 
effects on local level, but are incapable of recognizing problems globally. 
5 Human decision-making process is based on self-preservation; it does not 
consider happiness of others or of future generations. 
6 Human nature to care for others is overwhelmed by behavioral principles 
based on economic considerations. 
7 Value systems that respect one’s own environment and daily economic activity 
are inconsistent with each other. 
8 Current lifestyles based on large consumption of energy cannot be abandoned. 
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Figure 11 below presents the percentage number of people that agreed and those 
that did agree to statements in table 30. These were statements regarding communication 
between different levels and different sectors.  
About 80% of the respondents agreed that information communicated from 
conservation experts is not easily comprehended by the public. Also, 53% of respondents 
agreed that communication from conservationists is geared more towards political 
decision makers rather than members of the public. Following the same statement, 80% 
of the people who responded agreed that political decision makers do not communicate 
conservation information given to them from conservationists to members of the public. 
Figure 11: Communication in support of global biodiversity conservation is poor 
 
Another important piece of information was that about 77% of respondents agreed 
that members of the public do not value conservation information unless disaster occurs 
in their vicinity. About 50% of the respondents agreed that non-governmental 
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organizations overemphasize communication with political decision makers. In 
communication, a certain level of education is necessary for members of the public to 
understand conservation needs. For this, 79% of the respondents agreed and 6% said this 
was not necessary. About 80% of interviewees also agreed that economic profits get a 
higher consideration in communication much more than environmental concerns.  
Table 30 below presents the Likert scale statements used to generate figure 10. The 
numbers before the statements correspond to the numbers assigned to the columns of the 
figure 10.  
Table 30: Communication and global understanding of biodiversity conservation 
Columns Statements 
1 Easily comprehensible information is not communicated from 
conservation experts to the public  
2 Environmental experts focus communication of information too heavily 
upon political decision makers, failing to reach the public 
3 Political decision makers do not communicate information from 
environmental experts to the public 
4 Public does not value the information provided by environmental experts 
unless disaster occurs in their vicinity 
5 Non-profit organizations overemphasize Communications efforts on 
political decision makers 
6 Certain education level is necessary for understanding of environmental 
information, and environmental education is lacking 
7 The economic profits of a corporation, organization, or a region are 
prioritized so much that environmental considerations are not taken into 
account. 
 
Table 31 below shows a big difference between those that agree that aspects of 
biodiversity protection are good and those that disagree that conservation is not being 
implemented. Going by these findings, majority of the people seem to disagree that 
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enough efforts, programs, effective decisions, good communication and capacities exist 
to reverse biodiversity degradation. 
Table 31: Reconciling different levels and different sectors  
N = 1009  Agree  Disagree 
 
Figure 1 
1 13 79 
2 12 83 
3 15 80 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
1 10 80 
2 6 86 
3 9 78 
4 7 86 
5 11 75 
6 12 79 
7 10 71 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
1 13 74 
2 10 81 
3 15 65 
4 25 61 
5 18 64 
6 12 77 
7 11 74 
8 32 76 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
1 12 80 
2 26 53 
3 9 80 
4 15 77 
5 17 50 
6 8 79 
7 15 80 
  Source: Estimated using data from Asahi Glass Foundation 
These can be viewed as indications that not enough is being done to take all 
countries to higher compliance and there not enough support given conservation 
programs. The big question then is why with such high mobilization of governments 
215 
 
globally, conservation organizations, and other experts, is biodiversity conservation 
facing huge challenges? Estimating the overall differences between those that agree and 
those that disagree, 14% agree and 75% disagree. This brings a total to 89%. Those are 
neutral were only 11%. This is an insignificant figure to tilt overall perceptions and 
opinions. The conclusion is that more people share the idea that more needs to be done.  
The high percentage of people that disagree with existing conservations practices 
which does not in general optimize the whole confirms hypothesis 2b which was stated 
as: National and local environmental policies that evolve on the basis of shared meaning 
at all levels and across sectors and institutions have a higher rate of acceptance and would 
therefore lead to high levels of compliance with CBD goals.  
5.5 Theory in biodiversity conservation 
International relations theories try to galvanize global governmental cooperation 
to develop solutions to conservation problems, but this is only the first steps. Galvanizing 
global cooperation need to be accompanied with innovation, education and training, and 
transparency in order to be able to break away from traditional belief systems and 
mindsets of self-interest behavior. Findings from compliance levels established by this 
research show the clear need for cooperation as various countries have specific 
weaknesses and strengths in biodiversity protection. The 20 criteria used in determining 
compliance levels show the need for institutional cooperation within countries. 
Biodiversity protection must and should have the support of various institutions across 
different levels and sectors working together.  
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Governments as well as all other organizations involved in biodiversity protection 
need to know all available conservation options from other stakeholders. This is 
information is not often available, thus making it difficult to arrive at appropriate 
decisions. For instance, it is not enough to ask communities to implement conservation 
programs if there no clearly established compensation mechanisms for reduced/lost 
biodiversity benefits. People are not empowered and key supportive institutions are either 
too weak or missing all together. It is at this point that the wheels of biodiversity 
protection begin to grind to a stop. National and local capacities within countries need to 
be continuously improved so as to effectively address biodiversity challenges.         
5.6 Systems theory in biodiversity protection 
According  to AGF  (2012),  there  is a  limit  to conservationists being able  to 
speak  to people outside of  the  field  in  a  language  that  is  easily understandable. 
People in governments, private sector institutions and communities should also be 
able to speak a conservation  language alongside other priorities within their own 
settings.  What  is  needed  is  properly  trained  science  communicators,  policy 
developers  and  effective  implementers  (AGF,  2012)  across  different  levels  and 
sectors. 
For example, The South Africa NBSAP (2006) asserts that scientific experts, 
policy makers and local policy implementers should be able to work together to 
determine the carrying capacity of a specific area or resource. Such carrying capacity 
cannot be defined in absolute terms because of the dynamic nature of resources use. It is 
only after the carrying capacity of a specific area has been established that managers are 
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able to provide appropriate forms of management to ensure that use of that area is kept 
within sustainable limits. Local communities need to have the capacity also not just to 
understand the management aspects but to also be able to implement remedial measures 
should the carrying capacity be exceeded at some stage. This means that local level 
institutions should be able to understand and establish standards that a farmland can 
withstand without acceptable physical damage, or how much water can be taken from an 
aquifer without going beyond recharge level, or how much pollution rivers can withstand 
before the fish are killed.    
In the context of information management, the CBD can be viewed as a decider 
subsystem (Miller, 1978). Wang (2004) argues that the decider is an information process 
sub-system which receives, in this case, reports, plans and data from all other sub-
systems and transmits information outputs for guidance, coordination and management of 
the whole global structure. The relationship between the CBD, its member countries and 
local institutions can be viewed as a living system. Information Technology facilitates 
communication across these systems otherwise known as countries, and facilitates global, 
national and local coordination. Governments with information, policy and data rich 
websites will enhance local level biodiversity protection through better communication, 
sharing ideas and feedback (Witzel, 2012). The systems concept is a presentation of how 
the different units/structures in different hierarchies within an organization interact and 
manipulate when it is convenient or adopt the organization to the external environmental 
demands (Almaney, 1974). 
The level of support in financial terms, technical, education and communication 
given to national governments should be replicated within countries to their local levels. 
218 
 
The people and institutions at all levels in society should have a sound understanding of 
how vulnerable and fragile various species and ecosystems are to land use changes. It is 
important to communicate and explain conservation to all sectors at all levels of society 
so as to sufficient supply knowledge that can bring positive changes and change 
perceptions of people on biodiversity conservation. How such communication is done 
needs a thorough analysis and evaluation.  
There is inertia in the public and private institutions, and community beliefs 
against movement towards adoption of stronger biodiversity policies (Bickford et al. 
2012). Partly, the problem is due to low environmental literacy thus no shared meaning 
and this makes it difficult for stakeholders and consumers to make informed decisions 
that support conservation (Bickford et al. 2012; Jordan et al. 2009). What is needed is 
more effective communication and outreach. In addition to my study, other studies have 
found big gaps between knowledge and action and efforts should be placed upon making 
everybody engaged in lifestyles that reduce this gap (Bickford et al. 2012; Daily and 
Matson, 2008). Higher level of environmental literacy correlates with a higher degree of 
supportive lifestyles and small gaps between knowledge and action (Bickford et al. 2012; 
Rickinson, 2001). 
Brechin et al. (2003) makes a compelling argument that biodiversity protection is 
a social and political process requiring human organization. Interactions among 
governments at global level need to recognize the strong links between human wellbeing 
and biodiversity. Ecologically sound conservation programs also need to be socially and 
politically feasible, and morally just (Brechin et al. 2003). 
219 
 
5.7 Application of game theory strategies 
From a practical point of view, game theory approach to conservation is a 
continuous exercise that does not limit any country from cooperating with any other 
country. It is therefore possible that countries will cooperate with several other countries 
simultaneously.  For purposes of this study, two assumptions were made: (1) two players 
are cooperating at any given time (2) these players are not in competition with each other 
but want to support each other to move to more efficient outcomes/higher compliance.  
When players (donors and implementers) base their conservation priorities on 
self-interests, both follow a maximin (low-risk) strategy. With a maximin strategy, a 
player would determine the lowest outcome for each option, and then choose the option 
that provides the highest benefit at the expense of the other player. Conservation is thus 
driven into the prisoner’s dilemma situation which is characterized with a free-rider 
problem. As for biodiversity conservation, best strategies would be when countries 
cooperate and support each other at conservation points that lead to highest compliance 
for the two cooperating players.      
5.7.1 Cooperation and consensus compared  
The best conclusion to draw from maximin strategic cooperation between various 
countries was that conservation through cooperation allows countries to carry on with 
many aspects of conservation that they feel are their best strategies or have the capacity 
to handle. Those aspects that specific countries are weak in are identified and therefore 
can get supported under a cooperative arrangement.  
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Under international relations theories, conservation through a managed consensus 
is not structured to identify strengths and weaknesses of specific countries. This is 
because different parties come to a negotiation table often to win an argument. This leads 
to less than optimal decisions for some countries. Parties to the negotiation could easily 
be made to surrender their strong capacities and instead be made to implement strategies 
that they have no advantage. It is not easy to determine areas that may need more support 
under a negotiation.    
This outcome supports hypothesis 2 which was stated that Biodiversity protection 
efforts undertaken cooperatively leads to higher compliance with CBD goals. 
5.8 Opportunity costs of biodiversity protection  
Opportunity cost estimates presented in this study was based on the number of 
hectares a country has either in deficit or in surplus. There exist several types of costs and 
categories that various policy actions can take into consideration. The findings by this 
study on opportunity costs may not reflect the full range of variables that could go into 
measuring conservation costs. These findings by this study are very important in 
determining compensation levels by biodiversity deficit countries. Financial support to 
biodiversity protection by countries should be calculated based first on the deficit status 
of each country, secondly, on the country’s level of development. Every country should 
compensate for biodiversity protection the equivalent of its biodiversity deficit. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
6.0 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter brings together all the key findings regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of biodiversity protection globally. The challenges that the CBD faces and 
the ways governments are managing conservation programs have been summarized. 
Limitations, the gaps and policy implication of the findings from this research are also 
explained.       
6.1 Introduction 
My research examined a broad and yet focused biodiversity conservation 
strategies globally. It was broad enough to bring to light the extent to which the CBD has 
influenced conservation of biodiversity by countries.  Yet, the study conducted a detailed 
investigation into the extent to which the global policies penetrated into local levels 
within countries to effect changes.  I argue that it is not enough to for countries to send 
representatives to treaty conferences, draw national plans, submit reports and claim that 
treaty goals are being implemented at all levels from global to local levels based on 
written words. The drawing of plans and writing of reports is the first step in a very long 
and difficult journey towards implementation of goals and compliance.    
It was against this background that my study was designed to analyze multiple 
levels of CBD implementation. I have examined how globally designed biodiversity 
conservation policies are adapted into national programs and then passed down to local 
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settings where they are implemented. Implementation and compliance was divided into 
three levels: (i) global compliance; (ii) national compliance; and (iii) local compliance. 
The requirement to comply with the CBD goals at these three levels was found to be very 
different taking into account different actions on the part of those implementing the goals 
of the convention. What emerged was that those involved in both decision making and 
negotiations at different levels wanted to see final policy decisions that satisfied their 
own interests first. Although conservation outcomes have been clearly stated by the CBD, 
parties have been conducting negotiations without a model that is able to align global 
conservation interests with national and local interests, and private sector priorities.  
Key variables that most influence implementation and compliance at global, 
national and local levels were examined. Ways to reconcile local, national and global 
conservation challenges were analyzed. Two variables that emerged as the most 
influential and also that appeared to present numerous conservation challenges were 
communication and national capacities. Although the CBD has well-established 
information sharing tools, these have not been replicated by national governments to 
allow for sufficient sharing of knowledge between sectors and governments. Global 
biodiversity conservation policies have not been localized. This was evidenced by the 
complete lack of data that links global conservation initiatives and national policies to 
local level implementation.  
Hathaway (2005) argues that countries with robust domestic institutions on one 
hand can have better implementation. At the same time such countries are more reluctant 
to commit themselves to international treaties. However, findings from this research point 
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to who actually makes the decisions. If decisions are made at national level without 
structures that involve local level institutions, implementation of the CBD goals will 
remain problematic. Commitments to international treaties should be clearly worked at 
local levels using support mechanisms ranging from funding, actual capacity building and 
developing information sharing tools.                  
6.2 Historical context 
International treaties are created and recognized through the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969. The Vienna Convention was entered into force on 
January 27, 1980 and has been ratified by more than 100 countries. Since then, more than 
500 international treaties dealing with environmental problems have been created 
(UNEP, 2008). However, the rising number of treaties being created has not translated 
into greater achievement of environmental conservation (CBD, 2010). It is clear that with 
the rising number of treaties, environmental challenges are increasing too.   
It was with this knowledge in mind that the CBD was created at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992 and entered into force on December 29, the same year. 
Under the CBD, conservation of biological diversity is recognized as a common concern 
of all countries and as an integral part of economic development. The treaty covers all 
ecosystems, species and genetic resources and links traditional conservation efforts to the 
economic goals of using biological resources sustainably under the guidance of national 
governments (Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, 2010).  
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After a period of more than two decades, tremendous amount of awareness has 
been created but there is void in exactly how countries should proceed with 
implementation of the CBD goals and the nature of specific actions that countries should 
take to increase compliance. It should not be because the international law lacks 
enforcement powers within countries as this is technically fulfilled once countries sign 
the treaty and agree to abide with it. Guzman (2014) argues that treaty obligations should 
be taken in many small, low cost and observable steps toward compliance and not one big 
single obligation.  
Findings from this study indicate that there is much more that needs to go into just 
one small step that is taken to conserve biodiversity. Some countries do not simply have 
the capacity and funding to facilitate implementation of specific actions. Second, there 
are also those that have the capacity but have not made biodiversity protection their 
priority. Thirdly, many countries are in very huge biological capacity deficit but have 
instead chosen to focus their efforts to support other countries. The big problem is that 
the level of support given to other countries is so insignificant because this is a mere 
fraction of what it would take to bring donor countries out of the biological deficit. As of 
2008, the European countries in this study are in deficit of biological capacity going into 
a negative of about 3.4 million hectares. Asian countries and Australia combined are 
running a negative of 765,000 hectares.   
6.2.1 International treaties’ effectiveness 
Going by the findings of this study, one cannot qualify the CBD as having been 
very successful in all aspects of biodiversity protection. Compliance by all countries was 
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found to be at about 35%. Implementation of the CBD goals at local levels cannot be 
evaluated using information and data from the CBD documents. Such data is unavailable. 
Countries have not invested in data collection surveys to facilitate estimation of trends 
and losses of biological resources. It is extremely difficult to make good judgment and 
develop policies on the basis of unreliable, insufficient or missing information. It is 
therefore correct to make an assumption that the CBD may not know how and to what 
extent implementation has been carried out at local levels.  
Information gathered from country reports generally highlights various obstacles 
to achieving the 2010 biodiversity protection targets. These were weak governance in 
particular, lack of law enforcement and focusing on direct drivers of biodiversity loss 
rather than underlying causes. Looking beyond the 2010 biodiversity protection targets, 
governments need to re-position themselves to address these specific challenges.  
It is also clear that the convention has had some tremendous first few successful 
steps. The CBD has mobilized global governments and is now the international treaty 
with highest membership of 195 countries. Each of these countries has a developed 
National Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan (NBSAP) and some countries have made up 
to four revisions to the original plan. All these countries have submitted from between 
one to four national reports explaining national progress and problems countries are 
facing. These are indications that discussions are being conducted at national level, 
information is being shared and knowledge passed to facilitate effective conservation.  
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6.3 Global biodiversity protection initiatives 
So many global initiatives aimed at improving biodiversity protection efforts have 
been developed.  These initiatives range from public-private partnerships, creation of 
ministries and government agencies targeting conservation of environmental resources, 
pushing for legislation, seeking funding opportunities and developing human resources.  
These initiatives face numerous challenges though.  Global economic inequality 
and the number of people living in poverty at the rate of one dollar per day declined in 
the 1990s from 1.3 billion to 1.2 billion (World Bank, 2007). However, a large majority 
of people in developing countries that are also rich in biodiversity are still living in 
poverty and depend on land based resources (World Bank, 2007). There is a tremendous 
pressure to expand agricultural land in both developed and developing countries (World 
Bank, 2007). Expanding agriculture in the developing world will put high pressures on 
many ecosystems that support biodiversity. It is a well-known fact that greatest threat to 
forests, wetlands, mountains and biodiversity is the expansion of agricultural land due to 
increasing demand for food and loss of arable land due to over-intensive cultivation 
(World Bank, 2007) 
6.3.1 Sustainable use of biodiversity 
Sustainable use is one of the primary goals of the CBD which also relates to 
consumption and how natural resources are used. Sustainable use is a strong assurance 
for the protection of biodiversity which guarantees use of resources now without 
depletion so that there is some left for future generations. From the literature and data 
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examined in this study, it is not clear how and what governments are doing to find ways 
and design sustainable use programs at both national and local levels.  
The challenges facing the CBD under the goal of sustainable use is that rather 
than countries devise policies that bring about fundamental changes into the growth 
oriented cultural paradigm, the policies being developed are only producing reforms at 
policy level with insignificant impact at implementation levels. Over time, there has been 
an increase in high-sounding rhetoric and numerous environmental legislations in many 
countries but economic growth through over-exploitation of biodiversity has continued to 
be the focal political agenda (Rees, 2003). Going by the level of compliance globally as 
estimated in this study, it might be necessary to advocate for much stronger conservation 
measures than sustainable use approach. This is one of the surest ways to bring most 
countries that are both in biological deficit status to surplus and low compliant countries 
to at least 50% compliance level.     
6.3.2 Implications of global biodiversity deficit  
Overexploitation of biodiversity occurs because there is need to satisfy both local 
needs as well as supply for the deficits in other regions and countries. The status of 
biological resources globally is estimated to be in deficit by about 0.9 hectares per person 
(GFN, 2013). Most developed countries have very high biological resources deficits. In 
addition, local level compliance as per my study is at 14%. Global and national 
consumption of biodiversity does influence local level interests and thus compliance. 
Large-scale national and international trade undertaken by pharmaceutical companies, the 
timber industry, high fossil fuel use and land demanded by agriculture are all meant to 
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take resources from biodiversity rich to deficit regions. Compensation for the supply of 
biodiversity from rich to deficit countries is not based on the need to ensure sustainable 
use but rather on the economic concept of supply as much as possible and obtain 
maximum payment from the sale by supplying countries.  
 Examining this situation from an economic standard theory, the sharing of 
biological resources can be divided into two attributes: (i) the extent to which one 
country’s consumption reduces the supply available to other countries (ii) the extent to 
which access to the use of biological resources can be controlled so that it is not 
overexploited (excludability) (Polski, 2005). Controlled use is the most difficult since 
there are no mechanisms except trade that show how regions or countries share biological 
resources to eliminate the biodiversity deficits. Trade between regions or countries is not 
based on fair compensation of actual resources used. There is really no way of telling if 
countries that consume more do care about how much is left for other countries. This is 
demonstrated by the low compliance at local levels.    
To adequately explain the challenges that come with overexploitation of 
biological resources, the study used the figure 12 below. This is a two-by-two matrix with 
high and low scales of typical consumptive resources (Polski, 2005). This figure presents 
public resources that have low subtractability and low excludability, club (toll) resources 
that have low subtractability and high excludability, private resources with high 
subtractability and high excludability and common pool resources with high 
subtractability and low excludability. Biological resources easily fit into the four sections 
of the matrix below depending on the type of ownership and the specific resource.  
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Figure 12 below explains the complexity of overexploitation of biodiversity either 
through controlled use or developing effective compensation mechanisms. Existing 
compensation mechanisms based on trade ignore many aspects of overexploitation. These 
include the justification for consumption on the basis that it is paid for at a price agreed 
between the buyer and the seller. As most literature has mentioned, there is no well-
developed value of biodiversity thus making it difficult to determine a just pay to control 
use.   
Figure 12: The difficulties in managing biodiversity deficits 
 
High 
Consumption 
Subtractability (Supply) 
Low 
Low     High 
   Consumption Excludability (Access) 
Source: Modified from Polski, 2005 
 
Resources at high subtractability region are those whose quantity is reduced in 
direct proportion to the quantity consumed. The supply of resources with a perfect 
subtractability can only be sustained if management institutions can provide incentives to 
sustain adequate supply to meet the demand. It is the demand that drives how the 
resource is managed and not sustainable use.   
Resources located at high excludability region are those whose access can be 
controlled at a low cost. Consumers of such goods cannot just take or consume without 
Common Pool 
Public 
Private 
Club (Toll) 
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paying for their supply. Suppliers of these resources are incentivized to invest and 
produce enough to meet the demand. Once again, the desire is to overexploit in order to 
meet the demand.       
Biological resources are private when owned by an individual or corporations, 
they are common pool resources when communally owned, they are public when owned 
by the government and club when controlled by just a few owners and a small group of 
individuals/corporations.  When they are considered private, control and use cannot be 
interfered with because that could be considered a violation of private rights in many 
countries. The benefits of private properties cannot be shared freely.  Under club (toll) 
ownership, when it is costly or difficult to control access, consumers are able to “free-
ride” effectively removing supplier’s incentives to invest in the future production. When 
biological resources fall under the public resources classification, they have low 
subtractability and low excludability and therefore will be undersupplied in the private 
sector. The ownership and management of natural resources is in most cases inconsistent 
with actual political and economic conditions of a place. The management of biological 
resources cannot simply be a stated goal but there is need for an expanded dialogue 
between all stakeholders to establish monitoring systems, measurement criteria and 
effective compensation schemes.   
According to Polski (2005), natural resources governing institutions are more 
nested in numerous systems such as unified forms of self-governance by individual or 
collective entities. These may include citizens, corporations, NGOs and government 
agencies. Collective entities also can take other forms such as centralized, decentralized 
or polycentric institutions or market mechanisms such as tradable quotas. This makes it 
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difficult to determine compensation levels. Governments have not made any attempt to 
develop structures that would facilitate equitable sharing of the benefits of biodiversity.              
6.4 Measuring compliance and implementation 
The broad goal of my research was to analyze implementation of the goals of the 
CBD and estimate compliance by parties. The key challenge to my study was the lack of 
agreed standard measures for program implementation and compliance. The study 
designed two types of measures for international and national compliance; one based on 
score card approach and the other was based on identified criteria which were determined 
from NBSAPs and national reports providing information about local implementation.  
Measuring local compliance was rather problematic because of missing data and reports. 
The option sought was to identify primary data collected by the ASAHI Glass Foundation 
from local level conservation program implementation. To see compliance in more 
details, it was divided into three levels: paper, policy and implementation compliance.        
Measuring compliance was meant to show the level of influence of the CBD on 
countries, status of biodiversity and implementation of global policies at local levels. 
Most existing measures use direct measurement of species. These measures are the Red 
List developed by IUCN and the Living Planet Index developed by WWF (Barbault, 
2010). Using species as a measure of the health of biodiversity tells just the scientific 
story leaving out social, economic and political aspects of biodiversity protection. The 
criteria used to measure compliance at national level by my study looked at 
implementation, what countries are doing and how they are developing specific goals, 
objectives and initiatives across various conservation elements. The 20 criteria of 
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compliance provided a broad and long-term picture of biodiversity protection from the 
perspective of science, policy, politics, economics and communities. There is a big gap 
between the role of communities and the scientific community, political leadership and 
economic considerations. Ways to reconcile interests across sectors were also analyzed.             
6.4.1 Paper compliance 
Compliance requirements at the CBD level can be defined as merely paper and 
talk compliance, it is a participatory process meant to mobilize talks and conservations 
that set agendas. Countries define and identify commitments to specified goals and 
negotiate action strategies and partnerships with other stakeholders. Countries are 
required to abide with the treaty by merely signing to the treaty, submitting plans, reports 
and also attend conferences. Although paper compliance was found to be at about 64%, 
this does not actually reflect what actually takes place within countries as well as 
compliance at country levels.    
6.4.2 National compliance 
Compliance at national level, defined by my study as policy compliance, is much 
more than paper compliance. This is where policies are made, institutions are created, 
legislation is enacted, management staffs are hired and coordination structures are 
created. Strong national leadership bolsters local level conservation efforts. Every 
government must be a part of the local solutions to conservation problems through 
coordination, training, reporting, funding and technological support.   
National compliance should both define and create the intersection between 
policy development and implementation. At this intersection, guidelines for 
implementation and appraisal standards to help strengthen local capacities and 
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implementation should be developed. Potential trade-offs and conflicts of   interests 
between various stakeholders are identified and goals that take all stakeholders to higher 
understanding discussed. At the moment, there is no clear relationship between national 
policies development and local level implementation. The national mechanisms for 
taking conservation policies to local levels are not strong while local level institutions 
have no adequate capacity to implement conservation programs. This is demonstrated by 
the compliance gap at national level which is about 50% and local level compliance of 
14%.    
6.4.3 Local compliance 
There was no data and information in the NBSAPs and national reports on 
specific program implementation in all the countries analyzed to facilitate analysis of 
compliance at local levels.  There were no specific local reports about local level 
implementation. Either very little is going on and therefore there is nothing to report from 
local levels or reporting structures are not developed in most countries. I would like to 
reiterate that there exists conservation programs in many local levels but most community 
institutions have no sufficient capacities to develop reporting structures, collect data, 
analyze and report.  
National governments have not provided standards to guide program design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. There is need for clear negotiations with 
explicit interventions, expectations of all stakeholders and positions with regard to 
balancing local needs with biodiversity protection. National governments should ask all 
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international and local conservation organizations to report to a central depository where 
these reports are made accessible to all stakeholders.  
6. 5 Policy implications 
The ongoing debates on biodiversity conservation bring out the intertwined 
relationships between the political, social and economic interpretations of both the 
perceptions on the status and scientific understanding of the management of natural 
resources (Rosenau, 1993; Brechin et al. 2002). Results from this research indicate that 
compliance still remains very low, coordination at national level is weak and capacities of 
many institutions are low. The challenges of biodiversity protection therefore should 
involve without exclusion of scientific conservation experts, national political institutions 
and communities. Herein again lies the problem because most communities and local 
level institutions not only fall short in various capacities, there is also disconnect in the 
re-alignment of priorities. There is a need to develop policies to bring about a common 
position across sectors. There is a need to have a shared meaning and also reconciled 
priorities across levels and sectors in society.  
Self-interest behavior by countries has greatest influence on country decisions 
when it comes to support both within and across countries. Although the benefits of 
protecting biodiversity are clearly understood, free-riding by countries and high 
consumption sectors is still seen as something beneficial. There is need to develop 
policies and clearly compensation mechanisms to cap free-riders and also ask high 
consumers for a just compensation to suppliers of biological resources.          
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6.6 Limitations of the study 
Measuring compliance with the CBD goals should take into account many more 
factors beyond government plans, reports and works of conservation organizations. The 
compliance analysis presented here though credible, could as well be a partial 
compliance. The Millenium Ecosystems Assessment, for example, measures ecosystem 
services using the quality of ecosystem services. Ecosystem services come from 
biological resources. The quality and quantity of ecosystem services are good indicators 
of biodiversity status. Major losses of ecosystem services in various countries should be 
included in measuring compliance. The IUCN measures biodiversity using the number of 
species. WWF measures biodiversity using the Living Planet Index. What needs to be 
included in measuring compliance is a topic for future research. There is a well-
developed methodology for measuring compliance. 
The economic value of biodiversity does not exist. This makes measuring losses 
as well as developing compensation mechanisms more difficult. The current use of the 
number of hectares available to every individual (GFN, 2008) does not give a true status 
of biodiversity in every country. This method takes into account the size of the country 
regardless of the quality of land to support biological resources.   
There are no clearly established methods of measuring compliance. Many 
disciplines involved in biodiversity protection are likely to establish their measurement 
criteria leading to more confusion on the exact level of compliance. Establishing 
standards of measuring compliance is left for future researchers.       
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6.7 Conclusions 
The pre-2010 biodiversity protection strategies have had tremendous impact on 
the relationship between countries and the CBD but not so much at local levels within 
countries. Global structures that bring all countries, conservation organizations and 
public-private partnerships together have been established under the CBD. Detailed 
conservation plans and action strategies have been developed, and commitments by 
countries to specific goals and objectives made. Although there seems to be heightened 
conservation activities globally, there is insignificant impact at local level 
implementation. This is partly because of inadequate capacities as well as giving higher 
priority to other needs.        
Going by the estimated compliance level and the approach that countries have 
taken to implement biodiversity protection goals, it is unlikely there is going be any 
improvement going into the future. There are numerous weaknesses and capacity 
challenges that countries have not addressed in their plans. In order to increase the local 
level compliance, the study recommends a set of robust policies that build local capacity, 
incentivize local resource owners, and implement biodiversity protection programs that 
are akin to local needs and aspirations.     
The current global conservation efforts should not lose sight of the past 
conservation challenges as new targets are set and plans begin to be revised. As long as 
the capacity challenges of each country are not identified specifically and addressed, not 
so much will be achieved. Secondly, communication between conservation experts, 
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government agencies, policy makers, communities and NGOs remains weak and un-
coordinated.  
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) has played a very active and constructive 
global environmental role to bring governments together to debate, draw national plans 
and build national conservation institutions. Going forward, more attention should be 
paid to domestic economic and political factors as these are the ones that have ultimately 
shaped local policies towards biodiversity protection challenges. There is not much in 
terms of reporting on local level implementation and compliance. Depending on how 
implementation is done at local levels, overall conservation outcomes can only get worse 
than what it is at present. There is a need to do more on reporting, planning and 
information sharing. Progress has also been constrained by inadequate funding for 
conservation programs and weak enforcement of environmental laws. This is also 
because of inadequately trained human resources.        
Turning to the results of this research, compliance is lowest at local levels, is 
slightly better at national level and much better at the international level. This is an 
indication that both the international community and national governments need to give 
more support towards local level conservation initiatives. Insufficient national and local 
capacities, funding deficiencies, communication problems and coordination challenges 
are not adequately planned for in most NBSAPs.   
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